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Abstract 
This study tests whether the consensus on German foreign policy continuity after unification 
is applicable to foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the involvement 
is complicated by historical legacies resulting from the Holocaust, and includes an evaluation 
of realist and constructivist theories. An interpretative case study with comparative insights 
from EU, UK and French foreign policy considers three cases in the pre- and two in the post-
unification period: the 1967 War, the 1982 Israel-Lebanon War and the 1987 Intifada; and 
the Red-Green Coalition period from 2000-2005 and the Grand Coalition period from 2005-
2009 respectively. The hypothesis of foreign policy continuity caused primarily by an elite 
level norm of philo-Zionism is confirmed, although a constructivist reading needs to also ac-
knowledge rational liberal norm compliance. European integration and national interests are 
further determinants of German foreign policy towards the conflict, whereas transatlantic re-
lations and U.S. involvement have merely an enabling or obstructing impact on the success 
of German (and European) policy. While the findings support constructivism and illustrate 
the salience of norms in German foreign policy making, they also demonstrate the limitations 
of the civilian power model, which is at the core of the constructivist continuity thesis. 
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Introduction 
German unification in 1990 was an epic event with global implications that sparked 
lively debates about the future of Europe. Realists predicted instability, conflict and a bellige-
rent Germany; constructivists a continuation of the pre-1989 trends of peaceful coexistence 
and stability, including a tame Germany. Consequently, the debate over change and continui-
ty has been the major theme in the literature on German foreign policy since unification, with 
continuity generally found to be dominant. My thesis tests whether this consensus on conti-
nuity is applicable to German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is 
not commonly addressed within the change and continuity framework. As Germany’s foreign 
policy is commonly described as being constrained by German history, my constructivist hy-
pothesis is that historical narratives pertaining to the Holocaust and World War II caused the 
emergence of a norm of philo-Zionism at the elite level in the aftermath of World War II, 
which continues to inform German foreign policy towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict after unification. An assessment of constructivist and realist theories and their appli-
cability to German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be a central as-
pect of this thesis. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Jewish and Israeli observers were particular-
ly wary of the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic. The prospect of a united and powerful Germany brought back memories of the Ho-
locaust and World War II and thus sparked fears about the security of Jews in Germany 
(Gilman, 1991; O Dochartaigh, 2007). On a more symbolic dimension, people feared that the 
dominant historical narrative of the Holocaust would be replaced by a new, entirely German-
centered perspective that would “forget” the past: the long-desired reunification of a people 
2 
separated for most of the Cold War period. Jewish misgivings were reinforced by the fact 
that the date the Berlin Wall came down, November 9, was the same as that of Reichskris-
tallnacht in 1938, commonly regarded as the onset of Nazi Germany’s “Final Solution to the 
Jewish Question.” Such refocusing would, of course, also have very real implications for the 
German-Jewish and the German-Israeli relationships, which had always been grounded firm-
ly in the Shoah1
But Jews and Israelis were not alone in their skepticism. Realists (Mearsheimer, 
1990; Waltz, 1993) feared a German return to the pursuit of power politics and predicted that 
Germany would acquire nuclear weapons and pursue a more unilateral foreign policy while 
abandoning the European project. Mearsheimer (1990) even suggested that Poland and Aus-
tria might once more face German aggression. On the other hand, constructivists (Maull, 
1990/91; Rittberger, 1992; Markovits & Reich, 1993) predicted that Germany would not re-
linquish its commitment to multilateralism, European integration and its status as a civilian 
power, all of which had been characteristic of the post-World War II Bonn Republic. In-
creases in German power would be concentrated in the economic realm, and Germany’s en-
suing regional economic hegemony would be benign rather than aggressive. 
 (Gilman, 1991). These concerns were amplified by the fact that the GDR 
had been very hostile towards Israel for most of its existence, condemning Zionism as bour-
geois nationalism and chauvinism and Israel as a racist, imperialist aggressor state (Timm, 
2000). 
Consistent with the constructivist position, I hypothesize that the foreign policy of the 
Berlin Republic has been characterized by continuity rather than change as it is firmly 
grounded in history-derived norms. I will apply this theory of continuity to the Israeli-
                                                 
1 Shoah is the Hebrew word for the Holocaust. The two terms will be used interchangeably. 
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Palestinian conflict, with the underlying assumption being that German foreign policy to-
wards Israel is informed by a sense of historic responsibility, derived from the Shoah. The 
German case is interesting precisely because of the intervening event of unification, and the 
expansion of the material power base and acquisition of full sovereignty that came with it, 
which rendered the Berlin Republic an “almost ideal test case” (Rittberger, 2001, p. 2) or an 
“easy case” (Malici, 2006, p. 40) for realism. 
  
4 
Literature Review 
Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis 
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) and international relations (IR) have since the 1950s 
been disconnected fields of study (Kubalkova, 2001; Houghton, 2007). Mainstream IR scho-
lars, most notably realists, traditionally “black box” the state, i.e. they treat states as rational 
and unitary actors and study their interactions in the international system from a systemic 
point of view (Kubalkova, 2001; Hudson, 2005). FPA scholars, on the other hand, open the 
black box and study the impact of domestic politics and attributes within the state on foreign 
policy behavior, while also increasingly drawing on IR theories (Kubalkova, 2001; Kaarbo, 
Lantis, & Beasley, 2002). Decision-making by individual or group actors, the foreign policy 
elites, is at the core of FPA (Hudson, 2005; Houghton, 2007). Foreign policy decision-
making is assumed to be influenced by multiple factors at multiple levels of analysis, i.e. at 
the individual, domestic and international levels. Because of the comprehensiveness of units 
of analysis and factors involved, FPA draws on sociology, psychology, anthropology, eco-
nomics and other fields and is therefore interdisciplinary and integrative in orientation 
(Hudson, 2005). While FPA is disconnected from major IR theories and can thus be seen as 
both “without a home” and “its own home” (Houghton, 2007, p. 25), constructivist scholars 
in particular see the potential of bringing FPA and IR back together (Kubalkova, 2001; 
Hudson, 2005; Houghton, 2007). 
Constructivism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to dominant interna-
tional relations theories, putting into focus “the content and source of state interests and the 
social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998, p. 324). Ideas, values and intersubjective un-
derstandings figure prominently. Actors attach meanings to objects, including other actors, 
and act towards them according to that meaning (Wendt, 1992). For constructivists, the world 
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and the political environment in which states interact are therefore not only material but also 
socially constructed. The international political structure is a social one (Checkel, 1998; 
Houghton, 2007; Holsti). 
Social practices “reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social struc-
tures and actors alike” (Hopf, 1998, p. 178). Once a social fact has been established by ac-
tors, it “influences their subsequent social behavior” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 858). While agents 
play a central role in establishing the social structures within which they interact they cannot 
be considered autonomous from them. Agents and structures mutually constitute each other 
(Wendt, 1987; Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1996; Checkel, 1998; Ruggie, 1998; Fierke, 2007; 
Houghton, 2007).2
State identities are thus considered endogenous to interaction (Wendt, 1992; 
Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 1998; Hopf, 1998) and are shaped by collective ideas and other 
ideational factors, such as norms (Houghton, 2007). States’ interests, in turn, are not seen as 
unproblematic and given but as informed by these identities (Wendt, 1992; Hopf, 1998; 
Houghton, 2007). In short, norms are not only regulative, i.e. they specify behavior, but also 
constitutive, i.e. they shape identities and interests (Finnemore, 1996; Jepperson, Wendt, & 
Katzenstein, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Checkel, 1998; Ruggie, 1998). This constructivist un-
derstanding of norm-compliance must be contrasted with the rational-liberal understanding. 
 This dynamic can be applied to domestic politics as well: “the identity of 
the state and of social actors – for example, interest groups or political parties – could be un-
derstood only as mutually constitutive” (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 51). 
                                                 
2 While mutual constitution generally implies a symmetric relationship and equal attention to structure and 
agency, constructivists have been charged with focusing more on social structures and norms than on agency – 
both to compensate for the oversights of mainstream international relations theories and because an empirical 
engagement with mutual constitution is difficult – and with neglecting social construction at the agent level 
(Checkel, 1998). I too am forced to bracket agency in this thesis, due to time and place constraints. 
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In the liberal interpretation, decision makers are likely to engage in a rational cost-benefit 
analysis. Contrary to the constructivist contention that states follow a logic of appropriate-
ness, i.e. they do what they perceive as right, liberals suggest that states act in accordance 
with a logic of consequences and weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing a specific policy. 
Thus, while decision makers may comply with norms, they do so without internalizing them 
and without changing their interests (Checkel, 1997). In this thesis, I try to identify if norm 
consistent behavior must be attributed to a constructivist conception or to a liberal one. 
With their emphasis on norms, constructivists differ greatly from realists. Broadly 
speaking, realists treat states as rational and unitary actors pursuing their national interest, 
which is variously defined in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1967; Holsti), security or survival 
(Waltz, 1979; Grieco, 1997; Holsti), or in terms of relative capabilities (Holsti). This means 
more specifically that states are seen as goal-oriented, as having consistent goals and devis-
ing strategies to pursue these goals as well as being sufficiently independent from their na-
tional societies and domestic forces (Grieco, 1997). In an anarchical international system 
marked by uncertainty (Waltz, 1979; Grieco, 1997; Walt, 1998; Holsti), states are worried 
about their relative capabilities more than anything because a state’s primary concern is how 
it is positioned relative to others (Waltz, 1979; Holsti). An increase in a state’s power base 
will therefore produce a commensurate increase in its exercise of that power. This reasoning 
was employed by realist scholars in the wake of German unification (Mearsheimer, 1990; 
Waltz, 1993). 
Contingent realisms, taking context into account, consider norms and other non-
systemic factors as intervening variables, through which systemic factors must be translated 
(Rose, 1998; Wivel, 2005), while strict neorealism or structural realism focuses exclusively 
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on systemic factors (Waltz, 1979). While it has been argued that neorealism is unsuitable as a 
theory of foreign policy (Waltz, 1996; Wivel, 2005; Wohlforth, 2008), contingent realisms 
have been used, and praised, as foreign policy approaches (Rose, 1998; Wivel, 2005; 
Wohlforth, 2008) because contingent realists “occupy a middle ground between pure struc-
tural theorists and constructivists” (Rose, p. 152). From a realist perspective, considerable 
German foreign policy change in the form of increasing power politics should have occurred 
because of extensive changes in the power base, through unification, and in the international 
system, through the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the bipolar power structure 
(Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). 
Constructivism offers a good basis for foreign policy analysis and is especially appli-
cable to the German case. A useful approach to German foreign policy is to start from a con-
structivist standpoint and investigate how norms and other ideational factors impact the con-
tent of Germany’s foreign policy (thus bracketing agency), while investigating what (contin-
gent) realism has to offer with regards to the amount of power that it can and will exert. 
From a constructivist perspective, one would expect very little change in German for-
eign policy towards the conflict after unification, at least as long as norms remain intact. A 
commitment to Israel, derived from historical narratives, would maintain German sensitivity 
to Israeli concerns and would thus produce continuity in German foreign policy towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The perseverance of norms associated with the civilian power 
model would continue to result in some amount of norm conflict and a restrained policy. For 
realists norms would play a subordinated role at best, and no role at all for neorealists. In-
stead, the expansion of Germany’s power base would be expected to result in an increase in 
the exercise of its power with the aim of wielding greater influence in the Middle East. Now 
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clearly surpassing the United Kingdom and France in terms of economic and political power, 
Germany might be expected to display a more assertive unilateralism and seek to advance its 
material national interests. 
Change and Continuity in German Foreign Policy 
The theme of change and continuity is prevalent in the literature on German foreign 
policy and constitutes the framework within which this thesis is situated. Pre-1990 German 
foreign policy had a distinctly restrained and multilateral focus. It was characterized by a 
Western orientation (Westbindung), i.e. by close European and transatlantic alliances, partic-
ularly the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Germany was concerned with issues “close to home,” and German foreign policy had a dis-
tinctly Euro-centric character. The country was willing to cede sovereignty to supranational 
and international organizations and strictly rejected unilateral action. As Germany “im-
ported” its security from the U.S. throughout the Cold War, Germany could develop a dis-
tinctly anti-militarist culture and was generally viewed as a civilian power (Webber, 2001; 
Wittlinger & Larose, 2007). 
The classification as a civilian power is the overriding concept in German foreign 
policy analysis. It is based on the constructivist premise that political actors act in accordance 
with the logic of appropriateness rather than with the logic of consequences and that norms 
are fundamental in shaping states’ interests (Beck, 2006). More specifically, a civilian power 
desires and pursues the monopolization of force in collective security arrangements, embo-
dies restraints on violence and non-violent conflict resolution, maintains a commitment to the 
rule of law, to participatory forms of decision making and to social justice, and strives to 
uphold interdependence achieved through a division of labor among states (Harnisch, 2001; 
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Beck, 2006). A civilian power values cooperation and acts within multilateral institutions, 
while emphasizing non-military, primarily economic, means to pursue national goals (Maull, 
1990/91). 
Pre-1990 German foreign policy has been described as being characterized by a 
unique political-military culture emphasizing antimilitarism (Berger T. U., 1996; Duffield, 
1999), a “culture of reticence” (Malici, 2006) or, in emphasizing the economic component of 
Germany’s foreign relations, a cooperative or integrated trading state (Rittberger, 1992). The 
development of an anti-militarist culture is thereby attributed to the trauma of the Holocaust 
and the Second World War (Berger T. U., 1996; Duffield, 1999; Malici, 2006). 
Unification and the end of the Cold War resulted in gains in territory, population and 
resources, while Germany was no longer divided and constrained by Cold War security 
threats and obtained full sovereignty with the Two-Plus-Four Treaty between the four occu-
pying powers and the two Germanys (Banchoff, 1999; Duffield, 1999; Rittberger, 2001; 
Malici, 2006). From a realist perspective, Germany therefore fulfilled all the requirements for 
a return to (aggressive) power politics. Especially if one takes the GDR’s Soviet foreign poli-
cy style and its lacking sense of historical responsibility into account (Timm, 2000), the case 
for a change in German foreign policy can theoretically be sustained. Today, however, the 
academic consensus is that foreign policy since unification has been marked by more conti-
nuity than change (Duffield, 1999; Rittberger, 2001; Webber, 2001; Maull, 2006). Therefore, 
it has been suggested that constructivism is superior to alternative theories, and most clearly 
to neorealism, in explaining German foreign policy after unification (Banchoff, 1999; 
Harnisch, 2001; Rittberger, 2001). 
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Germany has maintained its Western orientation and multilateralism by increasing its 
involvement in NATO and the EC, and then the EU (Banchoff, 1999; Duffield, 1999; 
Rittberger, 2001; Webber, 2001). The FRG has further integrated its army into NATO 
(Berger T. U., 1996; Rittberger, 2001; Overhaus, 2005) and the European Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (Banchoff, 1999; Ed. Overhaus, Maull, & Harnisch, 2007). Post-
unification Germany makes every effort to “devise and execute its security policy almost en-
tirely in cooperation with others and within the context of international institutions” 
(Duffield, 1999, p. 783), strengthening existing multilateral security frameworks and working 
to establish new ones. Germany also remained reluctant to deploy military forces abroad 
(Berger T. U., 1996; Duffield, 1999; Malici, 2006) while its leaders exhibited a strong belief 
in diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, even when crises occurred in close 
geographic proximity (the Balkans), and used multilateral institutions to propagate their ap-
proach (Malici, 2006). 
This perspective, however, is disputed. Some suggest that the civilian power status 
has been compromised after the German Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that the Bundes-
wehr, the German army, can participate in military missions outside the NATO area if the 
deployment is authorized by the German parliament, the Bundestag (Baumann & Hellmann, 
2001). Changes in public discourse, public opinion and foreign policy behavior are said to 
have eroded the civilian power status and heralded foreign policy “normalization,” which has 
allowed stronger assertions of the national interest and articulations of greater confidence 
(Baumann & Hellmann, 2001). Collective memory and lessons learned from the past have 
taken on a flexible character and can be instrumentalized to justify various foreign policy de-
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cisions, ranging from military intervention to the refusal to participate in military action 
(Wittlinger & Larose, 2007). 
Pressure by allies and a process of transnational socialization (Harnisch, 2001) have 
further been found to impact Germany’s foreign policy, both in terms of relaxing the German 
position on military missions outside the NATO area (Duffield, 1999; Baumann & Hellmann, 
2001; Harnisch, 2001) and in terms of causing foreign policy inaction (Overhaus, 2005; 
Maull, 2006).  
German Middle East Policy 
The Middle East is not commonly addressed by scholars discussing change and con-
tinuity in German foreign policy since unification – at least not within a rigorous theoretical 
framework (for a theoretically informed post-unification analysis see Mueller, 2007). The 
following overview therefore considers the broader literature on German Middle East policy. 
German interests in the Middle East today are not significantly informed by economic 
considerations, but rather by a combination of security concerns (spillover effects of the re-
gion’s instability and Islamist terrorism) and moral obligation (Covarrubias & White, 2007; 
Mueller, 2007). It is commonly acknowledged that Germany, due to the perpetration of the 
Holocaust, has a special responsibility for Israel’s existence and security and that it is there-
fore often an outlier within the EU, embracing a more clearly pro-Israeli stance (Beck, 2006; 
Belkin, 2007; Ed. Overhaus, Maull, & Harnisch, 2007; Covarrubias & White, 2007; Mueller, 
2007). Germany generally supports Israel in European institutions and the UN (Covarrubias 
& White, 2007), while pursuing a rather passive role in the Middle East (Covarrubias & 
White, 2007; Mueller, 2007), and has been instrumental in advancing European-Israeli coop-
12 
eration. Germany also commonly softens EU positions by refusing to condemn Israeli actions 
and impose sanctions on the Jewish state (Belkin, 2007; Covarrubias & White, 2007). 
Despite the moral commitment to Israel, German political elites and decision makers 
have long evoked the notion of a policy of evenhandedness (Politik der Ausgewogenheit) in 
the conflict and have advocated Palestinian self-determination since the early 1980s. This 
support for Palestinian self-determination was exclusively rhetorical (Hubel, 1992) until 
Germany started assuming a more involved role in the 1990s, when Israel demonstrated its 
willingness to engage in direct negotiations with the PLO (Beck, 2006). The FRG has earned 
the respect and trust of Palestinian and Arab factions and is therefore often seen as a fair me-
diator – a role that neither the EU nor the U.S. can fulfill (Belkin, 2007; Covarrubias & 
White, 2007). The German intelligence service, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), has me-
diated several prisoner exchanges between Israel and Iran and Israel and Hezbollah (Belkin, 
2007; Lapid, 2008; Shpiro, 2008). 
Overall, Germany treads cautiously in the Middle East and even after unification has 
not developed a cohesive Middle East policy, often finding it hard to reconcile its double 
commitment to Israel and the Palestinians while, less importantly, also trying to balance its 
commitment to Israel with its economic and diplomatic ties with Arab states (Covarrubias & 
White, 2007; Ed. Overhaus, Maull, & Harnisch, 2007). While ties to Arab states were impor-
tant up until the 1970s and 1980s, they no longer figure as prominently in Germany’s Middle 
East policy (Covarrubias & White, 2007; Mueller, 2007). Instead, the commitment to Israel 
is in tension with other domestic norms derived from the civilian power status. Illustrating 
the dilemma of the Israeli-Palestinian double commitment, Martin Beck suggests that the no-
tion of responsibility for Israeli security clashes with, but trumps, a rejection of occupation, 
13 
which would be prescribed by Germany’s civilian power status (Beck, 2006). Furthermore, 
there is an inbuilt tension between German support for Israel and its desire, as a member of 
the EU and the European value community, to act as a neutral player in the peace process 
(Covarrubias & White, 2007). 
Finally, it has been suggested that the heavily under-institutionalized Middle East is 
an unfavorable environment for a civilian power to begin with, and that therefore the effec-
tiveness of German (and EU) foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is limited 
(Beck, 2006). That crafting a common EU Middle East policy still constitutes a major chal-
lenge further complicates this situation (Ed. Overhaus, Maull, & Harnisch, 2007). With, rela-
tively speaking, Germany representing the pro-Israeli position on the one end of a continuum 
and France occupying the pro-Arab position on the other, the EU has been able to agree only 
on the least common denominator: the recognition of Israel’s right to exist and to defend it-
self and the Palestinian right to self-determination. As a consequence, Israel has been less 
than enthusiastic about the EU as a mediator in the conflict (Hoelters, 2008). 
Despite these difficulties, Patrick Mueller has identified some change in German 
Middle East policy starting in the mid-1990s. Contrary to its previous restraint, Germany 
now supports a greater political, rather than just economic, role of the EU in the peace 
process while also favoring the development of a more comprehensive European policy to-
wards the Middle East and North Africa region. Parallel processes of national and transna-
tional socialization in the EU community have thereby resulted in a “dual strategy” in Ger-
man Middle East policy: the legacy of Nazi Germany calls for a “low key political role” in 
the Middle East, while on the other hand Germany’s European identity requires that Germa-
ny support a more proactive and engaged EU role (Mueller, 2007, p. 27). 
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On the whole, the literature suggests that German foreign policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict exhibits predominantly traits of continuity – in terms of a cautious in-
volvement and a high degree of sensitivity to Israeli concerns.  
15 
Theory 
This study aims to answer the question of whether the consensus in the literature on 
German foreign policy continuity after unification is applicable to German foreign policy to-
wards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Employing a constructivist approach, I hypothesize that 
historical narratives pertaining to the Shoah and the Third Reich caused the emergence of an 
elite-level norm of philo-Zionism in the aftermath of World War II, which continues to in-
form German foreign policy towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after unifica-
tion. 
The dependent variable in my study is German foreign policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and the first independent variable is a norm of philo-Zionism, i.e. a 
strong commitment to Israel’s security and a high sensitivity to Israeli concerns, derived from 
historical narratives of the Holocaust and the Third Reich. I will further consider norms de-
rived from the civilian power model, such as the commitments to human rights, peaceful con-
flict resolution and multilateralism, where discernible. Additional independent variables will 
need to be considered. First, the impact of the U.S., the most significant international actor in 
the Middle East and Germany’s closest ally outside Europe, on German Middle East policy 
deserves attention. Second, European integration and the movement towards a Common For-
eign and Security Policy within the EU, which as a whole is considered relatively more pro-
Palestinian, is an important factor to consider. Third, Germany’s economic interests in the 
Middle East can be expected to impact its foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict as well. Finally, security interests in the Middle East, in particular concerns about spil-
lover effects of the region’s instability and Islamist terrorism, must be taken into account. 
Continuity in German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is expected in 
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two respects. First, a sensitivity to Israeli concerns that is not shared by the relatively more 
pro-Palestinian EU is expected to persist and to continue to produce a pro-Israeli bias. 
Second, continuity is expected also in terms of a cautious involvement in the Middle East. 
By definition, foreign policy includes specific decisions, general guidelines, observa-
ble state behavior as well as verbal pronouncements targeted at other states, individuals, non-
state actors or international conditions (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2002). When I write 
about change and continuity in German foreign policy, I refer to the foreign policy of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. West Germany, in the period from 1945 to 1990 and to 
that of the Federal Republic of Germany post-1990. The foreign policy of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic will not be considered because the GDR was essentially incorporated into 
the Federal Republic with unification, which means that the latter has to be treated as the 
predecessor of today’s Germany. 
The underlying assumption of my theory of continuity is, in line with Jeffrey W. Le-
gro’s (2005) implicitly path-dependent constructivist foreign policy theory, that collective 
ideas drive foreign policy change and continuity. Foreign policy change requires two succes-
sive processes: collapse and consolidation. Existing collective ideas collapse if the social ex-
pectations associated with them were not fulfilled. Collapse is only a necessary condition, 
however, and foreign policy change occurs only if new ideas, and hence policies, are per-
ceived as successful by the state’s decision-makers and its population. Collective idea change 
in post-World War II Germany, Legro suggests, was successful partly because of the eco-
nomic boom years the country experienced, while collective idea change after World War I 
failed in the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles, which left Germany humiliated. I posit that 
philo-Zionism as a norm, and support for Israel as a foreign policy doctrine, developed post-
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World War II as part of Germany’s quest to be readmitted into the international community 
as a respected state, which in turn fostered economic growth and ended political isolation. 
Unless a cataclysmic shock occurs in German-Israeli relations, this norm is expected to pers-
ist. 
Norms are understood as “intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of ap-
propriate behaviour” (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner, 2001, p. 106) held by a “community of 
actors” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 22). In my thesis I will proceed according to a partial applica-
tion of the constructivist foreign policy theory advanced by Henning Boekle, Volker Ritt-
berger and Wolfgang Wagner (2001). Their main assumption is that collectively held norms, 
if they have sufficient commonality and specificity, will have a constitutive effect on foreign 
policy behavior. As do Boekle et al., I will bracket agency (a state’s constitutive effects on 
the domestic and international structure) and consider only the constitutive effect of norms 
on foreign policy behavior. This effect will be contrasted with other impacts, in particular 
economic and security interests and transnational pressures. Should the EU assume a greater 
political role in the conflict, tensions between the philo-Zionist norm and EU pressures in 
particular will likely come to bear more strongly on German foreign policy. 
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Methodology 
This study employs the qualitative method. As Germany is a unique case, considering 
the extent of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, the change in national identity that 
occurred in the aftermath of World War II, and then the experience of unification, I conduct a 
case study. Comparative insights from EU policy and the foreign policies of the United 
Kingdom and France are used to illuminate the character of German Middle East policy, but-
this thesis will not be an explicitly comparative project. A better understanding of German 
foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its determinants, and not theory 
development, is the purpose of this thesis. The study therefore employs an interpretative case 
study, as introduced by Arend Lijphart: it “make[s] explicit use of established theoretical 
propositions” and applies them to a particular case, with the aim of “throwing light on the 
case rather than on improving the generalization in any way” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). 
The empirical evidence considered includes, first of all, secondary literature on Ger-
man foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, where such literature is 
scarce, newspaper articles. I further employ an analysis of a range of primary sources: par-
liamentary debates, political party programs, official statements and decisions, and state-
ments made by high-ranking party officials. The goal is to identify the major factors influen-
cing foreign policy making and to discern the interplay of the norm of philo-Zionism with 
norms derived from the civilian power status, economic and security interests and transna-
tional pressures. Public opinion data is juxtaposed to elite level attitudes, and the relationship 
between the two is evaluated. 
My analysis is limited to those years that correspond with major developments in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the 1967 Six Day War, the 1982 Lebanon War, and the First Inti-
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fada in the pre-unification period; and the Red-Green coalition from 2000 to 2005, starting 
with the Second Intifada, as well as the Grand Coalition period from 2005 to 2009 in the 
post-unification period. Moreover, I conducted interviews with German, Israeli and Palestin-
ian diplomats, including Coordinator of German-American Cooperation, Karsten Voigt, as 
well as with member of the Bundestag, Dirk Niebel (FDP) and the Director of the American 
Jewish committee in Berlin, Deidre Berger. Efforts to find interview partners from all politi-
cal parties were unsuccessful because of the parliamentary recess in the summer of 2009 and 
the subsequent election campaigns. 
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The Early Years: Realpolitik and Morality 
The key in the development of the philo-Zionist norm lies in the economic and politi-
cal benefits that reconciliation with Israel was expected to have for Germany. Guilt and mor-
al obligation constituted only part of German motivations to “make good” for the atrocities 
committed during the Third Reich (Deligdisch, 1974; Lewan, 1975; Neustadt, 1983; Gardner 
Feldman, 1984; Witzthum, 1992; Lavy, 1996; Weingardt, 2002; Jelinek, 2004; O 
Dochartaigh, 2007). Realpolitik played an at least equally important role: the readmission of 
Germany into the international community as a civilized state, which was also a precondition 
for economic development, was contingent on how Germany addressed the question of resti-
tution to the victims of Nazism and dealt with the horrors of its past (Deligdisch, 1974; 
Neustadt, 1983; Gardner Feldman, 1984; Lavy, 1996; Weingardt, 2002; Jelinek, 2004). 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, epitomizing the ambiguous feelings that were shared by the 
German political elite at large (Jelinek, 2004), insisted that reconciliation with the Jews was 
crucial “from the moral and political as well as the economic standpoint” (O Dochartaigh, 
2007, quoted in Herf, p. 286). Adenauer was further concerned about negative consequences 
for the London Debt Conference, which would determine Germany’s payments to 23 states 
in the post-war period (Omar, 1982). Finally, his judgment that Jews had great sway in the 
economic and financial sectors also motivated him to pursue reconciliation and financial res-
titution (Weingardt, 2002; Jelinek, 2004). The political and economic importance or inevita-
bility, in light of the Cold War division, of complying with U.S. demands for support of 
Israel also needs to be borne in mind (Lewan, 1975; Timm, 2006). 
When it came to the vote, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) unanimously supported 
the Luxembourg Agreement (Jelinek, 2004), in which the FRG pledged to pay goods and 
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services in the amount of three billion DM to Israel and another 450 million to the Jewish 
Claims Conference over a period of twelve years (Frohn, 1991; Weingardt, 2002; Timm, 
2006). Of Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Un-
ion (CSU) bloc 106 out of 214 voted in favor of the agreement, with 39 abstaining from the 
vote. The Free Democrats (FDP), harboring a considerable number of former Nazis, did not 
show up for the vote in large numbers (Jelinek, 2004), while other small parties represented 
in the Bundestag were opposed to the agreement (Lewan, 1975). Overall, 360 out of 402 
members of the Bundestag voted, and the Luxembourg Agreement was adopted by a vote of 
239 to 25, with 86 abstentions (Jelinek, 2004). 
Lily Gardner Feldman (1984) postulates that the uniquely desperate situations in 
which both the FRG and the State of Israel found themselves after the war contributed great-
ly to the establishment of contacts so soon after the Holocaust. Ironically, each state’s securi-
ty and future depended on the other: for Germany, reparation payments to the young Jewish 
state were a precondition for trust-building and acceptance by other Western states; Israel 
had to accommodate thousands of refugees from Europe while facing hostility and military 
threats from its Arab neighbors and realized the advantage of having the support of the FRG. 
The 1952 Luxembourg Agreement thus arose largely from pragmatic concerns and geopoliti-
cal constellations and was not a phenomenon of reconciliation. Economic considerations and 
the prospect of gaining an important market in Israel made the Luxembourg Agreement pop-
ular in the German government, industry and the business community (Omar, 1982). German 
economic aid and exports helped immensely in the expansion of Israeli infrastructure, includ-
ing the train, electricity, telephone and telegraph systems (Lewan, 1975; Omar, 1982). 
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The issue of Palestinian refugees, a legacy of the 1948/49 Arab-Israeli war, was not 
high on West Germany’s agenda. The FRG increased its payments to UNRWA after 1952 to 
counterbalance the restitution payments to Israel, by which Germany stood against all Arab 
opposition; to improve the West German reputation in the UN; and for moral reasons. In 
1950 the FRG had contributed an initial amount of 100,000 DM, then annual payments of 
70,000 DM until 1957. In 1957 Germany responded to Arab demands and contributed 1 mil-
lion DM, and another 346,000 in 1959 (Jelinek, 2004). 
Arms shipments and German-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation too, both of 
which had become extensive by the late 1950s and early 1960s (Omar, 1982; Lavy, 1996; 
Shpiro, 2008) were at least initially motivated by a sense of pragmatism, encouraged or even 
requested by the U.S. (Omar, 1982) and often conducted despite (mutual) mistrust to serve 
national interests (Shpiro, 2003; Shpiro, 2008). David Ben-Gurion has been quoted as saying 
that the West German government did more than any other state in contributing to Israel’s 
military security in the early 1960s (Weingardt, 2002, p. 148), while German decision-
makers were interested in political and practical benefits arising from such arms shipments 
(Jelinek, 2004). Military cooperation was strongly motivated by facing a common enemy: the 
Soviet Union. (Shpiro, 2003). 
The establishment of official relations with Israel in 1965, finally, was influenced by 
a combination of American public pressures; a feeling that one could no longer refuse to ob-
lige the Israelis’ request for diplomatic relations, particularly in light of the decision to end 
arms shipments to the Jewish state; and a reaction to the improving relations of Arab states 
with the GDR (Lavy, 1996; Weingardt, 2002; Jelinek, 2004; Schumann, 2007). Both German 
states instrumentalized Israel, making use of the threat to establish diplomatic relations with 
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it to advance their interests in the Arab world (Jelinek, 2004). The Jewish state was in this 
sense reduced to a pawn in the political power struggle between the GDR and the FRG.  
On the whole, moral obligation played a minor role at best in Germany’s foreign pol-
icy and its relations with Israel up to 1965, although some political leaders acted out of a 
moral imperative. The FRG’s every move was determined by economic, political or strategic 
interests, while opposition to close ties with Israel among the political elite ran high. The fear 
of endangering German relations with Arab states, which would have economic repercus-
sions, was the primary concern in this respect. Realpolitik, not morality, dictated German 
foreign policy until 1965. A commitment to Israel was embraced chiefly for pragmatic rea-
sons. The case studies will trace the consolidation of the norm of philo-Zionism as well as 
other factors impacting German foreign policy from 1967 to 2009. 
My analysis starts with the 1967 War. German foreign policy and sovereignty had 
matured somewhat by 19673
                                                 
3 The Western occupying powers, reluctant to delegate sovereignty to the FRG, formally lifted the status of oc-
cupation and authorized the establishment of the German Federal Foreign Office only in 1951 (Deligdisch, 
1974). 
, while reintegration into the international community had large-
ly been completed. Germany had in 1957 become a member of the EEC and had established 
official diplomatic ties with Israel in 1965. Moreover, although the 1948/49 Arab-Israeli war 
caused the Palestinian refugee problem, Palestinian nationalism and a Palestinian dimension 
in the conflict were at first eclipsed by a pan-Arab nationalist movement (Weingardt, 2002; 
Dowty, 2008). The “re-emergence of the Palestinians” (Dowty, p. 105) came only after the 
1967 War, which left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation, and intensi-
fied in subsequent years, when Arab states started to withdraw from the conflict, leaving the 
field to the PLO (Weingardt, 2002; Dowty, 2008). My other cases in the pre-unification pe-
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riod are the 1982 Lebanon War and the First Intifada (1987-1991). After unification I analyze 
the Red-Green coalition years starting with the Second Intifada (2000-2005) and the Grand 
Coalition period (2005-2009). 
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Case 1: The 1967 War 
To this day, disagreements about who was responsible for the outbreak of the 1967 
War persist. Israel responded to an Egyptian troop build-up in the Sinai peninsula and to the 
Egyptian demand that the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) securing the border be-
tween Israel and Egypt withdraw, which in turn was a reaction to an apparently inaccurate 
Soviet notice that Israel was planning an attack on Syria to topple the regime in Damascus. 
Egypt moreover closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships, thus closing off Israeli access to 
Africa and East Asia. As the tensions unfolded, Egypt entered into a mutual defense pact 
with Syria and Jordan, and Israel attacked the three states by land and air on June 5, captur-
ing and occupying within six days of fighting the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights 
from Syria and the Gaza Strip and the Sinai peninsula from Egypt (Lavy, 1996; Dowty, 
2008). Both the Arab and the Israeli sides insisted that their moves were actions of self-
defense and that the other side was to blame for the outbreak of military confrontation (Dow-
ty, 2008). 
German Foreign Policy 
The FRG’s position in the run-up to the war was one of strict neutrality and non-
intervention, although foreign minister Brandt asserted a strong interest in regional peace. 
The emphasis on non-intervention but by no means indifference (Deligdisch, 1974) closely 
resembled U.S. rhetoric: the pledge of neutrality in “thought, word and deed” did not mean 
indifference (Archiv d. G., June 15, 1967, pp. 13228-37; Die Zeit, Joachim Schwellen, 1967). 
The FRG supported free navigation rights in the Gulf of Aqaba (AAPD (188), May 29, 1967, 
pp. 809-12) but was restrained otherwise. 
The fear of a greater military confrontation between east and west that would draw in 
the FRG was a strong motivation for German restraint and neutrality (Deligdisch, 1974; 
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Lavy, 1996). German division and its location in the geographical and political center of the 
superpower struggle made West Germany especially vulnerable. In particular, the Middle 
East conflict was perceived as indicating that divided Berlin too may be drawn into a military 
confrontation in the future (Die Zeit, Becker 06/09/1967). 
The Hallstein Doctrine4
Against this backdrop, the German government articulated its doctrine of neutrality. 
The FRG pledged strict adhere to the commitment, specified in the constitution and empha-
sized following the German-Arab crisis in 1965, that it would not ship arms to international 
areas of tension (Lavy, 1996), although the arms shipments had been replaced by financial 
aid to Israel (Schumann, 2007; Lapid, 2008). Brandt also pointed to the limited diplomatic 
influence that Germany could exercise in the Middle East (Bulletin, September 8, 1967, pp. 
831-2) but highlighted the German interest in good relations with both Israel and the Arab 
states (Deligdisch, 1974). 
 and economic considerations were further reasons for Ger-
many’s strict neutrality. The FRG could not risk a further deterioration of its relations with 
Arab states, which were already strained in the aftermath of West Germany’s Middle East 
crisis of 1965. A series of German arms shipments to Israel had become public in 1964, re-
sulting in Arab outrage, and the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser subsequently ex-
tended an invitation to the head of state of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht, who came to Egypt on 
an official state visit in February 1965. When the FRG established diplomatic relations with 
Israel on May 12, Egypt and many other states severed diplomatic ties with it (Lavy, 1996; 
Gerlach, 2006; Schumann, 2007). 
                                                 
4 The FRG’s policy of diplomatically isolating the GDR: insisting on being the sole representative of the Ger-
man people and desiring reunification, the FRG would sever ties with any state that recognized the GDR. 
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Responding to an Israeli request, the FRG shipped 20,000 gas masks to Israel, taking 
them from civilian stores so they would not qualify as military equipment. This decision was 
taken unanimously in the cabinet and was classified as a strictly humanitarian gesture; if 
Arab states desired similar humanitarian assistance, the FRG would consider their requests as 
well (Archiv d. G., June 5, 1967). Germany further supplied Israel with medical and clinical 
equipment as well as obliging an Israeli request for the shipment of trucks (Lavy, 1996; 
Weingardt, 2002). Opposition to the supply of gas masks and trucks came from the FDP, 
which argued that both were military equipment whose shipment to an area of tension was 
unlawful (Lavy, 1996). The government also “more or less secretly” approved the shipment 
of American arms to Israel via Germany (Weingardt, 2002, p. 190). 
The GDR accused the FRG of being a collaborator in the “Israeli aggression” and 
supplying the Israeli army with arms and military equipment. (Archiv d. G., June 21, 1967, 
pp. 13245-9). These claims were vehemently rejected as fabrications of the eastern bloc by 
the FRG (Bulletin, July 5, 1967, pp. 609-10). Daniel Gerlach finds, however, that the West 
German claim to have ended all arms shipments to the Middle East after 1965 was a “fairy-
tale,” as arms shipments and security cooperation continued in secret and with greater care 
taken that arms not be identifiable as being of German origin when used in combat. Similar 
shipments to Arab states played no significant role and were heavily restricted, following the 
principle that “exports were not to cause damage to Israel”5
                                                 
5 “Exporte nicht zum Schaden Israels gereichen durften” 
 (Gerlach, 2006, p. 141). Many of 
the arms delivered by France were actually financed by the FRG, which “paid directly to the 
French government for deliveries to Israel” (Shpiro, 2003, p. 319). A message from German 
Ambassador to Israel Pauls to Foreign Office Headquarters (AAPD (214), June 16, 1967, p. 
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888) mentions a German shipment of “modernized and more heavily armored tanks M 48,” 
which, according to an Israeli General Staff Officer, had “proven themselves outstandingly.”6
In the eyes of the Arab states, Germany assumed a pro-Israeli position in the war. The 
FRG lost from one day to the next 83.6 percent of its oil imports as all oil pipelines to the 
Mediterranean were blockaded, and Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Bahrain imple-
mented an export stop to Europe on June 6, while Algeria exported oil only to France (Lieser, 
1976, p. 322). On June 27, 1967 German-Arab relations had reached a “low point” from 
which Arab League Secretary General Hassouna saw at the time “no way out” (AAPD (285), 
June 27, 1967, pp. 1145-6). Nevertheless, all Arab states except Iraq and Libya started again 
to supply oil to states guaranteeing that they would not provide oil to the “aggressor states,” 
the U.S. and the UK. The selective embargo against the U.S., the UK and Germany was fi-
nally lifted at a summit meeting of Arab heads of state from August 29 to September 1 (Lies-
er, 1976). 
 
German-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation made a “considerable contribution” to 
Israel’s victories in 1967, 1973 and 1982 (Shpiro, 2003, p. 310). 
The 1967 War had proven that the destruction of Israel was not imminent and that the 
Jewish state was safer than thought (Weingardt, 2002, p. 192). In subsequent years the FRG 
therefore once more turned its attention to the Arab states. The German interest in the 
resumption of good relations with all states in the Middle East was repeatedly articulated 
(Bulletin, June 23, 1967, pp. 566-7; Bulletin, July 5, 1967; Bulletin, August 1, 1967, p. 694) 
and the FRG also “addressed” the refugee issue. Foreign Minister Brandt proclaimed: “[The 
federal government] pays particular attention to the fate of the refugees and is ready to con-
                                                 
6 “modernisierten und staerker armierten Panzer M 48”; “hervorragend bewaehrt” 
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tribute, to the best of its abilities, to a solution to this problem”7
A second German-Israeli economic aid agreement was signed only four months after 
the war, on October 4, 1967, without further negotiations: the FRG granted Israel 160 million 
DM in loans. In July 1968, a third economic aid agreement was signed, but the amount of the 
loan was reduced to 140 million DM, causing moderate protests in Israel. Despite the reduc-
tion in the loan amount, economic aid to Israel that year was second only to that to populous 
India, while Israel had up to this point received half the amount that all Arabs states had been 
given combined (Weingardt, 2002). In other words, despite the attempted rapprochement 
with the Arab world Israel continued to enjoy “preferential treatment” (Weingardt, 2002, p. 
195). In the years following the war an understanding took hold among the German political 
elite that “the present generation in the German administration as well as the German people 
felt responsibility for Israel’s fate” (Lapid, 2008, p. 70). 
 (Bulletin, August 1, 1967). 
The 1967 War had caused another 200,000 to 250,000 Palestinian refugees (AAPD (242), 
June 30, 1967, pp. 980-3), and the Bundestag allotted 5 million DM for the purpose of huma-
nitarian aid (Bulletin, June 23, 1967). This payment pales in comparison to the loans granted 
Israel and to the sums that were raised by the German public for Israel. 
Analysis of Primary Documents – The Foreign Service 
A close review of West German Drahtberichte8
                                                 
7 “Dem Schicksal der Fluechtlinge schenkt [die Bundesregierung] ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit und ist 
bereit, nach besten Kraeften zur Loesung dieses Problems beizutragen.“ 
 conveys a somewhat different story 
than the official doctrine of neutrality: the internal diplomatic documents indicate a distinct 
anti-Arab and pro-Israeli tenor. A circular decree issued by Under-Secretary of State Schuetz 
(AAPD (186), May 26, 1967; pp. 794-6) put blame on Egypt for causing a “dangerous situa-
8 Drahtberichte are encrypted confidential and secret messages exchanged within the Federal Foreign Office, 
i.e. between headquarters in Bonn and embassies, consulates and diplomatic missions around the world. 
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tion” in the Middle East through the build-up of troops in the Sinai peninsula, while the 
Egyptian assertion that this was a response to a planned Israeli strike on Syria was rejected as 
a mere pretext. Similarly, a possible Israeli strike was classified as a “strike of despair” 
(Verzweiflungsschlag) and the document spoke of the need to “rescue Israel from its exigen-
cy, i.e. to prevent an Israeli military action,”9 suggesting that the Egyptian behavior was giv-
ing Israel no alternative to a military strike. Schuetz ordered the deletion of a sentence con-
cluding that Israeli actions had contributed to the emergence of the crisis10
After the war, the German position maintained its distinctly pro-Israeli touch. A June 
23 record of the FRG’s Middle East policy (AAPD (232), June 23, 1967, pp. 950-2) listed the 
following German interests in the Middle East: 
 as well as formu-
lations indicating that Jordan would face equal or worse repercussions from an outbreak of 
war than Israel. Strikingly, Schuetz’s circular decree was in its major aspects and rhetoric – 
blaming Egypt for the crisis, mentioning the threat to moderate Arab states and highlighting 
Israel’s exigency – surprisingly congruent with the position of Israeli Ambassador Ben Natan 
(AAPD (188), May 29, 1967). Schuetz expressed the German willingness to assist Israel in 
any way possible below the “threshold” of non-interference (AAPD (190), May 29, 1967, pp. 
817-9). 
preservation of our economic interests; protection of the southeastern edge of 
Europe from increasing Soviet penetration; political presence including re-
                                                 
9 “Israel aus seiner Zwangslage zu befreien, d.h. von einer militaerischen Aktion abzuhalten” 
10 The deleted sentence was: “We do not ignore, however, that Israel through its tough retaliatory strikes, which 
it initiated in response to Arab infiltrations on November 13, 1966 against the Jordanian village Samu and on 
April 7, 1967 against Syria, as well as through its announcements of further retaliatory strikes against Syria 
from May 12, 1967 for its part pursued a politics that facilitated the emergence of the crisis” – “Wir verkennen 
allerdings nicht, dass Israel durch die harten Gegenschlaege, die es in Antwort auf arabische Infiltrationen am 
13. November 1966 gegen das jordanische Dorf Samu und am 7. April 1967 gegen Syrien gefuehrt hat, sowie 
durch seine Ankuendigungen weiterer harter Gegenschlaege gegen Syrien vom 12. Mai 1967 seinerseits eine 
Politik betrieben hat, die das Entstehen der Krise beguenstigte” 
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sumption of diplomatic relations with 9 Arab states; prevention of the GDR’s 
recognition under international law.11
 
 
All four of these interests would have called for a distinctly pro-Arab orientation in 
German foreign policy. Nevertheless, the remainder of the document had a clear pro-Israeli 
tenor, detectable in the reference to “Israeli aggression” in quotation marks, in the explicit 
condemnation of a policy aimed at the destruction of Israel and the simultaneous absence of 
criticism of Israeli policies or actions, as well as in the list (and its order) of requirements for 
a peace agreement in the Middle East: 
1) recognition of the State of Israel by the Arabs 
2) free navigation for Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal 
3) solving the Arab refugee problem 
4) peace without annexation 
5) a solution for Jerusalem that is acceptable to all parties 
6) control of arms shipments to the Middle East12
 
 
With regards to issues affecting the Palestinians and the Arab states, the German posi-
tion became a lot less explicit.13
                                                 
11 “Wahrung unserer wirtschaftlichen Interessen; Schutz der Suedostflanke Europas vor zunehmender 
sowjetischer Durchdringung; eigene politische Praesenz einschliesslich Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen 
Beziehungen mit 9 arabischen Staaten; Verhinderung einer voelkerrechtlichen Anerkennung der DDR” (pas-
sage includes Brandt’s handwritten corrections) 
 Interestingly, while the NATO Council agreed on the inde-
pendent principle of no annexation (AAPD (242), June 30, 1967), the German position spoke 
of “peace without annexation,” which implies an acceptance of the Israeli occupation as long 
as no peace agreement is signed. Overall, the content and rhetoric of the document suggest 
that the ties to Israel existed beyond the scope of material interests but had a disproportionate 
12 “1) Anerkennung des Staates Israel durch die Araber; 2) freie Schiffahrt fuer Israel im Golf von Akaba und 
im Suez-Kanal; 3) Loesung des arabischen Fluechtlingsproblems; 4) Friedensschluss ohne Annexion; 5) eine 
fuer alle Seiten tragbare Loesung fuer Jerusalem; 6) Kontrolle von Waffenlieferungen in den Nahen Osten” 
(passage includes Brandt’s handwritten corrections) 
13 Compare with the principles agreed on within the NATO Council: recognition of the existence of the State of 
Israel; preservation of the territorial integrity of all Middle East states (no annexation); just solution to the refu-
gee problem; guarantee of free navigation rights in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba; ending the arms race 
in the Middle East through restrictions agreed on by supplying countries; a solution acceptable to all parties – 
not just Israelis and Arabs – on Jerusalem (AAPD (242), June 30, 1967).  
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impact on German foreign policy. This is surprising also if set against concerns about the 
German inclusion in an oil embargo and its expected domestic repercussions (AAPD (227), 
June 20, 1967, pp. 936-8). 
In two debates in the NATO Council the German representatives argued for peace 
from an Israeli perspective. First, it was suggested that the Arabs need to accept the existence 
of Israel as an irrevocable fact while Israel needs to understand that the “creation of faits ac-
complis” and an aggravation of the refugee problem would endanger its own security (AAPD 
(242), June 30, 1967). Second, Israel’s security in the absence of external threats must be 
guaranteed (AAPD (220), June 14, 1967, pp. 905-10). No mention of Arab interests was rec-
orded in either session. 
While there was no hesitation to award Israel the requested economic aid in 1967 
“despite considerable difficulties,” the Foreign Office wanted a postponement of negotiations 
until the crisis had subsided because public announcements of the agreement would further 
weaken the German position in the Arab world (AAPD (200), June 2, 1967, pp. 854-5). Lat-
er, concerns about acting in a way that would be perceived as pro-Israeli, which would put 
Germany at odds with the consensus at the United Nations, might cause German inclusion in 
the Arab oil embargo, and could radicalize the moderate Arab states, were voiced. To minim-
ize possible damage it was suggested that the conclusion of the agreement be kept secret 
(AAPD (245), July 4, 1967, pp. 990-3). Humanitarian aid to Arab states was seen in instru-
mental terms: the expected gain was to improve the German reputation in the Arab world 
(AAPD (217), June 13, 1967, pp. 894-7) and thus to strengthen the relations with Arab states 
(AAPD (232), June 23, 1967). Chancellor Kiesinger emphasized that the benefits of good 
relations with Arab states lay especially in avoiding a further penetration of the Middle East 
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by the Soviet Union, which might pose a danger to Europe (AAPD (261), July 12, 1967, pp. 
1035-47). 
Overall, the uniqueness of German-Israeli relations beyond the realm of material na-
tional interests is obvious. Nevertheless, the fact that “pro-Israeli” statements were added by 
Brandt and Schuetz to diplomatic documents while “pro-Arab” statements were removed 
points to a division between a pro-Arab and a pro-Israel camp within the Foreign Office, 
which has also been identified in the 1945-1965 period (Jelinek, 2004). In 1967, the pro-
Israeli side dominated. 
Party Positions 
Two Bundestag debates, from June 7, 1967 (111th Session) and June 14, 1967 (115th 
Session), offer an insight into party positions towards the Middle East conflict and the parties 
involved. A commitment to neutrality and Nichteinmischung (non-interference) was enun-
ciated by politicians across all three parties. 
The need for German neutrality was voiced on grounds of security, and three interre-
lated themes were stressed. First, Schmidt (SPD) highlighted the geographical proximity of 
the Middle East and the possibility of a direct spread of the conflict to Europe (111th Ses-
sion). Second, Chancellor Kiesinger (CDU) and Schmidt (SPD) expressed fears about a dete-
rioration of world politics and indirect repercussions for Germany (111th Session). Third, the 
FDP highlighted that the location of a divided Germany at the frontline of superpower con-
frontation and the exposed location of Berlin made Germany particularly vulnerable (111th 
Session: Freiherr von Kuehlmann-Stumm, Mende; 115th Session: Mende). 
Despite the expressed commitment to neutrality and Nichteinmischung and the justifi-
cations given for it, an anti-Arab tenor was apparent in CDU/CSU and SPD, while the FDP 
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as a party could be best associated with neutrality. Barzel (CDU) spoke of a “terrible collec-
tion of evil words” in the Arab world that clearly showed the “extermination intentions” 
(Vernichtungsabsichten) of Arab states (111th Session, 5227A). He further asserted that the 
German position was in line with international law, which meant for him personally also 
“that you may not force anyone into self-defense”14 (111th Session, 5277A-B), which could 
only be a reference to Israel’s state of exigency as expressed also in diplomatic circles. 
Saenger (SPD) expressed “contempt” for those Arab leaders who, unlike their moderate 
counterparts, were unwilling to improve the living standards of their own populations and all 
other people in the Middle East but who “think they can escape such a task through acts of 
war or who offer to their starving people the delirium of enthusiasm instead of bread”15
A sense of responsibility for Israel was most prominent among SPD politicians. 
Brandt famously proclaimed that German neutrality “cannot mean moral indifference or in-
dolence of the heart”
 
(111th Session, 5317A). 
16 (5304C). Schmidt stated that for the Social Democrats Nichteinmi-
schung did not mean moral or political indifference towards the outcome of the war: strongly 
rejecting the intentions of Arab leaders to destroy the State of Israel, he expressed solidarity 
with the Israeli people and evoked the “special responsibility” that Germans have for the 
Israeli people (111th Session, 5270C). According to Eppler (SPD), in the German conscience 
the State of Israel was “simply not just a state like all others”17
                                                 
14 “dass man auch niemanden zur Notwehr zwingen darf“ 
 (111th Session, 5301D), and 
the FRG wanted a peace that secures Israel’s right to exist, as German history contributed to 
15 “die sich einer solchen Aufgabe in Aktionen kriegerischer Art glauben entziehen zu koennen oder die ihren 
hungernden Menschen den Taumel der Begeisterung statt Brot darbieten. ” 
16 “keine moralische Indifferenz und keine Traegheit des Herzen bedeuten kann” 
17 “eben nicht einfach ein Staat ist wie alle anderen auch” 
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its creation. Metzger (SPD) even demanded, on moral grounds, an association agreement be-
tween the EEC and Israel to ensure the preservation not only of its physical but also of its 
“economic existence” (111th Session, 5321C). 
The FDP advocated the “strictest neutrality as understood under international law” 
(111th Session, Freiherr von Kuehlmann-Stumm) and opposed, as the only party, the ship-
ment of the 20,000 gas masks through official channels, suggesting that such a move was 
bound to be interpreted as taking sides in the conflict. Scheel, for example, argued: 
I believe that it is problematic … in this situation to officially deliver material, 
namely material that can be used in cases of conflict or war, even if it serves 
to protect, into areas of tension. This is not about preventing the buying of gas 
masks from German manufacturers, but for us this is about whether it is not a 
form of taking sides if the German government supplies such gas masks from 
its stores.18
 
 (111th Session, p. 5280D-5281A) 
Zoglmann (FDP) further suggested that the Israeli request may not have arisen from 
material but from political interest and may have been a sly attempt to commit Germany to 
the Israeli side in the conflict (111th session). 
Finally, a sense of disillusionment was expressed in light of Europe’s limited influ-
ence on war and peace in the Middle East. Chancellor Kiesinger confessed himself aggrieved 
that Europe, both individual states and as a whole, had so little to say on the conflict and 
called for a resumption of regular meetings between the European heads of government, 
while Barzel (CDU) attested to the insignificance of Europe in influencing matters of war 
and peace in the world (111th Session). Brandt spoke of “political underdevelopment” (poli-
                                                 
18 “Ich glaube …, in dieser Situation Material, und zwar fuer den Konflikts- und Kriegsfall einsetzbares 
Material, wenn es auch nur dem Schutze dient, offiziell in Spannungsgebiete zu liefern. Es geht ja nicht etwa 
darum, zu verhindern, dass bei deutschen Produzenten Gasmasken gekauft werden, sondern uns geht es nur 
darum, ob es nicht eine Form von Parteinahme ist, wenn die Bundesregierung aus ihren Bestaendedn solche 
Gasmasken liefert. ”  
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tische Unterentwicklung) in Europe as there was hardly any sign of European political coop-
eration “in light of a heavy crisis before Europe’s front door”19
Overall, the parliamentary debates indicate a divergence between SPD and CDU/CSU 
on the one hand, and the FDP on the other hand, in terms of the interpretation of neutrality. 
SPD politicians in particular presented moral arguments in favor of Israel, while the condem-
nation of Arab actions and attitudes was shared both by CDU/CSU and SPD. Of course, a 
discussion of the disconnect with the FDP must not ignore the fact that the latter was the op-
position party. Nevertheless, other authors find that the FDP in general was more hesitant in 
its support for Israel than the other two parties were (Deligdisch, 1974; Lavy, 1996; Gerlach, 
2006). 
 (115th Session, p. 5693C). 
Public Opinion 
The official commitment to neutrality, and even the cautious support for Israel ex-
pressed by some Bundestag politicians, was at odds with “the excitement and pro-Israeli eu-
phoria shown by the West German media and public” (Lavy, 1996, p. 146). Donations in 
money, in kind and of medical material were widespread among the population, as were pub-
lic expressions of sympathy with, and support for, Israel (Deligdisch, 1974; Lavy, 1996; 
Weingardt, 2002). A sense of responsibility for the State of Israel was prevalent (Deligdisch, 
1974). Individuals, groups and local authorities raised millions of Deutschmarks for Israel 
(Weingardt, 2002). Survey data places pro-Israeli sentiments at over 50 percent during and 
immediately following the 1967 War, while about 5 percent of the population expressed a 
pro-Arab attitude. Similarly, 52 percent of Germans blamed the Arab states for the outbreak 
of the war, with only 8 percent blaming Israel (Bergmann & Erb, 1991, pp. 182, 184). 
                                                 
19 “angesichts einer schweren Krise vor der Haustuer Europas” 
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Following the 1967 War, the extreme left, and in particular the student protesters, 
adopted an increasingly pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist and occasionally anti-Semitic position, 
although the majority of the public continued to support Israel (Weingardt, 2002). This trend 
is reflected in public opinion polls conducted by the Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach. In 
May 1970, 45 percent of Germans supported the Israelis, 7 percent the Arabs, and 32 percent 
were neutral in the Middle East conflict (1973 / Nr. 19). Three years later, in April 1973, 
support for Israel had sunk to 37 percent, while 5 percent claimed to sympathize with the 
Arabs (1973 / Nr. 19). An opinion poll in October 1973, in the midst of the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War, however, shows an upsurge in support for Israel: 57 percent said they sympathized with 
Israel, compared to 8 percent support for the Arabs (1973 / Nr. 41). By April 1978, support 
for Israel had fallen to 44 percent, while support for the Arabs still hovered at 7 percent 
(1978 / Nr. 22).20
German Foreign Policy in the European Context 
 These public opinion data indicate a mobilization on behalf of Israel in 
times of war, while generally an Israel-friendly or at least not an anti-Israel attitude prevailed. 
Before the outbreak of the war, the UK declared neutrality in the conflict (Archiv d. 
G., June 5, 1967, pp. 13212-22), which was classified as “military neutrality,” as politically 
the UK sided with Israel (Die Zeit, Wocker, 06/09/1967). Following a Soviet refusal to im-
pose an arms embargo in the Middle East, a stop of arms shipments implemented by the UK 
following the outbreak of hostilities was revoked in order to avoid “a one-sided and unfair” 
embargo (Archiv d. G., June 15, 1967). British troops were ordered not to participate in the 
fighting in any way, however (Archiv d. G., June 15, 1967). Fearing unpredictable economic 
                                                 
20 Differences in wording must be noted. In 1970, 1971 and 1978 the question was: “Which side are you on, 
more on the side of the Palestinians or more on the side of the Arabs?” The question for both 1973 polls was: 
“Who has your sympathy in the Middle East conflict, the Israelis, the Arabs or neither of the two parties?” – 
“Auf welcher Seite stehen Sie, mehr auf der Seite der Israelis oder mehr auf der Seite der Araber?”; “Wem 
gehoert Ihre Sympathy im Nahost-Konflikt, den Israelis, den Arabern oder keiner der beiden Parteien?” 
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and financial repercussions in case of an expansion of the war (the UK obtained 72 percent of 
its oil from the Middle East), the government supported a quick ceasefire implemented by the 
UN. The British position did not, however, desire a return to the pre-war status quo, as that 
would have implied accepting Egyptian control of the Strait of Tiran, which was not in the 
British interest (Die Zeit, Wocker, 06/09/1967). Attempts to convince other states to sign a 
declaration classifying the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway proved fruitless (Arc-
hiv d. G., June 5, 1967). Public opinion, like in Germany, largely favored Israel in the con-
flict (Die Zeit, Wocker, 06/09/1967). 
The French position of neutrality was more true to the term. President de Gaulle in-
sisted that France had in no way committed itself to either side (Archiv d. G., June 15, 1967; 
Die Zeit, Ernst Weisenfeld, 1967). Before the outbreak of violence, de Gaulle had indicated 
that whichever state would commit the first strike would not obtain French approval or sup-
port. He had stated that if Israel was attacked, France would not allow it to be destroyed, but 
should Israel start the hostilities, France would condemn the initiative (De Gaulle Press Con-
ference, 1967). De Gaulle’s disapproval of Israel’s first strike marked “the beginning of a 
general change of direction of French foreign policy in favour of the Arabs” (Lavy, 1996, p. 
148). After the outbreak of hostilities, an arms embargo was imposed on the entire Middle 
East, which hit Israel especially hard because it used predominantly French equipment (Die 
Zeit, Weisenfeld, 06/09/1967). France subsequently became “a major arms supplier to Arab 
countries” (Soetendorp, 1999).  
After the war, France issued its own statement, distinct from the other western gov-
ernments, condemning the “opening of hostilities by Israel” (Deligdisch, 1974, p. 135). The 
new pro-Arab position was reflected also in the French translation of Security Council reso-
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lution 242, which was interpreted to demand an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territo-
ries.21 In a November 27, 1967 press conference (De Gaulle Press Conference, 1967), finally, 
de Gaulle strongly criticized Israel, a “bellicose state determined to expand,”22
Currently, it [Israel] is organizing in the territories that it has taken an occupa-
tion that cannot proceed without oppression, repression, expulsions; and a re-
sistance against it manifests itself, which Israel classifies as terrorism.
 for having 
attained in the Six Day War a central objective: to increase its territory in order to accommo-
date the growing influx of Jewish immigrants. As for the outcome of the war, de Gaulle fa-
mously assessed:  
23
 
 
Following the war the realization that “Europe,” i.e. the EEC24
                                                 
21 In November 1967, the UN Security Council passed resolution 242, which lays out two central principles 
necessary for peace in the Middle East: 
, had been unable to 
exercise any power in the Middle East crisis and had been incapable of ensuring the security 
of their allies as well as their own, was sobering (Die Zeit, H.K., 06/16/1967). In 1971, the 
six EEC foreign ministers agreed on a common position on the Middle East and composed a 
confidential paper that was leaked to the press. The recommendations and positions specified 
went beyond UN Security Council resolution 242 in the following ways: (1) the French ver-
sion of resolution 242 constituted the basis for the paper; the withdrawal of Israeli forces to 
the pre-conflict lines and borders was demanded, although room was left for “possibly minor 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;  
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sove-
reignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, 1967) 
Arab and Israeli opinions on the first principle diverged considerably. While the Arab side interpreted “from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict” to mean “from the territories” or “from all territories,” in the Israeli 
interpretation the missing specification was taken to mean that borders are negotiable (Dowty, 2008). France 
went along with the Arab interpretation, which was reflected in the French version, referring to the territories 
(Weingardt, 2002; Gerlach, 2006). 
22 “Etat d’Israël guerrier et résolu à s’agrandir” 
23 “Maintenant, il [Israël] organise sur les territoires qu’il a pris l’occupation qui ne peut aller sans oppression, 
répression, expulsions, et il s’y manifeste contre lui une résistance, qu’à son tour il qualifie de terrorisme” 
24 Consisting at the time of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg 
40 
adjustments agreed on by the parties”25; (2) Jerusalem should be placed under international 
authority, and free access to the holy sites should be guaranteed; (3) the six suggested the 
creation of a commission to ensure “the refugees’ freedom of choice between gradual return 
and resettlement, with compensation, in other countries.”26
Following Israeli criticism, Germany back-paddled from the 1971 position and 
pledged adherence to the English version of resolution 242, which caused a crisis in German-
French relations (Gerlach, 2006). In response to Israeli criticism, foreign minister Scheel 
(FDP) justified the EEC paper by pointing to the need for closer cooperation and coordina-
tion in Europe, while also pledging a commitment to the special relations with Israel, which 
were grounded in the past (AAPD (237), July 7, 1971, pp. 1098-102; AAPD (238), July 7/8, 
1971, pp. 1102-9; Bundestag, 133rd Session, 1971). 
 
Summary 
Even if the Arab states and relations with them moved up on the FRG’s agenda fol-
lowing the 1967 War, German-Israeli relations were hardly touched by these developments. 
Even the 1971 common statement by the EEC foreign ministers, which was in Israel per-
ceived to be pro-Arab, marked less a change in Germany’s attitude and was rather indicative 
of the French influence within the EEC (Weingardt, 2002; Gerlach, 2006). Closer German-
French cooperation regarding the Middle East, incidentally, had been desired in the Arab 
world (Bulletin, September 8, 1967), but angered the Israelis and led to German backpad-
dling. Overall, it appears that Germany did not pursue a coherent Middle East policy but had 
deadlocked itself into a position of inconsistency and confusion, by trying to please the 
                                                 
25 “eventuellement de rectifications mineures agrées par les parties” 
26 “la liberté de choix des refugiés entre le repriatement échelonné et la réinstallation, avec compensation, dans 
d’autres pays”, full French text of the document, in Gerlach, 2006, pp. 209-213 
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Arabs, the Israelis and the French at the same time while operating under a Cold War um-
brella and clinging to the Hallstein Doctrine. 
Different trends in German foreign policy making towards the Middle East can be ob-
served in 1967 and the following years. First, no doubt owing to the Cold War division Ger-
many closely followed the U.S. position during the 1967 War, practicing “benevolent neu-
trality” (Lavy, 1996, p. 160), which was reinforced by public opinion. The fear of a spillover 
effect of the Middle East conflict appears to have been the most important factor that rein-
forced the German desire to keep up the best impression of neutrality possible. The economic 
need for good relations with the Arab states appears to have had a minor impact only, despite 
German dependency on Arab oil. The Hallstein Doctrine too required a rapprochement with 
the Arab world. 
Second, a European (particularly French) influence, which in this case countered the 
U.S. position, on Germany’s Middle East policy transpired with the crafting of the 1971 EEC 
paper, several years after the war. The FRG was quick to backpaddle from the common EEC 
position in the face of Israeli criticism, however, not wanting to endanger the special Ger-
man-Israeli relations. A clash between the desire for European cooperation and multilateral-
ism and Germany’s obligation towards Israel was apparent, although the commitment to mul-
tilateralism and European coordination was more a consequence of Europe’s limited influ-
ence in the Middle East and the world than it was a norm. The parliamentary debates as well 
as the FRG’s indecision regarding the EEC paper, the first joint agreement on foreign policy 
of the sort, indicate that the European factor only just started developing in the late 1960s. 
During the war, there was no European influence on German foreign policy to speak of, 
while after the war finding a common position was marked by considerable difficulties. 
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Third, German neutrality and Nichteinmischung were a cover for an Israel-friendly 
policy. CDU/CSU and SPD politicians and diplomats alike shared a concern for Israel’s se-
curity and well-being, which was not seldom informed by moral considerations. The fact that 
from a strict “national interest” perspective the FRG should have pursued a distinctly more 
pro-Arab position, but did not, illustrates this phenomenon. The shipments of gas masks, 
trucks and even tanks to Israel are indicators of the pro-Israeli position. At the same time, a 
division between a pro-Arab and a pro-Israeli camp within the Foreign Office can be de-
tected. The possible argument that in the Cold War context Germany’s ability to adopt a 
more pro-Arab policy was limited is discounted by the U.S. desire to improve its relations 
with Arab states and the assessment that Germany could play an important role in bringing 
about such a rapprochement as Germany had the best access to the Arab world in the west 
(AAPD (208), 8. Juni 1967, pp. 875-8). But in its endeavor to improve its relations with the 
Arab world following the war Germany did not allow its relations with Israel to suffer. In 
fact, German economic aid to Israel continued, and any payments made to Arab states, aimed 
at alleviating the refugee problem, paled in relation to the loans reaching Israel. The Palestin-
ians, at any rate, played no role for the FRG; the only West German interest was in the Arab 
states, and the fate of the Palestinian refugees was at best a piece in the Arab puzzle. Overall, 
a norm of philo-Zionism, even if it was counterbalanced by other factors, existed and left its 
mark on German foreign policy. Public opinion supported the pro-Israeli bias. 
It cannot be concluded that moral considerations or norms trumped all else, in par-
ticular the “national interest,” although they shaped the tenor in German diplomacy and 
among political elites in SPD and, less so, in CDU/CSU. Germany’s geopolitical insecurity 
was clearly not conducive to a norm-driven foreign policy. Moreover, the West German gov-
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ernment appears to have wanted to comply with the various demands and expectations of its 
international partners, thereby compromising consistency and coherence. No one internation-
al relations theory fits this case perfectly. The weight of security political concerns cannot be 
downplayed, which gives support to realism. Another pivotal factor was the Hallstein Doc-
trine and concerns about a permanent institutionalization of German division, and as such – it 
must be noted – of a reduced German power base, which ranked high on the FRG’s agenda. 
The “national interest” was clearly the predominant variable in the 1967 War. The FRG’s 
attempts to adapt its official position to improve its standing with a particular actor and make 
material or political gains are probably most in line with liberalism’s conception of rational 
decision making, which supposes that a cost-benefit analysis informs every decision. That 
this sequence of rational decision making resulted in a chameleon foreign policy making 
style can be attributed to the fact that a long-term perspective appears to have been compro-
mised in favor of short-term gains. 
The rhetoric employed by government and Bundestag politicians as well as in confi-
dential Foreign Office documents indicates, however, that the German commitment to Israel 
influenced German foreign policy making to a considerable extent. Constructivism is sup-
ported in this regard also by the German unwillingness to compromise Israel’s special status 
in favor of the Arabs and to refrain from taking actions that may damage Israel. Due to the 
dependency of the FRG on Arab oil exports, this moral concern in a way overrode economic 
interests. 
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Case 2: 1982 Lebanon War 
Background 
A discussion of German foreign policy towards the 1982 Lebanon war requires a 
brief overview of the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of German and Eu-
ropean positions in the 1970s and early 1980s. In proving European incompetence at contain-
ing conflict and advancing peace in the Middle East, the 1967 War had sparked a European 
desire to develop a common approach to the region. The 1971 EEC paper set the stage for 
closer European coordination throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the defeat of the 
Arab states in the 1967 War for the first time put the Palestinians at the forefront of the con-
flict and thus marked the rise of the PLO27
The Rise of the PLO 
 (Starke, 2000; Weingardt, 2002; Dowty, 2008). 
The PLO’s new charter, crafted in 1968, abandoned the notion of Palestine as a pan-
Arab issue and highlighted a unique Palestinian identity instead (Dowty, 2008). After the 
1973 War had destroyed the “myth of Israeli invincibility” and set the stage for a land for 
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, Egypt started to withdraw from the conflict 
(Starke, 2000; Dowty, 2008). Soon Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia started favoring a politi-
cal solution to the Middle East conflict, heralding a new phase of pragmatism (Starke, 2000). 
When the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 and when Jordan abandoned its 
claims to the West Bank in 1988, the Palestinian dimension of the conflict became even more 
prominent (Dowty, 2008). 
                                                 
27 While the PLO established itself as the primary Palestinian organization it was by no means the only one. 
Infighting between several Palestinian factions continues to this day. Even the PLO itself was and continues to 
be internally divided along a moderates-extremists continuum. The complexity of Palestinian identity and Pales-
tinian factions cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. 
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Although initially desiring the eradication of the State of Israel and the “total libera-
tion of Palestine” (Dowty, 2008, p. 122), the PLO, out of political calculations, gradually 
moved towards accepting a two-state solution. For hardliners accepting a small Palestinian 
state was only the first stage in the eventual reconquest of all of Palestine (Hottinger, 1989; 
Starke, 2000; Dowty, 2008). Whatever the underlying motivation, the change in the PLO po-
sition constituted a remarkable adaptation to new realities, including the changed attitudes of 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In its struggle for Palestinian self-determination the PLO 
soon capitalized on diplomatic means, using the UN as a forum as well as entertaining bila-
teral relations with a vast number of states (Starke, 2000; Dowty, 2008). Following Arafat’s 
speech before the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1974 the body affirmed “(a) The 
right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national indepen-
dence and sovereignty” for the Palestinians (UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, 1974). 
Gradually, the PLO established itself as the primary antagonist for Israel and could no longer 
be ignored by the world (Starke, 2000). 
The German and European Response 
Thanks to the successes of the FRG’s Ostpolitik – the rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union, the GDR and other east European states – and the consequent improvement in its se-
curity situation, West Germany gained in confidence and started to pursue a foreign policy 
distinct from the U.S. (Lavy, 1996). The FRG set greater store by coordination with the other 
EC states, which had developed a more pro-Arab position after 1967. Germany developed its 
official doctrine of “evenhandedness” in the Middle East conflict (Jaeger, 1994; Lavy, 1996). 
Owing to the Arab oil embargo on Europe, enforced during the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War, the admission of pro-Palestinian states (such as Greece) into the common market, and 
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the election of the Likud hardliner Menahem Begin in Israel in 1977, the EC became a lot 
more susceptible to Palestinian concerns. The European position toughened in light of Israeli 
settlement expansion, Israel’s perceived unwillingness to engage in meaningful dialogue and 
the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Kirisci, 1986). 
Following the 1973 War, the EC issued a declaration on the Middle East that de-
manded adherence to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 33828 and reiterated prin-
ciples such as the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force and the right to territorial in-
tegrity of all states in the Middle East. Going beyond resolution 242, it requested that a peace 
agreement consider “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians”29
                                                 
28 Demanding a ceasefire in the 1973 War and an immediate implementation of resolution 242 (UN Security 
Council, 1973) 
 (Neustadt, 1983; Jaeger, 
1994; Lavy, 1996). The acknowledgment of the rights of a Palestinian people was “revolu-
tionary” as no UN resolution had to that day made any reference to the Palestinians (Jaeger, 
1994, p. 55). When it came to addressing the “Palestinian question” the EC, led by France 
and the UK (Soetendorp, 1999), was the precursor in the west. That the FRG had prevented 
the declaration from assuming an even more pro-Palestinian character did not mitigate Israeli 
outrage and protests; neither did Chancellor Brandt’s vows that nothing had changed in Ger-
many’s Israel-friendly politics (Jaeger, 1994). He presented the document as a compromise 
between the FRG’s pro-Israeli attitude and the need to cooperate with the other EC states and 
suggested that as such it had caused some dissatisfaction for everyone (Neustadt, 1983; Lavy, 
1996). European dependency on Arab oil was also an important factor in the crafting of the 
EC declaration (Neustadt, 1983). 
29 “die legitimen Rechte der Palaestinenser”, full German text of the declaration in Jaeger, 1994, App. 9 
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Channels to officials and politicians in various European states increasingly opened to 
the PLO, including in West Germany. In 1975, a newly launched Euro-Arab dialogue gave 
the PLO further access to Europe (Kirisci, 1986; Weingardt, 2002). While France was the 
first western European state to maintain direct official contacts with the PLO, the FRG was 
the first state in the EC to acknowledge, in 1974, the Palestinian right to self-determination 
and the right to establish a state authority (Kirisci, 1986; Muellenmeister, 1988). 
In 1980 the EC passed the Venice Declaration, which extended the resolution of 1973 
by defining the Israeli settlements as illegal under international law and by calling for self-
determination of “the Palestinian people, which is aware of existing as such.”30
It must be noted that the EC continuously pressed the PLO to recognize Israel, to 
work towards a political solution to the conflict and to renounce violence (Kirisci, 1986). 
Moreover, despite their demand that the PLO be included in negotiations, the EC refused to 
recognize it as the sole representative of the Palestinian people (Kirisci, 1986; Weingardt, 
2002). In 1974 France abstained on the resolution that eventually granted the PLO observer 
status at the UN, while all other eight EC members were opposed (Lindemann, 1988). Ger-
many, unlike France, refused to initiate official relations with the PLO as the latter refused to 
recognize Israel’s right to exist (Muellenmeister, 1988; Jaeger, 1994; Weingardt, 2002). 
Weingardt suggests that a divergence existed between official statements in the FRG proc-
 The declara-
tion further called for an inclusion of the PLO in negotiations, which was rejected by the U.S. 
and Israel (Weingardt, 2002). Again, the FRG had prevented more distinctly pro-Palestinian 
language (Lavy, 1996). Overall, the tone in Europe had changed dramatically and the PLO 
had come to be seen as a fixture and a legitimate actor in the Middle East. 
                                                 
30 “Das palaestinensische Volk, das sich bewusst ist, als solches zu existieren”, full text in Jaeger, 1994, App. 6 
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laiming a politics of evenhandedness and its actual policy, which was marked by strong sup-
port for Israel (Weingardt, 2002), much as I found for the 1967 War. In her analysis from 
1975 to 1983, Lindemann (1988) found that Germany was the pro-Israeli pole among the EC 
states when it came to votes on the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the UN, 
with France and especially Greece having, relatively speaking, a pro-Arab record. 
On the whole, the EC position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1970s and ear-
ly 1980s reflected developments in the Middle East that awarded the PLO increasing legiti-
macy, although neither declaration actually had an impact in the Middle East other than an-
gering and alienating various factions in the Arab world as well as Israel (Neustadt, 1983; 
Jaeger, 1994; Soetendorp, 1999; Weingardt, 2002). The U.S., for its part, was very critical of 
EC involvement in the Middle East, which it perceived as being in competition with its own 
efforts, and the rift between their positions became more pronounced. While France pushed 
for an independent position, Germany acted as broker between EC and U.S. (Weingardt, 
2002). 
The 1982 Lebanon War 
The 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon, Operation “Peace in Galilee,” was a response 
to the buildup of a PLO base in southern Lebanon, from which attacks on northern Israel had 
been launched for years (Reich, 2008). In another interpretation, the Israeli invasion was an 
attempt to undermine moderate Arab forces, including the PLO, to avoid the division of Eretz 
Israel into two states (Starke, 2000). Likud-governed Israel was willing to award the Pales-
tinians local autonomy at best and was opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
The institution of a moderate regime in Lebanon and the signing of a bilateral peace treaty 
between Israel and Lebanon are further ventured as goals of the invasion (Weingardt, 2002). 
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In the 1982 war, Israel allied itself with anti-Palestinian forces in Lebanon, especially the 
Maronites, with the aim of forcing the PLO out of the south of the country and diminishing 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Israeli military eventually advanced all the way into 
Beirut, while Maronite forces murdered between 700 and 300031
German and EC foreign policy 
 Palestinians in refugee 
camps in the Sabra and Shatila massacres, which caused outrage in Israel as well as interna-
tionally. An investigative commission found the Israeli military to be indirectly responsible 
for the massacres. The Israeli army withdrew from Lebanon in two stages in 1983 and 1985, 
instituting a buffer zone controlled by pro-Israeli Lebanese forces at the border (Dowty, 
2008). 
In the 1980s the FRG regarded the EC as the framework within which it could and 
should employ its political weight (Weingardt, 2002). The economic and political value of 
the EC and of European unity was highlighted particularly by SPD politicians (Bundestag, 
108th Session, 1982), while the CDU/CSU emphasized the importance of the transatlantic 
alliance (Bulletin, November 11, 1982, pp. 993-6; Bundestag, 108th Session, 1982; D-B 
18.11, 1982). 
Chancellor Schmidt and Israeli Prime Minister Begin had a very tense relationship 
and expressed their mutual animosity in a number of public statements, which led to a mini-
crisis in German-Israeli relations. Among other things, Begin strongly criticized the German 
contribution to EC declarations, in particular the Venice Declaration, which were perceived 
as pro-PLO and hostile to Israel (Neustadt, 1983; Jaeger, 1994; Lavy, 1996). Just two days 
before the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
                                                 
31 Different estimates exist. Steininger (2006) speaks of 3,000 casualties, while Weingardt (2002) and Jaeger 
(1994) speak of 700 to 800 casualties reported by the Israelis and 2,000 by the Palestinians. 
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(FDP) left from a visit to Jerusalem. Reiterating in several talks, speeches and interviews 
Germany’s special responsibility for Israel and highlighting the weight of the past (D-B, 
18.7/8, 1982), he clearly tried to convey the impression that the German support for the Ve-
nice Declaration and for Palestinian self-determination was not in any way aimed against 
Israel. The acknowledgment of German responsibility for Israel and the desire for closer 
German-Israeli relations, he said, was shared across all German governments and by all par-
ties in the German parliament (D-B, 18.7/8, 1982), thus evoking the notion of an elite-level 
norm. Simultaneously, he contended that respecting the Palestinians’ right to self-
determination was necessary for peace and security in the region, including Israel’s security 
(D-B, 18.7/8, 1982; D-B, 18.9, 1982). He further repeated a theme already articulated in 
1967: “peace in the Middle East is also our peace” (D-B, 18.7/8, 1982, p. 8). 
In a June 9 declaration32, the EC “condemn[ed] emphatically the renewed invasion of 
Israel into Lebanon,”33 which was described as “unjustifiable” and a “flagrant violation of 
international law as well as of the most basic humanitarian principles.”34 The EC called for 
the recognition of Lebanon’s “independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity”35 and demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces. 
Clearly, the EC did not share Israeli foreign minister Shamir’s assessment that Israel was 
“engaged in a struggle for its existence.”36
                                                 
32 Full German text printed in Deutschland-Berichte (D-B), 18.7/8, 1982, p. 13 
 Threats of sanctions against Israel remained with-
out consequences, although the EC did not sign a planned financial agreement with Israel, 
thus denying the Jewish state a promised 40 Million DM loan (Weingardt, 2002). The UK, 
33 “verurteilen nachdruecklich den neuerlichen Einfall Israels in Libanon” 
34 “eine flagrante Verletzung des Voelkerrechts sowie der elementarsten humanitaeren Grundsaetze” 
35 “Unabhaengigkeit, Souveraenitaet, territoriale Unversehrtheit und [nationale] Einheit” 
36 Full speech (in German) printed in D-B, 18.7/8, 1982, p. 6 
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France and Greece had supported EC sanctions should Israel occupy Beirut, while the FRG 
and the Netherlands had favored the more moderate approach of withholding loans (Archiv 
d.G., June 27, 1982, pp. 25738-48) and prevailed. Germany and the Netherlands also op-
posed explicit references to the PLO in EC statements, favored by France (Greilshammer, 
1988; Soetendorp, 1999). Contrary to the EC, Secretary of State Dr. Corterier explained that 
the German government was not planning to suspend the payment of the annual 140 million 
DM loan, which it granted in light of German history (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 
9/1904, 1982). Further, a limited EC embargo on military shipments to Israel was lifted on 
German insistence in June 1983 while the FRG held the EC presidency (Greilshammer, 
1988). 
The EC’s principles from June 9 were extended in the conclusions of two sessions of 
the European Council in late June37 and early December38
The basic points of the EC declarations were repeated by Genscher, who used the 
same strong language but did not explicitly call for an Israeli withdrawal. Instead, he called 
on all parties in the Middle East to find a solution to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty and its 
state authority.
 by the demand for a withdrawal 
also of Palestinian, Syrian and all other foreign forces from Lebanon. Moreover, the June 
declaration cautioned that Israel could not ensure its own security through the use of force 
but only through respecting “the legitimate efforts of the Palestinian people.” 
39
                                                 
37 Full text printed in Bulletin, July 1, 1982, pp.609-611 
 Subsequently, several government officials reiterated in speeches, press 
conferences and interviews the necessity of ensuring the Palestinian right to self-
38 Full text printed in Bulletin, December 7, 1982, pp.1109-1111 
39 Full text of the statement printed in D-B, 19.7/8, 1982, p. 13 
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determination (Speaker for the government Dr. Ruehl40; Genscher41, Undersecretary of State 
Dr. Mertes42), the need for a PLO withdrawal from Lebanon to restore Lebanon’s sovereign-
ty, territorial integrity and state authority (Dr. Ruehl), as well as the rejection of war as a 
means to achieve political ends (Chancellor Schmidt43). In Amman, Genscher asserted that 
“the politics of the Federal Republic of Germany is a politics of peace”44
Interestingly, EC and U.S. positions converged again when the U.S. adopted some 
basic principles outlined in the Venice Declaration – no annexation of territory, a stop to set-
tlement construction and full autonomy for the Palestinians in the occupied territories – and 
incorporated them into a peace plan (Weingardt, 2002). This illustrates yet again the limita-
tions of Europe’s power and influence in the Middle East. The European position meant 
nothing until the U.S. took up some of the issues expressed in the Venice Declaration. More 
to the point, beyond statements, condemnations and declarations that were inconsequential in 
the Middle East, there was no German or EC foreign policy to speak of. Preoccupation with 
the Falklands crisis and the Iran-Iraq war as well as the rift that had occurred between Euro-
pean leaders and the Reagan administration certainly deterred a more active EC involvement 
(Greilshammer, 1988). In addition, developing a common European position still constituted 
a major challenge and resulted in watered-down documents that were rejected in the Middle 
East. The U.S. had little actual impact on German and EC positions, although the lack of Eu-
 that accepts only 
non-violent means of conflict resolution. 
                                                 
40 Statement on the withdrawal of the PLO from West-Beirut on August 20, 1982, full text printed in D-B, 18.9, 
1982 
41 Genscher in the ZDF’s television program Bonner Perspektiven on the situation in the Middle East on July 
18, 1982, full text printed in D-B 18.9, pp.4-5 
42 Speech before the VI. German-Israeli Conference on November 8, 1982, full text in Bulletin, November 11, 
1982, pp.993-996 
43 Interview with Die Welt on August 14, 1982, full text printed in D-B, 18.9, 1982, pp.3-4 
44 “Die Politik der Bundesregierung ist Friedenspolitik”; full text of speech printed in Bulletin, July 14, 1982, p. 
651 
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ropean influence gave the latter little choice other than to support the Reagan plan. The Ve-
nice Declaration “was completely relegated to the background” in the process, which alie-
nated the Arab world (Greilshammer, 1988, p. 298). Reagan’s peace plan was rejected by 
Israel and the PLO (Greilshammer, 1988; Weingardt, 2002). 
The EC45 and the FRG46 strongly condemned the atrocities committed in the Sabra 
and Shatial massacres. Both statements expressed “deep shock” and “horror” at the massa-
cres, called for measures to ensure the safety of civilians and demanded the immediate with-
drawal of all Israeli troops from West-Beirut and a withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon at the earliest possible date. The EC further declared the ongoing settlement con-
struction in the occupied territories a violation of international law, while this aspect was ab-
sent from the FRG statement. Finally, both statements expressed support for Reagan’s peace 
plan and approval of the Arab willingness to work towards a peaceful solution of the conflict, 
as expressed in the Fez plan.47 Although the Fez plan was not a viable peace plan for the 
FRG, it was praised for containing “a series of absolutely positive approaches” by Speaker 
for the German government Klaus Boelling48, and for departing from the three nos of Khar-
toum from 1967 – no to negotiations, no to peace, and no to recognition of Israel – by Under-
secretary of State Dr. Mertes.49
                                                 
45 Statement issued on September 20, 1982, full text in D-B 18.9, 1982,  pp.4-5 
 
46 Full text in Bulletin, September 24, 1982, pp. 807-8 
47 The plan implicitly recognized Israel by speaking of an Israeli withdrawal, including a removal of settle-
ments, from the territories occupied in 1967 only but otherwise included no explicit mention of a recognition. 
The new Palestinian state would be placed under the leadership of the PLO, the “sole and legitimate representa-
tive” of the Palestinian people, and would have Jerusalem as its capital. The UN would supervise the implemen-
tation of the peace plan, and freedom of religion would be guaranteed for the holy sites (the full text, in Ger-
man, is printed in Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Nahe Osten: Dokumentation, pp.243-5). 
48 “eine Reihe durchaus positiver Ansaetze,” text printed in D-B 19.10, 1982, p.6 
49 In the speech before the VI. German-Israeli Conference on November 8, 1982 
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The striking congruence of FRG and EC positions was not least of all the product of 
the FRG using its power to prevent sanctions against Israel and the inclusion of a reference to 
a Palestinian state in the June declaration. Further, the FRG remained the only EC state that 
refused to establish official contacts with the PLO (Jaeger, 1994). By contrast, Weingardt 
describes the EC as an opportune forum for the FRG within in which it could be less inhi-
bited in its criticism of Israel. While the EC was also a convenient institution to hide behind 
when it came to escaping different demands from the U.S. and the various parties in the Mid-
dle East (Weingardt, 2002), such tensions could not be avoided at all times. At the UN, the 
FRG tended to vote with the EC on issues pertaining to the Middle East conflict, while the 
U.S. and Israel were isolated (Archiv d.G., August 23, 1982, pp. 25879-87; Jaeger, 1994). 
More than in 1967, the commitment to Israel clashed with the desire for a common European 
position. As a consequence Germany decided to hide behind EC decisions on some occasions 
and was actively engaged in crafting them on others. 
Following the change in government on October 1, Undersecretary of State Dr. 
Mertes explained the new CDU/CSU/FDP coalition’s approach to the Middle East, which 
continued in the tradition of the SPD/FDP government. He made it plain that the Palestini-
ans’ “right to self-determination does not mean the right to annihilate Israel. The Palestini-
ans’ right to self-determination does not mean the right to rule over the neighboring state 
Lebanon.”50
                                                 
50 “Selbstbestimmungsrecht bedeutet nicht Vernichtungsrecht gegenueber Israel. Selbstbestimmungsrecht der 
Palaestinenser bedeutet nicht Verfuegungsrecht ueber den Nachbarstaat Libanon”, full text printed in D-B, 
18.11, 1982, pp.4-6. 
 Before the Bundestag, Dr. Mertes reaffirmed that as long as the PLO did not ex-
pressly recognize Israel’s right to exist, the FRG would not initiate official contacts with the 
PLO and would not extend an invitation to Yassir Arafat (Bundestag, 128th Session, 1982). 
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An interview with Chancellor Kohl from January 198351
Party Positions 
 also shows consistency with the 
previous government’s commitments: to maintain good relations with Israel and the Arab 
world, to advocate on behalf of Israel within the EC and to work towards a lasting peace in 
the Middle East based on Israel’s right to exist within recognized and secure borders, Pales-
tinian self-determination, and the renunciation of force. 
The Bundestag did not debate the Lebanon War or the situation in the Middle East at 
length. The tone of the debates that did take place was critical of Israel in the FDP and pro-
Israeli and critical of the PLO and Syria in the CDU/CSU, with the SPD situated in between. 
Even FDP politicians, despite voicing disapproval of Israeli government officials and Israeli 
actions, did not condemn the Israeli invasion in clear language, which confirms Jaeger’s 
(1994) assessment of restraint. All three parties agreed on the basic requirements for peace in 
the Middle East and in Lebanon: the recognition of Israel’s right to exist within secure bor-
ders, the Palestinian right to self-determination, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
Lebanon and an end to Palestinian violence against Israel. The need for nonviolence was em-
phasized by all parties as well (Bundestag, 105th Session, 1982; Bundestag, 108th Session, 
1982). 
Beyond this basic consensus, rhetoric and content diverged. For the SPD the conflict 
had been caused by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, while the presence of the PLO and Syrian 
forces in southern Lebanon constituted only a secondary factor (Dr. Soell, 105th Session). 
Nevertheless, the SPD was restrained in its criticism. Soell merely suggested that a multila-
teral approach would be more fruitful than Israel’s unilateral action in achieving a lasting 
                                                 
51 Full text printed in Vogel, Der deutsch-israelische Dialog, 1988,  pp. 899-902. 
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peace and overall provided a rather balanced statement that also placed blame on the PLO 
and Syria. At the same time, he acknowledged an indirect German responsibility for the Pal-
estinians as they had been impacted by the creation of the state of Israel (105th Session). 
Brandt suggested that historical guilt cannot compel Germans to “hold their tongue about se-
rious mistakes or new bloodshed”52
The FDP, similar to 1967, presented itself as the least Israel-friendly. Israel was con-
sidered the primary aggressor and was described as acting as though it had “special rights 
that were not granted any other state in the world”
 (108th Session, p. 6591B). He further expressed under-
standing for Israeli concerns and motivations but classified the Israeli invasion as a dispro-
portionate response to terrorist attacks and security deficits. Lebanon, which had become the 
pawn of several foreign powers, could only regain its territorial integrity if all foreign forces 
withdrew (108th Session). 
53 (Schaefer, 105th Session). Schaefer ac-
cused Israel of having long planned the invasion although a ceasefire agreed with the forces 
in Lebanon had been kept and wondered about Israel’s true intentions, suggesting that maybe 
the aim was a division of Lebanon into a Syrian-controlled north and an Israeli-controlled 
south (105th Session). Further, he evoked the notion of the Palestinians as “the last victims of 
national socialism”54
                                                 
52 “man zu ernsten Fehlern oder neuem Blutvergiessen den Mund haelt” 
 and blamed Israel, but also the Arab states, that there was no state the 
PLO could withdraw to if it left Lebanon, although he supported the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces (108th Session, 6624B). He further asserted that the PLO could not make unilateral 
concessions, such as recognizing Israel, as long as Israel denied the Palestinians the right to 
53 “Sonderrechte, die keinem anderen Staat der Welt zugebilligt werden” 
54 “diese letzten Opfer des Nationalsozialismus” 
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self-determination (108th Session). Overall, Schaefer called on Germans to reconsider their 
sense of moral obligation: 
There is no question about Israel’s right to exist for any of us, but we cannot 
from this draw the conclusion that, because of a fear nourished in Israel 20 
years ago to be thrown into the sea, one can now allow others to be driven into 
the sea.55
 
 
Schaefer also expressed the need for an evenhanded policy in deeds as well as in 
words and called on the European foreign ministers to identify other measures than mere dec-
larations (Schaefer, 105th Session). Finally, he articulated fears of a possible spillover effect 
of the conflict (105th Session, 108th Session). Despite all the criticism, even he did not con-
demn the Israeli invasion or Israeli actions in clear language.  
The CDU/CSU regarded the Syrian and PLO occupation of Lebanon, as well as at-
tacks on Israel launched by the PLO, as the primary causes of the war. This position was pre-
sented by Klein, Graf Huyn, Lenz (105th Session), Dr. Dregger, Dr. Woerner (108th Session) 
and Dr. Mertes in his capacity as speaker of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group (D-B, 
18.7/8, 1982). The PLO was blamed for stalling the peace process by not recognizing Israel 
(Reddemann, 108th Session). On the other hand, the Israeli invasion was not condemned or 
even criticized; instead, Israel was praised for its willingness to trade land for peace, as dem-
onstrated by the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Lebanon was seen as a possible case to 
ensure a second secure border for Israel (Klein, 105th Session). The faits accomplis created 
by Israel’s invasion were simply accepted: “Maybe the current conflict is a chance for a new 
                                                 
55 “Das Existenzrecht Israels steht fuer uns alle nicht in Frage, aber wir koennen daraus nicht den Schluss zie-
hen, man koenne nach der vor 20 Jahren in Israel gehegten Befuerchtung, ins Meer geworfen zu werden, umge-
kehrt zulassen, dass andere ins Meer getrieben werden” (108th Session, 6625B-C) 
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beginning with another neighbor” (Klein, 105th Session).56
The possible argument that the CDU/CSU’s advocacy on behalf of Israel might have 
been a consequence of its opposition role is somewhat weakened by the continued skepticism 
of the PLO that Secretary of State Dr. Mertes expressed once the CDU/CSU was in govern-
ment. Further, the Kohl government worked towards improving German-Israeli relations in 
1983 (Greilshammer, 1988), although Kohl’s subsequent emphasis on “normal relations” was 
met with disapproval in Israel (Weingardt, 2002). Compared to 1967, the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD had switched positions, while the FDP maintained its neutral tone. Foreign minister 
Genscher (FDP), however, was perceived in Israel as one of the greatest advocates of Israeli 
interests in the German government (Weingardt, 2002).  
 Dr. Dregger moreover cautioned 
against reprimanding Israel from a moral high ground when the German security situation 
was not comparable to Israel’s (108th Session). 
Public opinion 
Although the German public was one of the more moderate in Europe, the 1982 Leb-
anon War changed previously philo-Zionist attitudes (Greilshammer, 1988). This was re-
flected in the press coverage of the war, exemplified by several articles from Die Zeit. One 
author titled his comment “Blind Vengeance” and characterized the Israeli invasion as exhi-
biting “brutal ruthlessness” that targeted “guerillas” as well as civilians (Die Zeit, Stroth-
mann, 06/11/1982). Another spoke of a “crusade of extermination” (Vernichtungsfeldzug) 
that “with imperial arrogance” turned Lebanon into a “blood-soaked battleground” and clas-
sified the Palestinians as “the Jews of the Arab world,” who are no more terrorists than Jew-
ish resistance fighters had been in the 1940s (Die Zeit, 07/17/1982). Yet another concluded: 
                                                 
56 “Vielleicht bietet die gegenwaertige Auseinandersetzung eine Moeglichkeit fuer einen Neuanfang mit einem 
weiteren Nachbarn.” 
59 
Such a war can never achieve peace. Even if Begin gives it the tag ‘self-
defense’ – it does not serve any purpose other than liquidation. Revenge has 
always been a bad counselor. Have the Jews forgotten their own, terrible 
past?57
 
 
Even more moderate commentators suggested that the war was not one of necessity 
and constituted just another episode in undermining Palestinian self-determination, thus di-
minishing the chances for peace (Die Zeit, 06/18/1982). Further, the idea that the Palestinians 
were the indirect victims of the Holocaust, suffering the consequences of the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine, started resonating with the public (Die Zeit, 07/02/1982). 
Two processes within parts of German society changed the perception of Israel. First, 
the younger generation started rejecting the notions of collective guilt and shame and hence 
of the special commitment to Israel, embracing a less inhibited approach to German-Israeli 
relations (Jaeger, 1994; Dr. Mertes58
                                                 
57 “Frieden kann solcher Krieg nie schaffen. Auch wenn Begin ihm das Schild ‘Selbstverteidigung’ umhängt - 
er bezweckt doch nichts anderes als Liquidierung. Rache war noch immer ein schlechter Ratgeber. Haben die 
Juden ihre eigene, schreckliche Geschichte vergessen?” (Die Zeit, 06/11/1982) 
). Second, the 1982 Lebanon war, which was not seen as 
a war of self-defense or of necessity for Israel’s survival, was instrumentalized to demon-
strate that Israel was not the eternal innocent victim but was supposedly capable of the same 
atrocities that the Nazis had been – that the victims had become perpetrators. Comparisons 
with the Third Reich abounded, especially in the case of the Sabra and Shatila massacres. In 
some interpretations this strategy was employed to negate German guilt (Neustadt, 1989; 
Jaeger, 1994), which was observed by politicians as well. In his capacity as SPD chairman, 
Brandt cautioned his “fellow compatriots” in a November 9, 1982 Bundestag debate that “we 
58 In a speech before the VI. German-Israeli Conference, Dr. Mertes mentioned this phenomenon. He empha-
sized also that Germany has to voluntarily accept a sense of commitment to Israel and that this cannot be exter-
nally enforced by Israel. Full text in Bulletin, November 11, 1982, pp.993-996 
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do not escape the responsibility for Auschwitz by pointing to Beirut”59
Jaeger also points to a third factor in the change in German public attitudes: the con-
solidation of a Friedensverstaendnis, the rejection of war as a political means (Jaeger, 1994). 
Bergmann and Erb similarly attribute the high degree of empathy with the Palestinians 
among young people to the existence of a pacifist orientation and a commitment to values 
such as human rights and international law. For the first time, the public showed greater em-
pathy and support for the Palestinians than for the Israelis (about 25 vs. 20 percent) in 1982 
(Bergmann & Erb, 1991, p. 182). 
 and suggested that 
balancing the victims of the Nazis against the victims of the war in the Middle East will not 
rid Germany of its responsibility. 
Summary 
What had clearly emerged after the 1970s was an understanding that a Europe speak-
ing with one voice would be the only way the EC could have an impact in the Middle East. 
The FRG embedded its foreign policy in the European framework as much as possible and 
focused on impacting EC policies rather than acting through bilateral channels. Nevertheless, 
finding a common position remained a major challenge, and the divisions between different 
EC states (ten at the time) caused weak and ineffectual compromises. Still more difficult than 
agreeing on a common position was agreeing on a course of action. Greilshammer (1988) 
concludes, inter alia:  
The Europeans should refrain from making numerous 'solemn declarations' 
and proposing ready-made solutions, and should rather employ discrete dip-
lomatic methods, in order to suggest to the parties a wide range of alternatives 
to put an end to the crisis. … The Europeans must understand that their inter-
vention in an international crisis can never be effective if they are not ready to 
                                                 
59 “Wir entgehen der Verantwortung fuer Auschwitz nicht dadurch, dass wir auf Beirut zeigen”, excerpt printed 
in D-B, 18.10, 1982, pp.8-9 
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commit themselves, if not militarily, at least on an economic level. This im-
plies, on the one hand, a promise of massive economic and military aid to the 
parties who accept the demands of the Europeans and, on the other, a real 
threat of serious sanctions against a party who refuses. (p. 301, emphasis in 
original) 
 
The most important impression to take away from this case may be that a European 
identity became ingrained in the FRG’s foreign political culture and received the highest 
priority at the expense of an effective Middle East policy. European integration certainly had 
material advantages for Germany, but in light of the difficulty of developing a coherent and 
substantive EC Middle East policy, the FRG might have achieved more on the bilateral level 
in the Middle East, considering its standing with Israel, the Arab states, the Palestinians and, 
of course, the U.S. 
Unlike in 1971, the FRG continued to express its commitment and adherence to the 
Venice Declaration, in particular on the issue of Palestinian self-determination, and there was 
no backpaddling and there were no qualifications of principles in light of Israeli protests. In 
highlighting Germany’s continued responsibility for Israel and repeating the understanding 
that peace in the Middle East is impossible without taking the needs and rights of both sides 
into account, Genscher merely tried to show that the support for Palestinian rights did not 
constitute an anti-Israel policy. This determined consistency was not, however, backed up by 
“discrete diplomatic methods” or any substantial involvement in the conflict. 
Germany and the EC were certainly absorbed by other international crises as well as 
transatlantic tensions and operated within a framework of constrained foreign policy inde-
pendence, all of which prevented a more proactive engagement. European acceptance of the 
status quo, as far as European influence in the Middle East was concerned, was probably also 
a consequence of normalized political and economic relations with Arab states and the limi-
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tations of European power, especially compared to the U.S. Nevertheless, taking into account 
the proximity of the Middle East and the proclaimed German and European interest in re-
gional peace, the almost exclusively rhetorical involvement is puzzling. Defensive realism 
explains German and EC policy in the 1982 Lebanon War only insofar as the chosen policies 
produced no political and economic losses in the relations with the Arab world or with Israel. 
In addition to the commitment to a common EC position, the philo-Zionist norm was 
the most important determinant of German foreign policy. In a review of his position as 
German ambassador in Israel from 1981 to 1985, Niels Hansen reports that the past was om-
nipresent and impacted German foreign policy and the German-Israeli dialogue significantly 
on a daily basis (Hansen, 2005). A commitment to Israel, derived from the past, remained 
evident especially in German reticence – at the governmental level as well as in Bundestag 
debates. The FRG also continued to pursue a pro-Israeli policy in the EC and, to a lesser ex-
tent, at the UN. 
This commitment to Israel was increasingly challenged by other norms and interests. 
On the German (Dr. Mertes60, Boelling61) and on the Israeli (Ambassador in Bonn, Ben 
Arie62
                                                 
60 Expressed in a declaration on behalf of the CDU/CSU Bundestag parliamentary group in July 1982 (full text 
printed in D-B, 18.7/8, 1982, pp. 12-3) and in a speech in the capacity of Undersecretary of State on November 
11, 1982 (full text printed in Bulletin, November 11, 1982, pp.993-6) 
) side the connection between the demand for Palestinian self-determination and Ger-
man self-determination was accentuated. A plausible interpretation is that the German inter-
est in unification and in full self-determination developed over time into a universal norm 
whose application to other peoples could not be denied. The clash of the norm of philo-
Zionism and the commitment to national self-determination had transpired in the mid-1970s, 
61 Undersecretary of State Boelling in a press conference on September 23, 1982 (full text printed in D-B, 
18.10, 1982,  p.4) 
62 In an interview with Rolf Vogel in July 1982 (full text in D-B, 18.7/8, 1982, p. 10) 
63 
when the FRG first started evoking the Palestinian right to self-determination and was chas-
tised for it by Israel. A commitment to international law and peaceful conflict resolution had 
also solidified, both in the political elite and among the population. 
One must caution against too readily embracing a constructivist reading of the case, 
however. The support for Palestinian self-determination could also have been a self-
interested, strategic move aimed at dispelling suspicions that the German leadership employs 
double standards, which would reflect positively upon the FRG. In a more instrumental in-
terpretation still, the extension of the norm of self-determination to the Palestinians consti-
tuted the basis for demanding the same sort of acknowledgment of self-determination for the 
divided German people from states that granted it to the Palestinians. Furthermore, German 
reticence was not necessarily a consequence of a sense of responsibility for Israel in its own 
right but may also be interpreted as an attempt to prevent a further deterioration of German-
Israeli relations, which could eventually have repercussions on levels of bilateral relations 
other than the political as well. In these cases, a liberal reading of German foreign policy 
would be more convincing. Finally, the commitment to the renunciation of force cannot be 
regarded simply as a norm but was sparked also by the fear of a war in Europe, which would 
be most detrimental for the FRG.63
  
 Both liberal and realpolitical elements impacted German 
foreign policy, although the divergence between German and UK and especially French atti-
tudes lends support to the constructivist interpretation. 
                                                 
63 This perspective was shared particularly by CDU/CSU politicians, who remained more critical of the Soviet 
Union and its policies than the SPD and FDP, while the FDP was most fearful of a spillover effect of conflict in 
the Middle East (Bundestag, 105th Session, 1982; Bundestag, 108th Session, 1982). 
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Case 3: The First Intifada (1987-1989[1991]) 
The First Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, was a response to the detrimental political and economic effects the 
occupation had on the Palestinian population as well as on the exercise of their human rights. 
Frustration that attempts to obtain a sovereign Palestinian state had failed sparked mass mo-
bilization and streamlined Palestinian nationalism (Hottinger, 1988; Hottinger, 1989; Stein, 
1991; Dowty, 2008). The intifada brought Palestinian national consciousness to unprecedent-
ed heights and produced “a deeper and prolonged Palestinian national coherence” than the 
uprisings of 1936-9 had done (Stein, 1991, p. 3). Following a trend that had emerged after 
1967, this phenomenon was reinforced by a sense of disillusionment with neighboring Arab 
states, whose support for the Palestinian cause was perceived to be predominantly “rhetorical 
and self-serving” (Stein, 1991, p. 7). The new Palestinian nationalism had its base in the oc-
cupied territories rather than in the Palestinian refugee communities dispersed in the Arab 
world, and its leaders were more prone to make territorial concessions to Israel in exchange 
for statehood (Hottinger, 1988; Hottinger, 1989; Dowty, 2008). At the same time, widespread 
despair and disillusionment galvanized an Islamic religious as well as a militant element in 
the resistance (Stein, 1991; Dowty, 2008). 
The intifada was initiated by the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Wein-
gardt, 2002). It was only two to three months into the uprising that the PLO managed to ob-
tain a measure of control (Stein, 1991) and gradually became the driving force behind it 
(Weingardt, 2002). Acts of civil disobedience and political violence dominated (Stein, 1991), 
while terrorism was also pursued by various Palestinian factions (Hottinger, 1988; 
Weingardt, 2002). For the international community, the face of the intifada were stone-
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throwing children and youth, who faced heavily armed Israeli troops (Die Zeit, 1988; Stein, 
1991; Jaeger, 1994; Weingardt, 2002). This had a great propaganda value for the Palestinians 
(Jaeger, 1994), and the PLO could strengthen its international profile, including in the West, 
until it supported Saddam Hussein in the Kuwait crisis in 1990 (Weingardt, 2002). When in 
1988 Jordan relinquished its claims to the West Bank, Yasser Arafat proclaimed a Palestinian 
state consisting of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He further renounced terrorism and ex-
plicitly recognized the state of Israel (Hottinger, 1989; Weingardt, 2002). This shift in PLO 
attitudes brought about the first series of official talks between the U.S. and the PLO, which 
were opposed and criticized by Israel (Hottinger, 1989; Weingardt, 2002; Dowty, 2008). 
The reported number of casualties varies greatly from source to source: by November 
1989, for example, the PLO reported 1003 Palestinian casualties, while the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) counted 525 Palestinian and 19 Israeli casualties. Similarly, different authors 
provide different statistics (Weingardt, 2002). Little doubt exists that the Israeli government 
encouraged a brutal approach to stone-throwing Palestinians. The IDF drew international 
criticism for its brutal and repressive dealings with the rebelling Palestinians (Hottinger, 
1988; Jaeger, 1994; Weingardt, 2002). The Israeli army foraged also into southern Lebanon, 
where it targeted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in air-bombings (Die Zeit, 
01/08/1988). 
German and EC Foreign Policy 
The analysis of this case is confined to 1987-1989, i.e. to the pre-unification period. 
Although spanning the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification, the First Intifada does 
not lend itself to identifying change and continuity pre- and post-unification. The FRG was 
so absorbed with domestic issues and with ensuring as smooth a process of national unifica-
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tion as possible that its late 1990/early 1991 foreign policy profile could hardly be repre-
sentative of post-unification foreign policy. If unification produced a foreign policy change, 
it will not have shown in the early 1990s. 
German and EC foreign policy towards the intifada must be considered in the interna-
tional political context. At the time the Palestinian uprising gained momentum, an end to the 
Cold War was imminent, brought about by Soviet détente policy (Weingardt, 2002). This de-
velopment further decreased concerns about Soviet penetration in the Middle East, which had 
already played a minor role in 1982, thus diminishing the strategic interests of the EC and its 
member states in the region. The FRG, caught up in a power struggle with the GDR through-
out the Cold War period, was especially impacted by this change. 
Another factor was European integration, which was rapidly progressing and ab-
sorbed much political, economic and diplomatic energy. In a press conference in February 
1988, Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasized the “existential significance” that European inte-
gration had for the FRG and that this integration should not just be of an economic but also 
of a social and political nature. The eventual aim should be a Europe “that can make its voice 
heard, speak with one voice, that can live up to its responsibility in the world, can do its bit to 
tackle problems on the old continent and outside in the world.”64
                                                 
64 “das seine Stimme erheben kann, mit einer Stimme spricht, das seiner Verantwortung in der Welt gerecht 
wird, seinen Beitrag leistet zur Bewaeltigung der Probleme im alten Kontinent und draussen in der Welt”, full 
text printed in D-B, 24.3, 1988, pp.9-10 
 In January 1989, Kohl hig-
hlighted the priority of establishing the European single market and furthering cooperation on 
the issue of a monetary union. He also announced that the EC was determined to exert its 
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“political weight” in the peace negotiations in the Middle East, “still one of the most danger-
ous conflict zones on the planet”65
As had been the case in 1982, the German and European response to the First Intifada 
was characterized above all by reticence and was largely limited to rhetoric: declarations, 
resolutions and demarches were the tools of choice. The FRG ambassador to Israel ex-
pressed, on behalf of the twelve
, but did not discuss specific initiatives. 
66 EC states, “concern” at Israel’s decision to “pursue a poli-
cy of deportations in the occupied territories”67 in a January 1988 demarche. The EC states 
called on Israel to end this practice, while pointing out that the 1949 Geneva Convention on 
the protection of civilians in times of war applied to the occupied territories. Another de-
marche criticizing deportations was undertaken in August 1988.68
In a February 8, 1988 statement, the EC described the status quo in the occupied terri-
tories as “untenable” and “deeply deplore[d]”
 The U.S. administration as 
well, departing from its traditional pro-Israeli stance, classified the deportations as a violation 
of international law (Die Zeit, 01/08/1988) and reacted with outrage to Israel’s disproportio-
nate use of force (Die Zeit, 01/15/1988). The U.S. government’s 1988 report on human rights 
abuses dedicated twelve pages to Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories 
(Die Zeit, 02/17/1989) 
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65 “noch immer einer der gefaehrlichsten Konfliktherde dieser Erde”, full text printed in D-B 25.2, 1989, pp.2-4  
 the continuing construction of illegal Israeli 
settlements as well as Israel’s repressive behavior in dealing with Palestinian protestors. The 
member states reasserted their commitment to the 1980 Venice Declaration, expressed sup-
port for the idea of an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN and 
66 Belgium, Denmark, FRG, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK 
67 “in den besetzten Gebieten eine Ausweisungspolitik zu verfolgen”, full text in Europa-Archiv 6, 1988, D 184 
68 Full German text in Europa-Archiv 1, 1989, D 10; D-B 24.3, 1998, pp. 8-9 
69 “unhaltbar”; “bedauern zutiefst”, full text in Europa-Archiv 6, 1988, D 187-8 
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pledged to continue the EC development program in the occupied territories and increase 
humanitarian aid. An April 1988 statement again only “deplored” the increases in the number 
of casualties caused by continued use of violence in the territories, further deportations of 
Palestinians, and Israeli repressive measures violating international law, including the demo-
lition of Palestinian homes. Israel was called on to consider “the impacts of such measures on 
the deteriorating situation in the occupied territories as well as on the search for a sustainable 
peace achieved through negotiation.”70
Clear condemnations of Israeli actions, even if they were in violation of international 
law, were absent from all statements, which used largely cautious language. The EC and its 
member states exercised restraint: although support for the peace process was repeatedly rei-
terated, it was not backed up by deeds. One exception was that the European Parliament, de-
spite Genscher’s opposition, put already agreed-upon trade agreements on hold.
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While many EC states called off or postponed planned official visits to Israel to pro-
test the Israeli response to the intifada, German visits continued unabated: for example, Pres-
ident of the German Bundestag Jenninger was the only foreign parliamentary president to 
 Both the 
inward focus of the EC and the realization that the U.S. was the only external actor powerful 
enough to impact developments in the Middle East deterred a more proactive European in-
volvement (Weingardt, 2002). Further, Israel made it quite plain that, after the 1980 Venice 
Declaration, it would not accept the EC as a mediator in the conflict (Jaeger, 1994; Haas, 
2005). The consensus at the German embassy in Israel in the second half of the 1980s was 
that a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was out of reach (Haas, 2005). 
                                                 
70 “die Auswirkungen solcher Massnahmen auf die sich verschlechternde Lage in den besetzten Gebieten sowie 
auf die Suche nach einem dauerhaften und auf dem Verhandlungswege erreichten Frieden”, full text printed in 
Europa-Archiv 16, 1988, D 458-9 
71 As asserted by Genscher in the Bundestag on March 11, 1988 (Bundestag, 69th Session, 1989) 
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attend the celebrations commemorating Israel’s 40th anniversary in 1988, while a unit from 
the German Bundeswehr visited Israel for the first time that same year (Bar-On, 2008). De-
mands by the SPD and the Green Party, now represented in the Bundestag, to seek dialog and 
establish relations with the PLO were rejected by the government (Bundestag, 83rd Session, 
1988, p. 5657C; Bar-On, 2008). 
The Proclamation of the Palestinian State and the PNC Political Statement 
On November 15, 1988, following Jordan’s decision to relinquish its claim to the 
West Bank, the Palestine National Council (PNC)72 issued a Palestinian Declaration of Inde-
pendence. The declaration referenced UN Security Council resolution 181 from 1947, which 
partitioned Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian state and which had long been rejected 
by the Palestinians and Arab states, as a document granting the Palestinian right to “sove-
reignty and national independence” international legitimacy. The newly proclaimed Arab 
Palestinian state was to be a parliamentary democracy, based on freedom of expression, so-
cial justice, equality and the rule of law, and majority-governed while protecting minority 
rights. It was further proclaimed to be committed to the principal of peaceful coexistence and 
a “peace-loving state,” while the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was 
condemned as “organized terror.”73
The PNC’s Political Communiqué accompanying the proclamation of the Palestinian 
state recognized UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, thus implicitly recognizing 
Israel, and called for an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN. Further, 
the “blessed” or “glorious intifadah” was praised and its fighters encouraged to keep up the 
resistance, while Israel was condemned as “a fascist, racist, colonialist state built on the 
 
                                                 
72 The PLO’s legislative body 
73 Full text in Documents and Source Material, Journal of Palestine Studies 18.2, 1989, pp.213-6 
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usurpation of the Palestinian land and the annihilation of the Palestinian people.”74 In light of 
such content and rhetoric it is hardly surprising that Israel rejected the proclamation and the 
communiqué as “a further maneuver of disinformation with the aim of spreading illusions 
and misleading the world public”75
American and European reactions were a lot more positive. Genscher, in an official 
response to the PNC decisions, called the recognition of resolutions 242 and 338 “an impor-
tant step” and expressed German support for an international peace conference to be arranged 
as soon as possible.
 and insisted that the PLO remained the major obstacle to 
Middle East peace. 
76
                                                 
74 Full text in Documents and Source Material, Journal of Palestine Studies 18.2, 1989, pp. 216-23 
 Beyond that, the FRG refused, out of consideration and solidarity with 
Israel and the U.S., to revise its critical stance vis-à-vis the PLO, even though the EC had de-
cided to initiate a political dialogue with the PLO and some of its member states, including 
France, were upgrading their relations with the PLO (Jaeger, 1997; Bar-On, 2008). Due to 
the FRG’s pro-Israeli attitude, German defense minister Scholz was received warmly in Jeru-
salem in the spring of 1989 (Bar-On, 2008). German ambassador to Israel from 1985 to 1990, 
Wihelm Haas asserts that this period further consolidated German-Israeli relations and that 
Germany emerged as Israel’s second-most important partner after the U.S. (Haas, 2005). Ac-
cording to the journalist Inge Deutschkron, the intifada improved German-Israeli relations 
because Israelis realized that, apart from the U.S., they would not encounter a “similarly em-
pathetic understanding” anywhere but in Germany (Haas, 2005, p. 181). Die Zeit reported 
that for many Israelis the Germans had proven to be reliable partners and not seldom even the 
only true friends. Thus, president of the Bundestag Jenninger’s 1988 visit to Jerusalem to at-
75 “ein weiteres Desinformationsmanoever mit dem Ziel, Illusionen zu verbreiten und die Weltoeffentlichkeit zu 
taeuschen”, full German text of the statement in Europa-Archiv 2, 1989, D 56 
76 Full German text in Europa-Archiv 2, 1989, D 55 
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tend the celebrations marking Israel’s 40th anniversary was gladly received in Israel as a sign 
of German support (Die Zeit, 05/20/1988). 
When Arafat also renounced terrorism and explicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist 
in safe and secure borders, the U.S. for the first time entered into direct talks with the PLO. 
These were broken off in June 1990, when the U.S. found that the PLO had not truly dis-
tanced itself from terrorist attacks (Weingardt, 2002). In November 1988, the EC expressed 
its “satisfaction” at the renunciation of terrorism and at the recognition of Israel’s right to ex-
ist by the PNC, once more expressed itself “deeply concerned” at the further deterioration of 
the situation in the occupied territories and called on all parties to end violence and other ac-
tions that may further escalate the situation.77
Only about a year after the proclamation did the FRG initiate official talks with the 
PLO and receive political advisor to Arafat Bassam Abu Sharif in Bonn. According to Wein-
gardt, the FRG did so gladly because of its continued interest in close economic relations 
with the Arab world; it wanted to send a “positive signal” (Weingardt, 2002, p. 340). Never-
 That this communiqué did not have a more 
pro-Palestinian character, as desired by the French, Italian and Greek foreign ministers, and 
was restrained in its deprecation of Israel’s negative response to the PNC’s political commu-
niqué was a result of German influence (Jaeger, 1997). It was also owing to Germany’s skep-
ticism of the PLO and its solidarity with Israel that the EC never commented on the declara-
tion of Palestinian statehood and that a meeting with Arafat never took place (Weingardt, 
2002). The FRG voted in favor of the UN allowing Arafat to address the UN General As-
sembly in Geneva in November 1988, however; only the U.S. and Israel were opposed (Jaeg-
er, 1997). 
                                                 
77 “Befriedigung”; “aeusserst besorgt”, full German text of the statement in Europa-Archiv 1, 1989, D 14-5 
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theless, the FRG refused to establish political relations with the PLO, unlike other EC states 
(including France and the UK) had done (Jaeger, 1997), and insisted that Germany’s Middle 
East policy would be informed first and foremost by German history (Bar-On, 2008). France, 
on the other hand, had officially received Arafat “with all protocolary honors” (Dr. Osswald, 
SPD, Bundestag, 171st Session, 1989, p. 12831B). 
Increasingly, the FRG found itself in the dilemma of balancing its European identity 
with its historic commitment to Israel (Bar-On, 2008), which was also reflected in debates in 
the Bundestag (Bundestag, 171st Session, 1989). The FRG was the last EC member state to 
cling to its distinctly pro-Israeli stance but in June 1990 supported an EC condemnation of 
Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians which used “unusually critical words” (Bar-On, 
2008, p. 123) and was unable to annul EC sanctions against Israel, decided in early 1990 
(Bar-On, 2008). Whether the German change of direction was a genuine commitment to the 
European consensus or whether it was the byproduct of a focus on domestic issues following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall is hard to determine. When the PLO expressed support for Iraq in 
the Kuwait crisis in 1990, the EC states followed the U.S. example and distanced themselves 
once again from the organization (Bar-On, 2008). 
Foreign aid to the Palestinians in the occupied territories amounted to 28 million DM 
between 1967 and 1988, with payments amounting to 10 million DM in 1987 and to 11 mil-
lion DM in 1988, while 1.2 million DM were contributed in humanitarian aid. In addition, 
the FRG paid 9.92 million DM to UNRWA directly in 1988 and contributed about 27 percent 
of the EC’s $40 million aid, although these payments benefited also Lebanon, Jordan and Sy-
ria, which hosted Palestinian refugees. The FRG further contributed to the EC Commission’s 
aid program, which provided 2.97 million ECU in 1988 to support small scale agricultural 
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and industrial programs, education and local governance initiatives (Deutscher Bundestag, 
Drucksache 11/4870, 1989). It is hard to reject contentions that compared to the FRG’s con-
tinued annual payments to Israel in the amount of 150 million DM, the financial aid to the 
Palestinians looked like charity (Dr. Osswald, SPD) or like a symbolic gesture (Beer, Greens, 
Bundestag, 171st Session, 1989). 
Party Positions 
A March 11, 1988 Bundestag (69th Session) debate provides a surprisingly balanced 
assessment of the First Intifada, which can under the circumstances even be described as dis-
tinctly pro-Israeli. The position towards the Middle East in all parties remained grounded in 
the principles articulated in previous years: Israel’s right to exist in secure borders, the Pales-
tinian right to self-determination, and the renunciation of force. Beyond this, the overall em-
pathetic and determinedly Israel-friendly tone of the debate reflects neither the severe criti-
cism issued by the EC nor the restrained-perturbed tenor of official government statements. 
Every single speaker evoked the notion of a German responsibility for the state of 
Israel and peace in the Middle East, derived from the Holocaust.78 Gansel (SPD) went as far 
as asserting that a debate in the German Bundestag about the situation in the Middle East “is 
invariably also a debate about ourselves”79, while Bulmahn (SPD) stated similarly that it is 
also “a debate about our past, about our heavy heritage, about our self-conception and about 
our future.”80
                                                 
78 Dr. Stercken (CDU/CSU), Gansel (SPD), Dr. Hamm-Bruecher (FDP), Genscher (FDP), Renger (SPD), Geig-
er (CDU/CSU), Schily (Green Party), Bulmahn (SPD) 
 In the 171st session on October 26, 1989, Dr. Osswald (SPD) classified Germa-
ny’s reticence vis-à-vis the Middle East and especially vis-à-vis Israel, practiced by govern-
ments across all parties, as “part of our coming to terms with the past” (p. 12831A). 
79 “ist unverneidlich auch eine Aussprache ueber uns selber” (p. 4669D) 
80 “eine Debatte ueber unsere Vergangenheit, ueber unsere schwere Erbschaft, ueber unser Selbstverstaendnis 
und ueber unsere Zukunft” (p. 4682A) 
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How emotional an issue was debated became evident during Schily’s (Green Party) 
speech, when he remained silent for 40 seconds after insisting that nothing can undo German 
guilt and then had to end his speech prematurely (Jaeger, 1994).81 A prominent theme, 
evoked by members of CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP, was the concept of Israel as the home for 
Holocaust survivors, who had endured persecution and had escaped the industrialized murder 
of six million Jews in Europe82, only to find themselves face to face with Arab states desiring 
the eradication of the newly founded Jewish state. Speakers from CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP 
highlighted their understanding for Israel’s perception of insecurity and its heightened need 
for security, reinforced by Arab hostility, which had led to several interstate wars and had 
been officially proclaimed by Arab leaders on various occasions.83 Opinions on this situation 
as of 1988 differed, however. While Dr. Stercken (CDU/CSU) and Gansel (SPD)84
Strong criticism of Israeli actions – most prominently the violent IDF response to 
stone-throwing Palestinian youth, but also of deportations (Genscher, FDP) and of Israeli set-
 consi-
dered threats to Israel’s survival a phenomenon of the past, Dr. Hamm-Bruecher (FDP) and 
Renger (SPD) pointed to continued terrorism and hostile statements by Palestinian and Arab 
leaders. Likewise, assessments on the nature of the intifada diverged between those who con-
sidered it a popular uprising that employed non-military means (Gansel, SPD; Genscher, 
FDP) and those identifying a violent element of terrorism at its core (Dr. Hamm-Bruecher, 
FDP; Renger, SPD; Bulmahn, SPD). 
                                                 
81 Schily had  vehemently rejected comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germany and criticized some Germans’ as-
sertions that after Israeli wrongdoing in the Middle East, Germans and Jews were even. After saying “But the 
blood cannot be washed off” he fell silent and had to resume his speech at a later point. 
82 This position was presented by Dr. Stercken, CDU/CSU, Gansel, SPD, Genscher (FDP) and Renger (SPD). 
83 See Dr. Stercken (CDU/CSU), Dr. Hamm-Bruechen (FDP), Genscher (FDP), Renger (SPD) and Bulmahn 
(SPD) 
84 Gansel stated: “Israel’s security is not threatened by burning car tires, by strikes or even by stone-throwing 
Palestinian youth”; “durch brennende Autoreifen, durch Streiks und selbst durch Steinwuerfe palaestinensischer 
Jugendlicher wird die Sicherheit Israels nicht gefaehrdet” (p. 4671) 
75 
tlement construction (Renger, SPD) – was voiced unanimously. It was, however, mentioned 
jointly with criticism of Palestinian violence across the board, with references to protests 
within Israeli society and to the Israeli peace movement (Genscher, FDP; Renger, SPD; 
Geiger, CDU/CSU; Schily, Green Party), and with the contention that Israeli soldiers were 
not trained to deal with popular uprisings but that human rights violations were punished 
(Renger, SPD; Geiger, CDU/CSU). Overall, blame was placed on Israel and the Palestinians 
equally, while an understanding for Israeli security concerns resonated with all speakers. 
Representatives of FDP (Genscher), SPD (Renger) and the Green Party (Schily) called for an 
international peace conference under the auspices of the UN and involving all parties to the 
conflict, including the PLO. 
Despite minor deviations, the debate was marked by great inter-party agreement, re-
flected also in the unusually high rate of universal or near-universal applause during the 
speeches. Judging by the rhetoric employed, the primary reason for the FRG’s involvement 
in the Middle East should be of a moral or humanitarian kind. The weight of the past was un-
doubtedly great and appears to have entrenched a norm of philo-Zionism across all speakers. 
Genscher (FDP) and Renger (SPD) did evoke security interests, though as little more than 
side notes, and Geiger (CDU/CSU) described the Middle East as a “politically, strategically 
and economically very important region” (p. 4680A). Only Genscher (FDP) mentioned the 
traditional friendship with the Arab world. Then-German ambassador to Israel, Wilhelm 
Haas, reports that the March 11, 1988 Bundestag debate was received very positively in 
Israel because it expressed understanding for Israel’s situation despite the criticism (Haas, 
2005). Nevertheless, positions and statements beyond this March 1988 debate indicate a 
more diverse set of perspectives. 
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A debate on October 26, 1989 (171st Session) on the political, economic and security 
political situation in the Mediterranean region exhibited more realpolitical thinking. Kittel-
mann (CDU/CSU) spoke of European interests in the Mediterranean as including free navi-
gation rights; political, social, foreign- and security-political stability in the region; the guar-
antee of energy supplies via the Mediterranean Sea; and maintaining access to European ex-
port markets. Dr. Feldmann (FDP) highlighted the importance of peace and stability in the 
Mediterranean region by pointing to the European dependency on oil, which had transpired 
in the oil crisis of the 1970s. Antretter (SPD) pointed to both a security-political and an eco-
nomic interest in the Mediterranean region, suggesting that its states were as important a 
market for the EC member states as were the U.S. and Canada. The notion of Germany hav-
ing indirectly become a Mediterranean state was also evoked (Dr. Feldmann, FDP; Dr. 
Adam-Schwaetzer, Under-Secretary of State). Dr. Osswald (SPD), while acknowledging 
German responsibility for Israel, also posited that Germany should feel solidarity with the 
Palestinians, as with “other suppressed peoples” (p. 12831B) and criticized Israel, which was 
increasingly moving towards “injustice” (p. 12831C). 
Beer (Green Party) criticized the German government for supporting Palestinian self-
determination but not statehood and for not addressing “the monstrous human rights viola-
tions of the Israeli occupying power.”85
                                                 
85 “die ungeheuren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der israelischen Besatzungsmacht” (12835C) 
 The Green Party parliamentary group further submit-
ted a motion to the Bundestag requesting that it recognize the PLO as the legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people, that it assume talks with the PLO in Tunis, that it official-
ly receive Yasser Arafat in Bonn, that it award the PLO mission the status of an embassy, 
and that it support the convention of an international peace conference (Deutscher 
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Bundestag, Drucksache 11/5452, 1989). Further, the Green Party had caused a major éclat 
when some of its members had held talks with representatives of two of the PLO’s military 
factions in Syria in 1984 and “openly put their anti-Zionist disposition on display.”86
Clearly, the tenor of Bundestag debates varied with the target group – those with a 
heartfelt interest in Israeli-Palestinian peace and/or German-Jewish reconciliation used dif-
ferent rhetoric than those politicians concerned with trade and economic relations and of a 
realpolitical orientation. The Greens as a party were most clearly critical of Israel and pro-
Palestinian, while among the other three parties the attitudes appeared rather balanced or pos-
sibly of “benevolent neutrality,” to borrow a term evoked in 1967. The two most vocal critics 
of Israel in the FRG government were members of the FDP: education minister Moellemann 
and Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office Schaefer, whose comments and state-
ments drew criticism from other members of the government (Bar-On, 2008). It must be 
borne in mind that all parties harbored (more) pro-Israeli as well as (more) pro-Palestinian 
politicians.
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Public Opinion 
 Other authors have found the SPD to be less inhibited because of its opposition 
role, allowing it to call for an upgrading of relations with the PLO and receiving PLO-
representative Abdallah Frangi while the government still rejected talks with the PLO (Jaeg-
er, 1994; Jaeger, 1997). 
The public response to the intifada was largely a continuation of 1982. Criticism of 
Israeli actions and the violent response of Israeli soldiers to the rebelling Palestinians was 
widespread, which again transpires in a review of a small selection of newspaper articles 
                                                 
86 “ihre antizionistische Gesinnung unverbluemt zur Schau trugen” (Hansen, 2005, p. 161) 
87 Renger (SPD) and Schily (Green Party) were known to be particularly Israel-friendly (Bar-On, 2008). Anoth-
er example was Dr. Hamm-Bruecher (FDP), who not only gave a very pro-Israeli speech in the 1988 Bundestag 
debate but who left the FDP in 2002 after Moellemann caused a scandal by distributing anti-Israeli pamphlets 
and after she found that the FDP was not doing enough to distance itself from him (Tagesschau.de, 2002).   
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from Die Zeit. One author asserted that Israel was employing disproportionate force in a war 
against women and children and suggested that the young generation of Israelis grew up with 
“a feeling of security that they were living in a Greater Israel from the Mediterranean Sea to 
the Jordan River”88
Public opinion data paints an ambivalent picture: In December 1987, 75 percent of 
Germans supported closer relations with Israel (compared to 81 percent before the start of the 
intifada in November 1987) and 63 percent in February 1989. These numbers increased again 
in July 1989, while at the same time 63 percent of Germans said they disliked Israelis (Jaeg-
er, 1994, p. 184). 
 (Die Zeit, 01/15/1988). Another author predicted that Israel might turn 
into “the South Africa of the Middle East,” employing a similar practice of apartheid and 
possibly with the aim of “liberating” the occupied territories from Arabs (Die Zeit, 
12/25/1987). Even more objective and sober coverage (Die Zeit, 01/08/1988) lacked the 
sense of understanding exhibited by at least a considerable portion of the political elite. 
Amnon Neustadt suggested in a 1989 article that, while both the German and the 
Israeli national characters were grounded in the Shoah, they had produced different narra-
tives. Germans drew from the Holocaust the conclusion that patriotism and nationalism were 
to be rejected while they embraced anti-militarism. Israelis, on the other hand, having sur-
vived the Holocaust and being forced to continue fighting hostile Arab states, had embraced 
nationalism and militarism. Coupled with vast differences in their security concerns, these 
divergences caused little understanding for Israel among the German population. Further, 
some Germans instrumentalized Israeli violence to negate German guilt and to speed up a 
process of historical revisionism (Neustadt, 1989). Comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germa-
                                                 
88 “in dem sicheren Gefühl, in einem Groß-Israel vom Mittelmeer bis zum Jordan zu leben” 
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ny, lamented a German Jewish author, were prominent in the media and among the public 
(Die Zeit, 03/18/1988). Discussions about “the historical-moral aspects of the German-
Jewish past” did not occur on the same scale as during the 1982 Lebanon war, however 
(Jaeger, 1994, p. 184). 
Summary 
As had been the case in the 1982 Lebanon war, German and EC policy were re-
strained and largely limited to rhetoric, except for the EC trade agreement with Israel that 
was put on hold in 1988 and the sanctions that were imposed by the EC in 1990. These deci-
sions were marginal, however, and certainly had no impact on Israeli policies. The FRG con-
tinued to act as an advocate for Israel within the institutions of the EC, softening its positions 
and preventing e.g. an EC response to the PNC’s declaration of Palestinian statehood. Other 
than that, however, the FRG too maintained a low profile. 
The Soviet policy of détente had removed Soviet penetration of the Middle East as a 
concern for the EC and for Germany and had also ended the power struggle between the FRG 
and the GDR in the Arab world. Compared to 1982, German and EC strategic interests in the 
Middle East had therefore declined; at the same time these new developments had opened the 
door for a less inhibited and a more independent EC Middle East policy. This opportunity 
was not, however, seized. Instead, the EC focused primarily on itself in this period of global 
change. 
The March 11, 1988 Bundestag debate on the situation in the Middle East indicates 
the existence of a philo-Zionist norm at the elite level and a sense of responsibility and un-
derstanding for Israel that was unparalleled in the world except in the U.S. By contrast, the 
October 26, 1989 debate on the Mediterranean region shows that other factors were at work 
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as well. A realpolitical element, embodied in the view of the Mediterranean as a region of 
utmost economic, strategic and security-political significance, must be acknowledged to have 
impacted German foreign policy making in the Middle East as well. Neither the German 
government nor the Bundestag is a homogeneous entity: some politicians are more inclined 
to act on moral impulses and others are guided by more narrowly defined (i.e. economic and 
security) national interests. 
Most likely, German foreign policy during the intifada was impacted by a combina-
tion of national interests and the philo-Zionist norm – a strictly realist explanation, in any 
case, would not account for the pro-Israeli position that the FRG continued to exhibit in the 
EC. Dependency on Arab oil in particular, brought up in the 1989 Bundestag debate, would 
have prescribed an alignment with the other EC member states. While without access to in-
ternal Foreign Office documents it is impossible to trace the process of foreign policy deci-
sion making during the First Intifada, only the existence of a philo-Zionist norm seems able 
to account for the FRG’s foreign policy. This is especially so as the eventual initiation of 
talks with the PLO was expected to improve Germany’s economic ties with the Arab world. 
Yet, the FRG remained far behind other EC member states, especially France, as far as the 
depth of relations with the PLO was concerned and refused to officially recognize the PLO 
until Israel did. A liberal interpretation would not account for the German “delinquent” status 
in the EC either, considering that the government saw great value in progressing European 
integration and in the development of a common foreign policy. 
The impact of the EC on German foreign policy appears to have been limited, despite 
the increasing dilemma of reconciling the European identity with the German responsibility 
for Israel. Rather, the FRG exercised its influence within the EC on behalf of Israel – some-
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times successfully and sometimes less so. The impact of the U.S. on Germany’s Middle East 
policy is hard to determine. Although the FRG did not assume official talks with the PLO 
until the U.S. had done so (and long after most European states had taken this step), it is un-
clear whether this had a direct or an indirect impact on German foreign policy. In other 
words, without reviewing classified Foreign Office documents one cannot determine whether 
U.S. pressures or encouragements impacted the German decision to relax its position vis-à-
vis the PLO or whether the FRG waited for Israel’s most important ally to make this move 
first and then followed suit. The latter possibility would support a rational-liberal interpreta-
tion of the case, while a constructivist reading is supported by the advocacy on behalf of 
Israel that the FRG carried out in the EC. Although the FRG and German politicians re-
sponded positively to the U.S.-PLO dialogue, the FRG itself was still reluctant to take a more 
proactive role vis-à-vis the PLO (Jaeger, 1997), which suggests a considerable impact of the 
philo-Zionist norm. Jaeger too attributes the FRG’s aberrant position to its special obligation 
to Israel but suggests that the eventual, limited upgrading of relations with the PLO was a 
response to EC and U.S. pressures (Jaeger, 1997). 
Anti-militarism, already brought up in 1982, had consolidated into a German public 
norm. This norm, coupled with a high degree of scrutiny when it came to the state of Israel, 
sparked widespread criticism in the media and the population. Frustration with the collective 
guilt narrative and the desire to unload some of the German burden by pointing to Israeli 
wrongdoing appear to have played into the public reaction as well. Nevertheless, Israel came 
to consider Germany as one of its best friends in the world. The opposition parties, SPD and 
the Greens, criticized the government’s uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the PLO and fa-
vored official diplomatic relations long before the government decided to take such steps. 
82 
Pre-Unification Foreign Policy: A Summary 
The lukewarm support for German-Jewish and German-Israeli reconciliation from the 
1950s had developed by the late 1980s into a norm of philo-Zionism. Already the 1967 War 
was an opportunity the FRG used to express its solidarity with Israel and to practice “benevo-
lent neutrality.” While criticism of Israeli policies and actions became more vocal during the 
1982 Lebanon War and the First Intifada, the German position nevertheless exhibited a high 
sensitivity to Israeli security concerns and Israeli interests that was not shared in other Euro-
pean states. Not only did all governments and many politicians repeatedly evoke the notion 
of a historical responsibility for Israel; they also advocated on behalf of Israel in the EC, 
while officially proclaiming a policy of evenhandedness. Differences between the governing 
and opposition parties, who tended to represent a more pro-Palestinian orientation (except for 
the CDU/CSU in 1982), need to be noted in this context. Electoral concerns, the opposition 
role and the ability to embrace a less inhibited stance than the government are all contribut-
ing factors. 
The existence of a philo-Zionist and of other norms does not in and of itself confirm 
constructivist theories. The fact that on several occasions the FRG gave in to Israeli pressures 
indicates that a logic of consequences was also at play because no German government 
wanted and could afford to permanently damage its relations with Israel. That opposition par-
ties tended to be less inhibited in their criticism of Israel also suggests a combination of the 
two logics. The philo-Zionist norm clashed with economic and security interests, sometimes 
trumping them and sometimes being trumped. Security interests had an important impact on 
German Middle East policy. Superpower struggles and the Cold War scenario were the major 
foreign policy determinants in the 1967 War – the pro-Israeli stance articulated in internal 
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Foreign Office documents indicates that the FRG would have pursued a different course had 
it not been restricted by Cold War constellations. 
By 1982 and more so by the late 1980s, an east-west rapprochement and détente poli-
cies had reduced the Cold War factor considerably. This had little impact on EC Middle East 
policy, however. The EC and its member states pursued a restrained, predominantly rhetori-
cal and incoherent foreign policy in the region. With the Cold War diminishing as a con-
straint, the diversity of European positions and opinions emerged as a complicating factor. 
The FRG increasingly found itself trying to balance its moral obligation towards Israel and 
its own national interest with its European identity and the interests of other EC member 
states. Moreover, the FRG found itself at the center of clashes between the EC and the U.S. – 
particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s – which it tried to mediate. 
At the same time, the gap between the political elite and the population, which had 
come to embrace a norm of anti-militarism, widened. Bergmann and Erb further find that al-
though a generally Israeli-friendly attitude that acknowledges the concept of moral responsi-
bility prevailed through 1987, the German public favored a foreign policy style that priori-
tized national, material interests (Bergmann & Erb, 1991). 
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Post-Unification German Foreign Policy 
Post-unification German Middle East policy has been characterized by greater open-
ness. Previously secret arms shipments to Israel have increasingly been carried out in the 
open, while opponents of this policy – both within in Germany and Europe – have been con-
fronted (Voigt, 2009). While German foreign policy itself has been marked by continuity, a 
major change is the new public assertiveness of German support for Israel as well as the pos-
sibility for greater domestic dialogue and debate. The following discussion will show that 
although support for Israel and its security remained a fundamental tenet of German Middle 
East policy through 2009, opposition to this policy increased and was voiced in clearer lan-
guage than before while at the same time the FRG embraced a more evenhanded approach. It 
supported, for the first time, a resolution that condemned Israeli actions (the construction of 
illegal Israeli settlement) in 1997, although only after the text of the resolution had been sof-
tened and a condemnation of Hamas terrorism had been included (Pallade, 2004). 
The 1993 Oslo Accords marked a sea change in Israeli-PLO relations and in the dy-
namics of the peace process. Not only did the two-state solution consolidate into the single 
viable option recognized by regional actors as well as by the international community and 
was reiterated in subsequent agreements and initiatives, such as the Wye River Memoran-
dum, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Middle East Quartet’s Roadmap for Peace. Israel’s 
official recognition of the PLO also led Germany to recognize the organization and to up-
grade its relations with it. The accords thus gave the start signal for greater German involve-
ment in the Middle East peace process and heralded the era of German and EU involvement 
in institution building and economic development in the PA. The 1999 Berlin Declaration for 
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the first time expressed the EU’s readiness to recognize “a democratic, viable and peaceful 
sovereign Palestinian state on the basis of existing agreements" (Perthes, 2002, p. App. I). 
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Case 4: German foreign policy of the Red-Green Coalition (2000-2005) 
The Second Intifada 
The Second Intifada broke out in the aftermath of the failed Camp David talks, con-
vened by U.S. President Bill Clinton in July 2000 with the aim of arriving at a final status 
agreement, as anticipated in the Oslo Accords. In the aftermath of the failed talks, Hamas 
threatened with a new, and more lethal, intifada (Spiegel Online, 07/12/00; Spiegel Online, 
07/25/00). Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, accompanied by 1,500 
Israeli police, is commonly considered to have triggered the Second Intifada, although opi-
nions diverge on whether he or Palestinian groups are to blame for the renewed violence. The 
international Mitchell Report, led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, put blame both 
on the Palestinians for starting the violence and on Israel for the pursuit of its settlement poli-
cies (Die Welt, 05/05/01). As in the First Intifada, the violence escalated and the Israeli mili-
tary was criticized for its excessive use of force, while terrorist attacks were a part of the Pal-
estinian strategy. 
When Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited the Middle East in October 2000, shortly 
after the outbreak of the intifada, he did not want to get involved or take sides in the conflict. 
The media cited both the “shadow of the past” (Spiegel Wissen, 10/23/00; Die Zeit, 24/2001) 
and the more pragmatic desire not to get involved in such an intractable conflict (Spiegel 
Online, 08/22/01; Die Zeit, 24/2001) as reasons for the German restraint. First and foremost, 
Germany did not want to assume a position in which it would have to criticize Israel for its 
dealings with the Palestinians (Spiegel Wissen, 10/23/00). Similarly, it did not support con-
demnations of Israel at the UN Human Rights Commission, in the UN General Assembly 
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(Spiegel Wissen, 10/23/00) or in the EU (Die Welt, 11/10/00)89
Tentative Mediation: The Fischer Factor 
. Subsequently, Germany 
voted against two resolutions critical of Israel in the Human Rights Commission in 2002 and 
2003, finding them unbalanced because they included no reference to Palestinian terrorism, 
while supporting four other UN resolutions critical of Israeli settlement activities, the plan to 
build a security fence and imminent changes in the legal character of the Golan Heights (Pal-
lade, 2004). While it appears that a taboo had been broken in that Germany now supported 
motions criticizing Israel, it only did so when the text was considered balanced, i.e. when it 
included simultaneous criticism of Palestinian misconduct. The FRG refused to support mo-
tions containing terminology such as “Israeli aggression,” “crimes against humanity” or “war 
crimes” (Pallade, 2004, p. 285).  
When during foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s visit to Israel 21 people died in a ter-
rorist attack in a Tel Aviv club on June 1, 2001, Fischer extended his stay and immediately 
started mediating between Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Die Welt, 
06/03/01), knowing that the German delegation would most likely be the last to meet with 
Arafat before Israel’s looming counterstrike (Fischer, 2007). Fischer’s shuttle diplomacy has 
been credited with preventing an Israeli counterstrike (Spiegel Online, 08/22/01; Die Zeit, 
24/2001) and with moving Arafat to renounce violence in Arabic in front of the press and to 
order an end to attacks on Israeli targets in front of his own Fatah organization (Spiegel Wis-
sen, 11/02/01; Die Zeit, 24/01; Forward, 03/25/05; Pallade, 2004). Specifically, he pushed 
Arafat to renounce all acts of terrorism and violence and to express a commitment to an im-
mediate and unconditional ceasefire as well as to effective security cooperation with Israel 
                                                 
89 Germany, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands abstained from the European vote, as did Norway. 
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(Fischer, 2007). Fischer had been able to help establish a “fragile ceasefire” (Spiegel Wissen, 
11/02/01) not least because he enjoyed the respect of the Israelis and the Palestinians 
(Spiegel Online, 08/03/01; Spiegel Online, 08/22/01), both of whom considered him one of 
their “greatest friends in Europe” (Forward, 03/25/05). He had also, however, threatened 
Arafat that a failure to condemn terrorism would produce “disastrous consequences” for Eu-
ropean-Palestinian relations (Pallade, 2004, p. 300). A leading German diplomat attributes 
Fischer’s successful shuttle diplomacy also to the European presence on the ground, i.e. to 
police and security mission, and to the trust it generated (German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
While Fischer and Schroeder rejected a German mediator role, at least in the form of 
a more prolonged and involved foreign policy (Spiegel Wissen, 10/23/00; Spiegel Online, 
08/22/01), the overall tenor in the German media was supportive of such a role in light of the 
good relations that Germany entertained with both the Israelis and the Palestinians (Die Welt, 
10/13/00; Die Welt, 11/10/00). German politicians from SPD (Christoph Moosbauer), CDU 
(Hermann Groehe) and the Green Party (Christian Sterzing) all favored greater German in-
volvement and more diplomatic initiatives in the conflict and criticized Fischer’s restraint 
(Spiegel Online, 08/22/01). This cross-party support for greater German engagement attests 
to the emergence of a post-unification consensus that Germany should more actively and de-
liberately employ its influence in the world as well as to the recognition that Germany’s good 
relations with Israel and the Palestinians were an important asset. 
Israeli views on a greater German involvement diverged: Speaker of the Israeli Em-
bassy in Berlin, Yuval Fuchs, expressed skepticism of a German mediator role (Spiegel 
Online, 08/22/01), while Ron Pundak, advisor to Shimon Peres, expressed support for a more 
involved EU with Germany at the helm (Spiegel Online, 08/03/01). The Palestinian position 
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was in favor of greater EU engagement (Die Welt, 2002). At the same time, the realization 
spread that as the U.S. withdrew from the peace process during George W. Bush’s first term 
the EU had to step up to the plate (Die Welt, 08/21/01; Die Zeit, 51/2004). 
Fischer was very sympathetic to Israel’s security concerns. Thus he acknowledged 
Israel’s right to build a security fence to protect its citizens but voiced strong criticism of its 
construction beyond the Green Line (Die Welt, 12/08/03). He also argued that military supe-
riority in the Middle East was a necessity for the Jewish state (Die Zeit, 05/11/05), for which 
he drew criticism from Palestinian Delegate General to Germany Abdallah Frangi (Die Zeit, 
22/2005). 
German Involvement and the Roadmap for Peace 
Joschka Fischer’s “Seven Point Plan” for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
from April 15, 2002, presented to the EU foreign ministers, reflects two different processes 
in Germany. On the one hand, the crafting of the plan showed the FRG’s commitment to 
finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In that respect, it attests to Germany’s 
increasing assertiveness and involvement in the Middle East. On the other hand, the docu-
ment was a blueprint for a truly international action in the conflict, involving UN, EU, the 
U.S. and Russia – which reflects both a commitment to multilateralism and the realization, 
shared globally (Die Welt, 08/21/01; Die Welt, 12/10/01), that only a concerted international 
effort could advance the peace process. 
Fischer’s plan90 outlined seven steps towards peace: (1) Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank and Gaza, “including the dismantling of settlements”91
                                                 
90 Full English text in Perthes, Germany and the Middle East: Interests and Options, 2002, p.220-1 
; (2) the proclamation of a 
91 As with UN resolution 242, the formulation chosen by Fischer is vague: it is unclear what “dismantling of 
settlements” refers to. Considering that settlements were to be an issue included in the final status negotiations 
he most likely did not intend for this formulation to mean “withdrawal from all settlements.” One may speculate 
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democratic and demilitarized State of Palestine with provisional borders, with Jerusalem as 
the capital of both Israel and Palestine; (3) mutual recognition and renunciation of violence, 
conclusion of final status negotiations to be concluded within two years, (4) international 
guarantees, under U.S. leadership, and including the EU, Russia and the UN, (5) final status 
negotiations on border issues, settlements, Jerusalem and the holy sites, refugees, and mili-
tary, water and transit security that would also include Syria and Lebanon; (6) international 
conference on security and cooperation in the region; (7) endorsement of this roadmap by the 
UN. With this plan Fischer is generally credited for giving the initial impetus for the Middle 
East Roadmap for Peace (Perthes, 2005; Asseburg, 2009; Berger D. , 2009). 
The Roadmap92
Fischer’s notion of a joint U.S.-EU-UN-Russian supervision of the Middle East peace 
process makes the Roadmap and the Quartet “in a sense the German Foreign Ministry’s fos-
, introduced to Israeli and Palestinian leaders by the Quartet, is a per-
formance-based three-phase timetable to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within a five-
year framework. Phase one envisions the immediate and unconditional cessation of Palestini-
an violence, a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, the drafting of a Pales-
tinian constitution and the holding of elections, an Israeli withdrawal from areas re-occupied 
after the start of the intifada, and a freeze on all settlement activity. In phase two (transition 
phase), a Palestinian state with provisional borders should be created and bolstered by the 
international community; an international conference convened by the Quartet should also 
include Syria and Lebanon. Phase three would produce final status negotiations on borders, 
Jerusalem, refugees and settlements and would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                       
that Fischer wanted to be cautious and leave the discussion of what settlements Israel should withdraw from up 
for further debate in the EU and then at the UN. 
92 Full text online: BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2989783.stm) 
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ter children” (Perthes, 2005, p. 2). The Quartet was described by a leading German diplomat 
as the product of lessons learned from the Camp David Accords, which had been negotiated 
by the U.S. alone and lacked European and Arab support. While Germany attempted to con-
vince the Arabs to accept the accords, Arafat considered them too vague and feared that the 
Arab states would stab him in the back if he signed on. The Roadmap was an attempt to 
avoid the repetition of such mistakes in a new peace initiative (German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
Rather than clamoring a German leadership role, however, Fischer gladly let the U.S. admin-
istration present both initiatives as American inventions (Perthes, 2005). Germany had the 
Roadmap introduced to the Quartet by the Danes and wanted the U.S. to present it as an 
American plan. Unlike the Camp David Accords it was moreover flanked by Arab support: 
although the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was perceived as one-sided, Arab states were in-
cluded in the peace process this time around (German Diplomat 3, 2009).  
While German political involvement had increased considerably, the notions of multi-
lateralism and German/European complementariness to U.S. leadership were upheld. Despite 
Fischer’s obvious passion for the peace process he accepted a German role behind the scenes 
– reinforced both by a realistic evaluation of German/EU diplomatic limitations and by the 
constraints of German history (Fischer, 2007). A truly regional approach also became the ve-
hicle of choice. Subsequently, Fischer insisted that the U.S. could not bring peace to the 
Middle East on its own and that a European commitment was essential (Deutsche-
Aussenpolitik.de, 06/21/03). 
Stagnation in the Middle East and strains in the transatlantic relationship and in EU-
Israeli relations soon inhibited progress on the Roadmap, however. The intifada continued 
unabated even after Israel and the Palestinians had committed themselves to the Roadmap. 
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Israel’s assassination of Hamas founder and alleged mastermind behind countless terrorist 
attacks Sheikh Yassin in March 2003, which drew heavy EU, French and British criticism 
and a more restrained German announcement of dismay (Die Welt, 03/23/04), was only one 
indication that a solution to the Middle East peace remained as far away as ever. Additional-
ly, the world was divided over the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Germany (as 
well as most of Europe) was at odds not only with the U.S. but also with Israel, which sup-
ported the U.S. invasion. German opposition to the war therefore compromised Fischer’s 
mediator status in the Middle East (Die Welt, Schuster, 04/09/03), although Germany’s repu-
tation had improved in the Arab world (Die Zeit, 09/22/05).  
Not wanting to accept a failure of the Roadmap, Fischer and the Red-Green govern-
ment upheld the illusion of transatlantic cooperation on the issue of Middle East peace and 
were reluctant to voice criticism of the Bush administration’s unilateral initiative, knowing 
that U.S. leadership was unavoidable.93
                                                 
93 By contrast, leading politicians in SPD and the Green Party were outspoken against Bush’s one-sided and 
unconditional support for Ariel Sharon and of his tendency to ignore all EU efforts in the peace process 
(Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 06/28/02). 
 President Bush implicitly supported Ariel Scharon’s 
plan to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip while annexing settlements in the West 
Bank (Die Welt, 04/17/04; Die Welt, 04/19/04; Die Zeit, 04/22/04). Time and again Fischer 
and Schroeder referenced the Roadmap, denied allegations that it had failed and called on the 
parties to the conflict to adhere to its stipulations while emphasizing the need for U.S. leader-
ship and an important role for Europe in the peace process (Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 
06/21/03; Die Welt, 06/23/03; Die Welt, 06/24/03; Die Welt, 02/17/04; Die Welt, 04/17/04). 
This behavior was mirrored in the EU (Die Welt, 04/17/04), which was aware that the death 
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of the Roadmap would heavily undermine a European role in the conflict (Die Welt, 
04/19/04), once again illustrating European weakness and inefficiency in the political realm. 
It did not help that Israeli skepticism of the EU had reached unprecedented heights, 
not least because a lawsuit against Ariel Sharon for crimes against humanity was underway 
in Belgium (Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 04/08/03).94
An interesting development was Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s proclamation that, 
while history-derived sensibilities determine what Germany can and cannot do, a UN mili-
tary mission might be necessary to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that a German par-
ticipation could not be ruled out on principle (Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 04/17/02; 
Bundestag, 233rd Session, 2002). He specifically cautioned against recreating old taboos, 
suggesting that military means are sometimes necessary to achieve peace (Bundestag, 233rd 
Session, 2002). This marks a stark departure from the pre-unification doctrines of anti-
 Sharon’s plan to remove all settlements 
from the Gaza Strip was welcomed in Germany, but both Schroeder and Fischer repeatedly 
emphasized the need for the disengagement to be carried out in accordance with the Road-
map and in coordination with the Palestinians (Die Welt, 02/17/04; Die Welt, 04/18/04; 
Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 05/17/04; Bulletin, 03/01/05). By contrast, Israeli ambassador to 
Germany, Shimon Stein, announced in an interview that Israel would adhere to the Roadmap 
only as long as it was in Israel’s national interest and that a unilateral course would be pur-
sued if found more promising (Die Zeit, 12/19/03). Unlike the Palestinians, argued an article 
in Die Zeit, the Israelis did not need the Roadmap (Die Zeit, 51/2004). 
                                                 
94 Significantly, Shalom stated that the EU “has an important role to play in the peace process. It can take on the 
task of causing a balance in international forums once again. It could free the UN of anti-Israeli committees and 
resolutions” (Die Welt, 07/13/2003). One and a half years later he said once the EU has developed a more ba-
lanced approach it could participate in the peace process – especially by providing financial assistance (Die 
Welt, 12/07/04). It could not have been plainer that Israel’s appreciation for the EU was at a deep low. 
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militarism and restraint in the Middle East. By contrast, CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor 
Edmund Stoiber opposed the deployment of German troops to Israel, invoking German histo-
ry and special relations with Israel (Pallade, 2004; Bundestag, 233rd Session). Considering 
that the Grand Coalition government sent German troops to Lebanon within the UNIFIL 
framework in 2006, one may speculate that Stoiber’s position was at least in part an attempt 
to appeal to the public’s opposition to the deployment of Bundeswehr troops abroad. Fischer 
too, referencing the burden of history, rejected the idea of deploying German troops in the 
Middle East (Die Welt, 06/23/03). 
Arms Shipments, “Embargos” and Sanctions 
The imposition of a “silent arms embargo,” in the form of a halt on arms exports to 
Israel in the absence of an official declaration, was reported by the media in April 2002. In-
cluded in the export hiatus were sniper rifles, parts of electronic systems and components for 
the battle tank MERKAVA IV. While a temporary solution in which the tank components 
were manufactured in a U.S. plant affiliated with the German producer was found, the prob-
lem was eventually solved diplomatically and arms shipments resumed. Defense Minister 
Scharping later stated that Germany had wanted to send a signal, responding to the “over-
reactions” of the IDF but that “in principle one has to help a friend in the case of tensions, 
even if the world around us regards this as an aggravation of the conflict” (Pallade, 2004, p. 
189). The silent embargo was therefore an opportune way to express disapproval of Israeli 
policies while not deviating from German policy towards the Jewish state. An actual embar-
go would also have damaged relations with Israel, on whose technology Germany was more 
dependent than vice versa, and hurt Germany’s reputation as a supplier of defense technolo-
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gy. The decision to resume arms exports was thus not solely motivated by a commitment to 
Israel. Both France and Britain placed similar embargos on Israel (Pallade, 2004). 
While Germany delivered PATRIOT batteries capable of destroying SCUD missiles 
to Israel in light of the 2003 Iraq War (Pallade, 2004) and had supplied three Dolphin subma-
rines, only one of which Israel paid for, in 1999 and 2000 (Sterzing & Boehme, 2002), it de-
nied an Israeli request for FUCHS APC transport tanks made in 2002. Several politicians 
voiced concern about a possible delivery of the tanks to Israel because they were deemed of-
fensive weapons that might be used against the Palestinians. While the SPD and the Greens 
tended to be opposed to the delivery, the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition was more suppor-
tive (Pallade, 2004). In an interview with Der Spiegel Israeli President Moshe Katsav stated 
that he could not guarantee that the tanks would not be used in the occupied territories 
(Spiegel Wissen, 12/09/02). The request was eventually denied on a technicality: Germany’s 
FUCHS tanks were in use in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the Bundeswehr could not spare 
them (Pallade, 2004). 
As in previous decades, the FRG blocked attempts by the European Commission, the 
French foreign minister and Sweden to impose economic sanctions on Israel and was the ma-
jor opposition force to the suspension of the EU-Israeli Association Agreement, favored by 
Commissioner on Foreign Affairs Chris Patten, in reaction to Israel’s harsh military response 
to the intifada. Fischer argued that imposing sanctions on Israel would undermine the EU’s 
credibility as a partner in the peace process. Together with the UK and Italy, Germany also 
foiled an attempt by the European Parliament to impose an arms embargo. The government’s 
stance that it would not support sanctions against Israel if the peace process stalled was 
shared also by the leadership of the major opposition party CDU/CSU (Pallade, 2004). 
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State-Building in the Palestinian Authority 
The Oslo Accords stipulated a significant financial and economic role for the EU in 
the build-up of the Palestinian Authority. EU financial contributions, totaling 179 million € 
annually from 1998 to 2004, were earmarked for infrastructure and institution building and 
for strengthening the private sector, including the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, the 
police and the legislative council. By 2004, the EU was the most important non-military aid 
donor in the peace process (Schaefer, 2004). When in 2000 Israel started withholding all 
transfer payments to the PA in response to the Second Intifada because it accused Arafat of 
fueling Palestinian violence, the EU took over the payments of 10 million € per month (Die 
Zeit, 24/2002; Die Welt, 06/08/2002; Asseburg, 2003). 
Within the EU context as well as bilaterally Germany stepped up its support for the 
PA. Annual payments of 40 to 50 million € throughout the Red-Green Coalition years helped 
with the building of infrastructure and schools, with bolstering the Palestinian economy, pub-
lic administration and civil society as well as with guaranteeing the water supply (Die Zeit, 
2002; Spiegel Online, 04/17/2002; Bulletin, 03/01/2005). The provision of Palestinian 
stamps and passports became an integral part of German support for the PA early on (Gene-
raldelegation Palaestinas, Deutsch-Palaestinensische Beziehungen). The BND further as-
sisted with the training of Palestinian security forces, while Germany’s financial commitment 
and cooperation was welcomed and encouraged by Israel (Pallade, 2004). Following the out-
break of the Second Intifada, Germany shifted its support from long-term infrastructure 
building to humanitarian and development aid. While ranking seventh among donor countries 
to the PA by December 2003 (Generaldelegation Palaestinas, Deutsche Entwicklungszu-
sammenarbeit), Germany had become the largest bilateral donor by June 2005, with PA 
97 
state-building one of Germany’s foreign policy priorities (Perthes, 2005). Germany had been 
one of the first states to institute a permanent mission in the Palestinian territories in 1994 
(General Delegation of Palestine in the FRG, 2009). 
In January 2002, the EU responded with fierce criticism and a formal protest when 
Israeli forces destroyed several projects in the Palestinian territories, including Gaza Airport, 
that had received EU funding. The damage was estimated at 9.3 million €. Further, the EU 
called on Israel to withdraw its military, to end extrajudicial killings and to stop settlement 
construction while demanding that Arafat destroy terrorist networks and put an end to the 
intifada (Spiegel Online, 02/28/02). Subsequently, the EU drew heavy criticism when Arafat 
was accused of financing terrorism against Israeli civilians, and partly with EU funds. Doc-
uments obtained by the IDF during a raid of PA headquarters in Ramallah allegedly proving 
that Arafat funded terrorism were found to be authentic by the German Foreign Office and 
the BND (Die Welt, 2002; Die Zeit, 24/2002). There was also evidence that Arafat used EU 
funds to spread anti-Semitism via the TV station PA-TV and via school books and to directly 
fund terrorist attacks carried out by his security forces. The EU insisted, however, that there 
was no hard proof that EU funds had been misused (Die Zeit, 24/2002; Die Zeit, 34/2002). 
Eventually, the EU responded to international and internal criticism by suspending its 
monthly 10 million € payments in June 2002 (Die Welt, 06/08/2002). 
Despite the extensive financial involvement of the EU, its political role remained neg-
ligible. Diverging national interests and positions, as well as the EU’s military weakness, 
continued to inhibit a comprehensive common foreign policy, which made the criticism that 
the EU’s Middle East policy was one of declarations “certainly legitimate” (Schaefer, 2004, 
p. 49). In 2000 the European Council passed a Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Re-
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gion to reinvigorate the stagnating Barcelona Process. Largely owing to Germany’s desire to 
prevent the Council from passing far-reaching resolutions concerning Israel by majority vote 
it was decided that the strategy would come into effect only once the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict has been resolved (Schaefer, 2004). Moreover, Muriel Asseburg criticizes the EU’s in-
stitution- and state-building efforts as a post-conflict peacebuilding approach that cannot be 
effective while the conflict is ongoing. Overall, she concludes, EU involvement in the con-
flict has not had a positive impact; a minor success was a local ceasefire secured between the 
cities Gilo and Beit Jalla (Asseburg, 2003). Joschka Fischer also referenced this monitoring 
success of a six party team of secret service agents that included also one German 
(Bundestag, 233rd Session, 2002). 
Party positions 
An April 25, 2002 Bundestag debate (233rd Session) on the situation in the Middle 
East shows a cross-party consensus on the central points concerning the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict: the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, which necessitates the removal 
of Israeli settlements; an end to terrorist attacks on Israeli targets and the renunciation of 
force on both sides; adherence to UN resolutions; a political, negotiated solution to the con-
flict; and international security guarantees by the Quartet under U.S. leadership.95
                                                 
95 See Schroeder (SPD); Stoiber (CDU/CSU), Fischer (Green Party); Gerhardt (FDP); Moosbauer (SPD); Kers-
tin Mueller (Green Party); Gehrcke (PDS); Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD) 
 Members 
of SPD (Schroeder, Weisskirchen, Moosbauer, Klose), the Green Party (Fischer, Mueller), 
CDU/CSU (Stoiber, Lamers) and FDP (Gerhardt) highlighted the special relationship be-
tween Germany and Israel grounded in history and Germany’s consequent responsibility to-
wards Israel. The PDS, predecessor of the Left, while emphasizing that Israel’s right to exist 
must not be denied, was the only party not evoking the special relationship and German re-
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sponsibility. While presenting itself overall in a surprisingly balanced manner for a left-wing 
party, it was also the most vocal in its criticism. Roland Claus classified Israeli violence 
against Palestinians as “terrorism” (23129D) and “state-sanctioned force against human be-
ings” (23130A) and asserted that achieving peace was in the hands of the Israelis. 
The overall tone of the debate can be described as very balanced, with all speakers 
expressing understanding for both sides but also criticizing the use of violence on both sides 
without condemning either party. As in the case of the First Intifada this can, in light of over-
all European attitudes and the state of public opinion, be equated with a pro-Israeli bias. In 
fact, Stoiber (CDU/CSU), Gert Weisskirchen (SPD) and Dr. Friedbert Pflueger (CDU/CSU) 
were more sympathetic in their understanding for Israel’s security fears and needs and accor-
dingly more critical of the Palestinians, in particular of Palestinian terrorism. Weisskirchen 
even expressed understanding for Sharon’s unilateral course of action in light of internal 
pressures and pointed to Israel’s right to defend itself, although in accordance with interna-
tional law. On the other hand, Karl Lamers (CDU/CSU) showed great understanding for Pal-
estinian feelings of frustration and humiliation, while insisting that neither justifies terrorism, 
and criticized Israel’s disproportionate response to the intifada. The goal of Israeli military 
actions, he stated, was to destroy PA institutions to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. 
Christoph Moosbauer (SPD) too expressed his incomprehension at the destruction of PA in-
stitutions, olive trees and infrastructure. Lamers (CDU/CSU) and Gehrcke (PDS) once more 
brought up the notion of German responsibility for the Palestinians, who had suffered under 
the creation of the state of Israel.  
The understanding that criticism of Israel must be possible in a democratic society 
and must not automatically be equated with anti-Semitism was also voiced (Schroeder, SPD; 
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Gerhardt, FDP; Moosbauer, SPD; Klose, SPD), while always mentioned in connection with 
the special relationship. Kerstin Mueller (Green Party) suggested that any criticism of Israel 
has to be measured by Germany’s special responsibility for Israel.  
Several politicians rejected the idea of imposing sanctions or an embargo on Israel bi-
laterally or through the EU – because of Germany’s historic responsibility (Schroeder, SPD), 
because of shared democratic values (Schroeder, SPD) or because sanctions were deemed 
ineffective and would only undermine the EU’s negotiating potential (Fischer, Green Party; 
Weisskirchen, SPD; Mueller, Green Party; Klose, SPD).96 Chancellor Schroeder stated: “I 
want to say quite unequivocally: Israel gets what it needs for the maintenance of its security, 
and it gets it when it is needed.”97
International terrorism, still on everyone’s minds after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the U.S., was – besides the German responsibility for Israel and the Middle East – the 
most-cited reason why Germany should be committed to the peace process: Schroeder 
(SPD), Stoiber (CDU/CSU), Fischer (Green Party) and Gerhardt (FDP) asserted that a con-
tinuation of the conflict would pose a security threat also to Europe and Germany. Chancellor 
Schroeder also invoked the notion that as the only democratic state in the Middle East Israel 
was an important partner for Germany, although the classification of Israel as a functioning 
democracy was contested by Roland Claus (PDS). Schroeder also mentioned German eco-
nomic and political interests at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, without elaborating. 
Despite their call for an international military involvement in the conflict, Edmund Stoiber 
 
                                                 
96 Stoiber (CDU/CSU) also opposed sanctions against Israel but did not elaborate on the reasons. 
97 “Ich will ganz unmissverstaendlich sagen: Israel bekommt das, was fuer die Aufrechterhaltung seiner Sicher-
heit braucht, und es bekommt es dann, wenn es gebraucht wird.” (23115A) 
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(CDU/CSU) and the PDS (Claus, Gerhcke) spoke out against the deployment of German sol-
diers in the Middle East. 
Significantly, universal norms associated with the civilian power status were brought 
up by only two speakers. Gehrcke (PDS) demanded that Germany be consistent in its com-
mitment to human rights and criticize Israeli violations as well as those of other states. Dag-
mar Schmidt (SPD) pointed to three goals of German policy – strengthening civil society, 
advancing processes of democratization and safeguarding human rights – and suggested that 
against this backdrop Germany should remain committed to the building of democratic Pales-
tinian institutions. 
Two external factors must be taken into account in assessing this Bundestag debate. 
First, it occurred in the middle of an election campaign. In light of public skepticism of Israel 
the generally pro-Israeli tenor as well as the high degree of cross-party consensus in the mid-
dle of a campaign suggest the existence of a philo-Zionist norm. The PDS alone used lan-
guage inconsistent with this norm when its representatives spoke of “Israeli terrorism.” 
Second, the Bundestag debate took place at a time when criticism of Israel was 
voiced more clearly by German politicians than it had been before. Norbert Bluem (CDU) 
had accused Israel of fighting an “unrestrained war of annihilation” (Pallade, 2004, p. 318), 
while segments in all parties distanced themselves from the Sharon government (supported 
by 80 percent of the Israeli population) and aligned themselves with the Israeli peace move-
ment, which was a minority in Israel (Pallade, 2004). The loudest and most controversial crit-
ic was FDP politician Juergen Moellemann, who previous to the Bundestag debate had spo-
ken of “Israeli state terrorism” and had expressed understanding for Palestinian suicide 
bombers by stating that if Germany were under occupation, he would respond with violence 
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too – violence not only in his own country but also in that of the aggressor (TAZ, 
04/04/2002). Subsequently, he suggested that Sharon and Vice Chairman of the Central 
Council of Jews in Germany, Michel Friedman, contributed to an increase in anti-Semitism 
in Germany. While at first the FDP leadership defended Moellemann, they distanced them-
selves from him when he distributed anti-Israel flyers to all households in North Rhine-
Westphalia without the party’s consent (Pallade, 2004). The FDP drew criticism also for ac-
cepting Jamal Karsli into their party in North Rhine-Westphalia. Karsli had been forced to 
leave the Green Party after he had accused the Israeli army of employing “Nazi methods” 
against the Palestinians and claiming that Germans feared an international Zionist lobby 
(Spiegel Online, 05/16/2002). 
While a rise in criticism of Israel could be perceived in Germany in the early 2000s it 
was counteracted by protests and proclamations of solidarity with Israel from politicians 
from various parties. The April 2002 Bundestag debate was not least a response to the esca-
lating criticism of Israel. Responsibility for Israel as part of Germany’s raison d’état was re-
peatedly evoked as well (Pallade, 2004). In response to the Moellemann scandal Joschka 
Fischer proclaimed: 
No line can be drawn under Germany’s historical and moral responsibility for 
the destruction of European Jewry. It forms the basis of Germany’s special 
obligation to uphold the right of existence and security for Israel and its citi-
zens. This responsibility is not a matter of current political constellations, but 
a permanent principle of German policy … Criticism [of Israel] is possible on-
ly on the firm foundation of indelible solidarity (Fischer, 2002). 
 
Although German foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had become more 
active, involved and evenhanded, the commitment to Israeli security remained one of the pil-
lars of German foreign policy and of elite level political culture. 
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Public opinion 
Overall, German public opinion during the Second Intifada lay in the European main-
stream, occasionally more supportive of Israel, occasionally less so. A March 2001 survey by 
the Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach found that 15 percent of Germans favored Israel in 
the conflict and 14 percent, the Palestinians, although a subsequent survey found that only 2 
percent of Germans felt “particular sympathy” for Israel, which suggests that “to a large ex-
tent those who favoured Israel in the former poll were rather motivated by a dislike of the 
Palestinians” (Pallade, 2004, p. 344). The Anti-Defamation League found in a study in May 
2002 that 17 percent of Germans supported Israel while 25 percent supported the Palestini-
ans. 36 percent said they supported neither, 8 percent supported both while 7 were undecided 
(Anti-Defamation League, 2002, p. 13). In 2003 Germans rated Israel at 43 degree on a 0 to 
100 scale (with 50 meaning neutral) and the Palestinians at 40 degrees (Transatlantic Trends 
2003, p. 16). By 2004, German support for Israel was still at 17 percent whereas support for 
the Palestinians had dropped to 21 percent, with 43 percent supporting neither party, 11 per-
cent supporting both and 6 percent undecided (Anti-Defamation League, 2004). 
Interestingly, 60 percent of Germans supported sending a peacekeeping force to the 
Middle East while 37 percent were opposed (Pallade, 2004, p. 345), while almost 40 percent 
of Germans subscribed to the proposition that “under some conditions, war is necessary to 
obtain justice” (p. 14). Both of these outcomes call the existence of a popular norm of anti-
militarism in doubt. Support for the “special relationship” with Israel was also low: between 
46 and a “slight majority” were in favor of terminating the special relationship (Pallade, 
2004, p. 348), while 25 percent of Germans found comparisons of Israeli practices with the 
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Nazis acceptable; 69 percent of respondents chose to “rather not agree” with this statement 
(Pallade, 2004, p. 346). 
Overall, the period from 2000 to 2005 saw a continuation of the trends apparent in the 
1980s: the public was largely critical of Israel, questioned the “special relationship” between 
Germany and Israel while increasingly choosing not to take sides in the conflict, i.e. being 
equidistant if not necessarily indifferent. The philo-Zionist norm therefore appears to have 
existed only at the political elite level, although it no longer had the same character there ei-
ther. Criticism of Israel started to be voiced more openly, sometimes bordering on anti-
Semitism, while the majority of politicians continued to acknowledge the special relationship 
with Israel and a special German responsibility for Israel. 
Summary 
Under foreign minister Fischer Germany saw an increase in political involvement in 
the Middle East. Unification, the Oslo Accords and the end of the Cold War certainly were 
all enabling events in this regard. But one must also take Fischer’s personality into account: 
He has been described as someone for whom reviving the peace process was a “Herzensan-
gelegenheit,” a matter very close to his heart (Berger D. , 2009) and who made the conflict 
one of his foreign policy priorities soon after taking office (Berger D. , 2009; Voigt, 2009). 
No German foreign minister before him had been as passionate about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and shown such a high profile in the Middle East (Die Zeit, 51/2004; Voigt, 2009). 
To an extent, Germany’s policies have become more evenhanded than they were be-
fore unification: the fact that Germany now supported some UN resolutions criticizing Israel 
indicates that a previous taboo had been broken. The “silent embargo” against Israel must 
also be taken into account as a sign of increasing German evenhandedness in the conflict. It 
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has been suggested that a Europeanization of German foreign policy had taken place (Schae-
fer, 2004). One can certainly detect that as Germany continued to integrate into the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – established in 1993 – it also adapted its positions to the 
European mainstream. On the other hand, the Oslo Accords and Germany’s subsequent rec-
ognition of the PLO, concomitant with a significant economic and financial role in the peace 
conflict, also impacted the course of German foreign policy. 
At the same time, Germany remained the most clearly pro-Israeli pole within the EU 
as well as one of the more pro-Israeli states at the UN. Germany was the major opponent to 
the imposition of sanctions against Israel, although apart from a normative argument this op-
position also served a more pragmatic purpose. Fischer’s insistence that sanctions or a boy-
cott against Israel would undermine the EU’s credibility as a mediator in the conflict, shared 
by several other SPD and Green politicians, is more in line with a rational liberal than with a 
constructivist reading. Nevertheless, one may ask why only Germany was as adamant on this 
issue within the EU.  
Yves Pallade concludes in his extensive study of German-Israeli relations in the 
1990s and beyond that Germany did not have closer political relations with any non-
European state besides the U.S. than it did with Israel and that within the EU Germany was 
willing to prioritize its commitment to Israel and to preventing one-sided criticism of Israel 
over a common European position “in times of political tension” (Pallade, 2004, p. 365). The 
FRG remained reticent in its statements while addressing disagreements directly and behind 
closed doors. Among the political elite, the Shoah remained an important aspect in the for-
mulation of the German commitment to Israeli security, although the gap between political 
elites and the public was substantial (Pallade, 2004). Rudolf Dressler, German ambassador in 
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Israel from 2000 to 2005, also points to the continued presence of the past in the German-
Israeli relationship and asserts that in light of their common history “normal relations” be-
tween the two states are impossible (Dressler, 2005). Similarly, Moshe Katsav said in a 
speech before the Bundestag that while Germany is “a true friend of Israel,” “the Shoah will 
always constitute the starting and the end point” of the German-Israeli relationship (Die Zeit, 
05/31/2005). 
A cross-party consensus on special German-Israeli relations and on Germany’s re-
sponsibility for the Jewish state remained, despite some outspoken opposition, strong. In 
Israel the predominant view was that Germany could be trusted and was one of few reliable 
partners in Europe. This perspective was voiced by Shimon Stein, Israeli ambassador in 
Germany, former Israeli ambassador to the EU, Ephraim Halvey (Pallade, 2004) and Israeli 
President Moshe Katsav (Spiegel Wissen, 12/09/02). Stein even suggested that Germany was 
the only state in the EU that Israelis felt they could rely on (Pallade, 2004). The German po-
sition as mediator between Israelis and Palestinians as well as between Israelis and the EU 
and, to a lesser extent during the Bush years, between the EU and the U.S. must be consi-
dered a major asset. 
Besides the commitment to Israel, international terrorism was the reason brought up 
the most by politicians to explain the German interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. This concern made it onto the radar screens of all European states following the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London. Economic inter-
ests, on the other hand, appear to not have had a major impact on foreign policy making, al-
though it has been suggested in German diplomatic circles that security, economic and other 
national interests are increasingly hard to disentangle in today’s era of globalization (German 
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Diplomat 1, 2009). It appears, however, that in the complex web of national interests the se-
curity aspect was predominant in this case. 
 Surprisingly little support can be identified for the prevalence of norms derived from 
the civilian power status: only two politicians in the April 2002 Bundestag debate explicitly 
brought up the issue of human rights (one of them a representative of the marginalized PDS) 
and Germany’s role in promoting the values associated with its civilian power status. Of 
course commitments to human rights, the rule of law and national self-determination are im-
plicit in the kind of solution Germany envisions to the Middle East conflict and in the kind of 
approach it favors. At the same time, the German response to, and stance on, issues such as 
settlement construction and the security fence seem to confirm that a commitment to Israel 
outweighed concerns about human rights, national self-determination and international law. 
Although Germany was opposed to settlement construction it was unwilling to put pressure 
on Israel and repeatedly prevented EU sanctions. Moreover, the FRG deviated from the Eu-
ropean mainstream in its recognition of Israel’s right to build the security fence. The exis-
tence of a norm of anti-militarism, proscribing also the deployment of German soldiers 
abroad, must be seriously questioned based on Schroeder’s pronouncements as well as on 
public opinion data. 
Solely a commitment to multilateralism was apparent across the board and repeatedly 
articulated by Joschka Fischer. Both Germany’s past and a realistic assessment of the limita-
tions of German (and EU) power moved Joschka Fischer, for example, to reject a greater 
mediator role for Germany in the conflict. Coordinator of German-American Cooperation in 
the Federal Foreign Office, Karsten Voigt, suggests that while Germany was unable to im-
pact the conflict at its core, it tried to decrease the human suffering it caused (Voigt, 2009). A 
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truly multilateral involvement in the peace process and U.S. leadership, quite at odds with 
German and EU positions throughout Bush’s first term, were desired mostly because of a 
realistic assessment of the limitations of European power. 
Summing up, security concerns and the norm of philo-Zionism appear to have been 
the major determinants of German foreign policy, while a combination of developments in 
the Middle East (the Oslo Accords) and in Europe (the Maastricht Treaty that founded the 
EU in 1993) facilitated a more active and evenhanded approach to the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. The basic tenets of German Middle East policy remained unchanged, however: the poli-
cy of the Red-Green Coalition continued in the tradition of pre-unification policy (German 
Diplomat 3, 2009). 
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Case 5: 2005-2009 (Grand Coalition) 
The Grand Coalition period was in the Middle East dominated by the conflict be-
tween Israel and Hamas as well as by the intra-Palestinian struggle between Hamas and Fa-
tah. In January 2006, the radical Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and has been re-
sponsible for numerous rocket attacks on southern Israeli cities fired from the Gaza Strip, 
won the majority in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. It obtained 74 of 132 seats; Fatah 
won 45, and the remaining 13 seats were divided up between smaller alliances, parties and 
independent politicians (Asseburg, 2006, p. 3).98
The consensus in the scarce evaluative literature of German Middle East policy dur-
ing the Grand Coalition years suggests continuity vis-à-vis previous administrations. Muriel 
Asseburg describes German foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict as influenced by 
three factors: a historically derived commitment to Israel, security interests (protection from 
 After a national unity government had been 
in place for only three months, violence between Hamas and Fatah escalated in June 2007 
and Hamas remained in control of the Gaza Strip while the PA governed over the West Bank. 
This Hamas-Gaza and PA-West Bank split persists to this day and has produced a “West 
Bank first” approach in the U.S. and the EU, aimed at propping up PA President Mahmoud 
Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the West Bank while pursuing a strategy of iso-
lating Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Asseburg, 2009, p. 29). On December 27, 2008 Israel re-
sponded to renewed rocket fire on Israeli cities by launching a three-week military attack, 
Operation Cast Lead, on the Gaza Strip. Israel faced international criticism for the high num-
ber of civilian casualties, while Israel accused Hamas of using civilians as human shields by 
launching attacks from, and hiding in, civilian facilities, such as hospitals. 
                                                 
98 Third Way: 2; Independent Palestine: 2; The Alternative (left-wing parties): 2; Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine: 3, independents: 4. 
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terrorism, irregular migration and organized crime), and good relations to resource-rich Arab 
states and Iran, related to concerns about energy security. Among these three, Israel’s securi-
ty and interests are clearly prioritized by the political elite across all parties represented in the 
Bundestag, and Germany continues to see itself as an advocate of Israel within the EU. Asse-
burg even suggests that Germany uncritically adopts Israeli security perceptions and concep-
tions, even if they clash with other declared objectives of German and EU foreign policy, 
such as a commitment to international law (Asseburg, 2009). Similarly, Isabel Schaefer sug-
gests that the historic dimension of German-Israeli relations continues to restrict the FRG’s 
room to maneuver in the Middle East. The determinants of German foreign policy during the 
Grand Coalition years were the special relations with and moral obligation towards Israel, 
multilateralism, and security and energy interests. International terrorism, migration, energy 
security and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were issues high on the German 
agenda in the Middle East. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s foreign policy style was marked by 
“continuity, serenity and modesty,” yielding “few fundamental changes and few significant 
results”99
After taking office as Chancellor, Angela Merkel was described as feeling strongly 
about Germany’s friendship with Israel and as firmly rejecting Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric 
(Hacke, 2006). Throughout her time in office, she repeatedly emphasized that because of the 
 (Schaefer, 2008, p. 3). EU representative to the peace process, Marc Otte, high-
lights security political interests: Muslim immigrants from the Middle East increasingly ex-
pose Europe to the conflict, while Islamist terrorism, previously an Israeli problem, has also 
reached Europe (Otte, 2008). Foreign Minister Steinmeier evoked a common history of Eu-
rope and the Middle East, security interests and special relations with Israel (AA, 01/25/07). 
                                                 
99 “la continuité, la sérénité et la modestie”; “peu de changements de fond et peu de résultats significatifs” 
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Shoah Germany’s commitment to Israel is part of Germany’s raison d’état, while also not 
holding back with criticism of Israeli policies, e.g. its settlement activities. Common values, 
challenges and interests, Merkel suggested, also play into the friendly relations between the 
two states (Bundesregierung, 03/18/08). Therefore German-Israeli relations are not only fo-
cused on the past but also future-oriented and should deepen further across the cultural, eco-
nomic and political spheres (Bundesregierung, 04/01/07a). In Israel, Merkel was perceived as 
being close to Israel and as further intensifying German-Israeli relations (Israeli Diplomat, 
2009). In 2008, for example, Germany and Israel agreed on annual consultations at the go-
vernmental level (Bundesregierung, 03/18/08). Merkel was also committed to improving re-
lations with the U.S. after the break over the Iraq war (Hacke, 2006). 
Steinmeier, while not displaying the same “historic pathos” that Fischer had embo-
died (Voigt, 2009), had an obvious interest in the Middle East and in the solution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Berger D. , 2009; Voigt, 2009). He pursued Fischer’s idea of in-
cluding Syria and Lebanon in the peace process with greater rigor and embraced a more 
comprehensive regional approach than his predecessor had done (Berger D. , 2009). Within 
the EU he intensively advocated and advanced a regional approach to the Middle East con-
flict starting in the summer of 2008 (German Diplomat 1, 2009). Indicative is his endeavor, 
preceding that by French President Sarkozy, to end Syria’s political isolation. Coordinator of 
German-American Cooperation in the German Foreign Office, Karsten Voigt, attests both 
Merkel and Steinmeier “a personal commitment to Israel’s security” and “sympathy for 
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Israel.”100
The response to Hamas 
 Steinmeier had a close relationship of personal trust with Israeli foreign minister 
Tzipi Livni (Voigt, 2009). 
The German response to Hamas’s election victory in 2006 and to the Hamas coup in 
the Gaza Strip in June 2007 was a policy of isolation, in line with the policies of the EU and 
the Middle East Quartet. No direct talks and cooperation with Hamas would take place unless 
the party fulfilled three central conditions: recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation 
of terrorism and violence, and a recognition of all previous agreements relating to the peace 
process (Beck, Fuertig, & Mattes, 2008; Asseburg, 2009). As Hamas was unwilling to accept 
these criteria, the international community imposed a boycott: not only did the Quartet101
                                                 
100 “ein persoenliches Engagement fuer die Sicherheit Israels“; “Sympathie fuer Israel” 
 
refuse direct talks and cooperation; Israel also started again to withhold transfers of VAT and 
customs duties and sealed off the border to the Gaza Strip while the EU suspended its budge-
tary assistance and the U.S. imposed sanctions (Asseburg, 2009). The necessity for Hamas to 
accept the Quartet’s three conditions were repeatedly articulated by both Merkel and Stein-
meier (AA, 02/05/06; AA, 09/18/06; Bundesregierung, 02/23/07; Bundesregierung, 
04/01/07a; AA, 05/14/08), often in connection with Germany’s special responsibility towards 
Israel. Preceding the Palestinian parliamentary elections Angela Merkel first mentioned these 
three conditions as the German position, which it would also introduce in the EU 
(Bundesregierung, 01/29/06). Israel was called on to improve the Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement so that the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip could improve (AA, 
05/22/07). 
101 Disagreements existed within the Quartet as to which strategy might lead Hamas to accept the criteria. While 
Russia considered direct talks useful, the EU and U.S. rejected such an approach. 
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In order to alleviate the devastating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, where 
80 percent of the population was dependent on foreign aid, the EU initiated an international 
funding mechanism (Temporary International Mechanism) that circumvented Hamas while 
still allowing humanitarian assistance to reach the population (AA, 06/21/09; Steinmeier, 
2007). In 2007, the EU contributed more than 300 million € in humanitarian aid – more than 
in previous years (AA, 05/22/07). While the national unity government was in place in the 
Palestinian Territories, the EU foreign ministers agreed to talk to, and cooperate with, those 
ministers that accepted the Quartet’s criteria while maintaining the policy of isolation for all 
other ministers (Bundesregierung, 04/01/07a; Bundesregierung, 04/01/07b; AA, 05/22/07). 
As far as the peace process was concerned, the PA (Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad) re-
mained the partner on the Palestinian side for Israel and the Quartet, including Germany and 
the EU (AA, 05/22/07). Scholars have criticized this “West Bank first” approach for implicit-
ly supporting the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip and for contributing to the deterioration 
of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of violence (Perthes, 2007; Asseburg, 2009). 
EU Presidency 
In the first half of 2007, Germany assumed the EU Council presidency and could thus 
considerably impact the EU’s foreign policy. The revival of the Middle East Quartet and a 
return to the Roadmap had become central goals of German Middle East policy (AA, 
09/18/06; AA, 01/25/07; Bundesregierung, 02/05/07; Bundesregierung, 01/17/09). The in-
volvement of the international community in a multilateral approach – under U.S. leadership, 
with a significant role for the EU and an inclusion of Arab states – was seen as the best 
means to advance the peace process (AA, 01/18/08). The endeavor to revitalize the Quartet 
was successful: high-level and lower level Quartet meetings resumed during the German 
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presidency and continued beyond (Asseburg, 2008; Schaefer, 2008), and the German gov-
ernment claimed credit for this development, including for re-engaging the U.S. and for en-
gaging Arab states in the peace process (Bundestag, 94th Session, 2007; p. 9621A; AA, 
09/24/07). 
The revival was only a marginal accomplishment, however, and not a true victory for 
multilateralism: the U.S. nomination of Tony Blair as the Quartet’s official envoy occurred 
without consulting the EU and the other Quartet partners (Asseburg, 2008; Schaefer, 2008). 
A mandate narrowly focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its inefficiency as a “co-
ordination and co-operation body” rendered the Quartet eventually insignificant (Asseburg, 
2008). Steinmeier, aware of the Quartet’s limitations, considered it nonetheless the only via-
ble body to address Middle East peace negotiations (AA, 02/23/07). Although the FRG suc-
cessfully re-engaged the international community, including the Arab states, achieved unified 
European positions by relegating its own pro-Israeli bias to the background and “contributed 
to the renewed diplomatic vigour in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,” these efforts were 
eventually fruitless because “the diplomatic process was not grounded in the realities of the 
Middle East” (Asseburg, 2008, p. 86): The division into a Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and a 
Fatah-controlled West Bank did not equip Abbas and Fayyad with the necessary legitimacy 
to represent the Palestinian people in the peace process. Germany confidently used its power 
and influence to achieve what it possibly could – to place the Middle East conflict back on 
the international agenda – while the situation in the Middle East was simply not conducive to 
substantial progress and results. 
A second effort during the German presidency that also indicates greater self-
confidence and a German willingness to be actively involved in the Middle East as well as in 
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shaping the EU’s Middle East policy was the introduction of Steinmeier’s Action Plan for the 
Middle East, which led to the adoption of the EU Action Strategy on the Middle East. Stein-
meier’s plan (Steinmeier, 2007) envisioned a significant European role in the U.S.-led peace 
process following the November 2007 Annapolis Conference. He suggested that the EU 
could, firstly, be instrumental in engaging international and regional actors to create an at-
mosphere conducive to negotiations between Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime 
Minister Olmert and, secondly, step up its state- and institution building efforts in the PA by 
1) strengthening the private sector, 2) assisting with the build-up of modern and democratic 
security forces, 3) providing funds for students and universities to prevent brain drain, and 4) 
assisting with institutional and state structure reform. The EU Action Strategy on the Middle 
East incorporated and expanded Steinmeier’s suggestions. In it, the EU committed to engag-
ing the conflict parties, the U.S., the Quartet and the Arab states in the peace process and to 
assist with Palestinian state building as well as to provide support for the transition period 
and for conflict resolution. Specifically, the EU pledged to help build up a modern and dem-
ocratic police force, assist with institution building and good governance, stimulate the Pales-
tinian private sector, assist with the creation of a customs and trade policy and institutions, 
and intensify its emergency and humanitarian support for the refugee population and the 
people in the Palestinian territories. If requested, the EU would also “contribute to a system 
of security arrangements that would be agreed between the parties in the framework of a 
permanent settlement” (EU Action Strategy, 2007). 
German and EU involvement in the Palestinian Territories 
Of course, the EU had been involved in the areas of institution and state building al-
ready since the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the major goal as articulated in the Action Strategy 
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was to intensify and modify existing activities according to the agreement reached between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians at the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. One area of 
EU involvement is the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), 
which started its work on January 1, 2006 with the aim of allowing the PA to build up an au-
tonomous and self-sufficient police force capable of ensuring public order and law enforce-
ment. EUPOL COPPS provided equipment and training and coordinates and facilitates finan-
cial support (EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, 2008). While the U.S. as-
sumed responsibility for the National Security Forces, the EU assisted the civil police and the 
judiciary (AA, 06/24/08). Another EU mission, the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah 
Crossing Point (EUBAM RAFAH), provided a third-party presence at the Rafah border 
crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt with the purpose of building confidence between 
the Israeli government and the PA. Started on November 24, 2005, the mission was sus-
pended following the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007. Nevertheless, EUBAM main-
tained its operational capacity so it could redeploy at short notice (EU Border Assistance 
Mission at Rafah Crossing Point, 2009). 
German involvement within the EU context was substantial. Between 2007 and 2009 
the German Foreign Office donated over 50 cars and 550 radio sets to the Palestinian police. 
Germany also supported the construction of 55 police stations in the West Bank, assisted 
with education and training initiatives (Bundesregierung, 05/28/09) and helped finance, 
amongst other things, an industrial park in Jenin, which was to create more than ten thousand 
jobs (AA, 06/24/08). As part of the Future for Palestine initiative Germany further funded a 
number of educational and cultural projects in the Palestinian Territories, such as e.g. the 
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foundation of an acting school, the rebuilding of a cinema in Jenin and initiatives to foster the 
political education of teenagers (AA, Projekte der Initiative). 
Part of Steinmeier’s Action Plan and the EU’s Action Strategy was the Berlin Confe-
rence in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and The Rule of Law on June 24, 2008. Forty 
states and representatives of international organizations pledged to contribute $242 million 
for the creation of a functioning civil police and judicial system. The “implementation pack-
age” included training opportunities, provision of equipment and the establishment of institu-
tions. Germany allotted 15 million € and the EU Commission 35 million € (AA, 10/09/09). 
Already at a donor conference in Paris in December 2007 Germany had earmarked 200 mil-
lion € for state-building in the Palestinian territories for the 2007-2010 period (AA, 
12/17/07). Its humanitarian aid amounted to 5 million € each in 2006 and 2007 (AA, 
12/17/07) and to 8 million € in 2008 (AA, 04/24/08). In June 2009 Germany contributed 25 
million € “at short notice” to safeguard energy supplies in the Palestinian Territories 
(Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 07/01/09). 
At the Berlin Conference Steinmeier highlighted the importance of creating realities, 
i.e. state structures and viable institutions, in the Palestinian territories that complement ne-
gotiations towards finding a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political 
solution to the conflict, he argued, could only be realized when structures are in place that 
make the implementation of such a solution feasible (AA, 06/24/08). Muriel Asseburg calls 
the effectiveness of this approach into question: not only did the asymmetric support for the 
West Bank/PA exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip; the EU also had to 
pump more and more money into Palestinian institution building to prevent a complete col-
lapse of the PA. The catastrophic security situation, the Gaza Strip-West Bank division, the 
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security barrier in the West Bank and continuing Israeli settlement activity ultimately ren-
dered all EU efforts at institution and state building fruitless (Asseburg, 2009). 
Germany’s involvement can therefore be described as well-meaning and committed, 
although it proved – with the possible exception of humanitarian emergency assistance – in-
consequential. Of course, there are limits to what Germany, the EU and the international 
community can achieve as outside actors. In the end, however, the Quartet and EU response 
to Hamas as well as the continuation of previous state-building efforts are symptomatic of an 
involvement that does not address the actual fault lines in the conflict. Calls for Palestinian 
reconciliation were not supplemented by active mediation, which was left to Egypt, while 
statements and pronouncements demanding concessions from Israel were likewise not 
backed by tangible action. The policy of isolating Hamas, even if pursued with good reason, 
doomed all international initiatives at Palestinian state-building and the peace process to fail-
ure. 
2008-09 Israel-Gaza Conflict 
After Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008 Germany sided with 
Israel in the conflict. Steinmeier asserted that the German government had no understanding 
for Hamas’s one-sided ending of the ceasefire, which had been in place for six months, and 
called for an immediate and permanent cessation of rocket fire. At the same time he affirmed 
Israel’s right to defend itself, although he called for adherence to the principle of proportio-
nality (AA, 12/12/08). Similarly, Merkel saw Hamas solely responsible for the escalation, 
emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself and asserted that it was up to Hamas to end the vi-
olence. She insisted that cause and effect must not be confused in the conflict 
(Bundesregierung, 12/29/08; German Diplomat 2, 2009). Subsequently, Steinmeier attempted 
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to help negotiate a humanitarian ceasefire (Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de, 12/30/08; AA, 
01/15/09) as well as a permanent ceasefire (AA, 01/05/09; AA, 01/09/09; Bundesregierung, 
01/12/09). He also offered that a German expert team assist Egypt with developing a strategy 
to secure its border with the Gaza Strip (AA, 01/11/09; Bundesregierung, 01/12/09). Stein-
meier emphasized that the international community could not desert Israel in light of daily 
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip (AA, 01/12/09; Bundesregierung, 01/12/09), while criticizing 
Israeli attacks on UN Headquarters in Gaza and the Al-Quds hospital (Bundesregierung, 
01/16/09) as “inacceptable” and a “dangerous escalation” of the conflict (AA, 01/15/09). He 
welcomed both the unilateral Israeli ceasefire, implemented on January 18, 2009 (AA, 
01/18/09), and the subsequent ceasefire announced by Hamas, although he insisted that direct 
talks with Hamas remained out of the question (AA, 01/19/09). 
German humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip was continuously increased as the crisis 
progressed and amounted to 13 million by January 20, 2009 – reaching UNRWA as well as 
humanitarian non-profit organizations (AA, 01/20/09). At an international donor conference 
in March 2009, whose convention Steinmeier had vigorously supported, Germany additional-
ly pledged to contribute 150 million € for Gaza reconstruction (AA, 03/02/09). 
Once again, Steinmeier was at the forefront of EU action in the Middle East. He de-
veloped a five-point plan for the establishment of a permanent ceasefire between Hamas and 
Israel that was adopted, with minor modifications, by the EU. Components of the plan were 
humanitarian aid, prevention of arms smuggling, opening of border crossings for the Pales-
tinians, reconstruction, and a resumption of peace negotiations as well as Palestinian recon-
ciliation (AA, 01/20/09; AA, 02/27/09). Overall, however, the European response to the 
Middle East crisis was inconsistent, with no official EU response to the conflict being issued. 
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While Germany and the Czech Republic prioritized Israel’s right to defend itself, French 
President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Brown highlighted Palestinian suffering (Ta-
gesschau, 01/13/09). Former foreign minister Joschka Fischer, while praising Germany’s 
commitment to Israel’s security, criticized the European response to the Middle East as “a 
diplomatic flea circus”: the EU did not speak with one voice but was instead represented in 
the Middle East by a plethora of foreign ministers and competing delegations (Die Zeit, 
01/08/09). 
The response to the 2008-09 Israel-Gaza conflict illustrates the very rudimentary cha-
racter of the CFSP and the fact that individual states continue to prefer autonomous foreign 
policy making to finding a common European position – at least when it comes to quick res-
ponses to sudden developments. Common positions, however vague and broad, are possible 
only on the fundamental issues underlying the Middle East conflict and on the central com-
ponents of a peace process. When it comes to responding to escalations in the Middle East 
finding a consensus becomes almost impossible. This is a major reason why the EU can do 
little more than support the peace process financially, assist with Palestinian institution build-
ing and supplement U.S. mediation efforts in areas where it has established itself as a trusted 
partner, such as on issues of security cooperation and border controls. As has been discussed, 
such an involvement can be effective only if it takes the realities on the ground into account. 
The EU could also become more active in the crafting of peace initiatives and behind the 
scenes mediation rather than just in the implementation process. 
The new Israeli government 
In March 31, 2009 a new and controversial right-wing government under Likud 
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was formed. The major problem for Germany was that 
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the Netanyahu government had not committed itself to a two-state solution and was reluctant 
to resume peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Chancellor Merkel (Haaretz, 05/06/09) 
and foreign minister Steinmeier (Tagesschau, 05/08/09) insisted on a two-state solution as 
the only viable option for peace. The EU, meanwhile, decided to freeze its upgrading of rela-
tions with Israel unless Israel changed its strategy and publicly committed itself to a two-state 
solution (Haaretz, 05/06/09). In July 2009, Steinmeier welcomed the Israeli government’s 
official recognition of the two-state solution as the right goal and reiterated that Germany 
would stand by Israel and that the precondition for all talks with the Palestinians would have 
to be Israel’s security (AA, 06/07/09). Israel’s new and controversial foreign minister, Avig-
dor Lieberman102
German diplomats characterize Germany’s Middle East policy as being embedded in 
international law, previous peace process agreements and UN Security Council resolutions 
(German Diplomat 1, 2009; German Diplomat 2, 2009). In response to a minor interpellation 
by the Green Party the government expounded that the Hague Conventions on the laws of 
, was received in Berlin shortly after taking office, but in the absence of the 
press. FDP politician Werner Hoyer and SPD politician Gert Weisskirchen expressed them-
selves disappointed by Lieberman’s positions and foreign policy priorities, which did not in-
clude advancing the peace process (Tagesschau, 05/08/09). Overall, however, the change in 
government produced no change in German-Israeli relations. Bilateral relations have become 
good enough for Germany to use clear language and to voice its criticism behind closed 
doors (German Diplomat 1, 2009; Voigt, 2009), while Israel perceives German criticism, still 
relatively cautious, as that of a friend rather than as “bashing Israel where you can” (Israeli 
Diplomat, 2009). 
                                                 
102 Lieberman was known for his anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab attitude. 
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war as well as the Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians in times of war, which 
declare the relocation of citizens into occupied territories illegal, apply to the Palestinian Ter-
ritories (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/13311, 2009). The German government consi-
dered the continued settlement activity a major obstacle to peace and called on the Israeli 
government to comply with the specifications of the Roadmap (German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
Steinmeier (AA, 05/29/09; AA, 06/04/09; AA, 06/11/09; AA, 07/03/09) and Merkel (Bunde-
sregierung, 07/02/09; Bundesregierung, 08/27/09) were determined in their opposition to 
Israeli settlement construction, although Merkel used more cautious language than Steinmei-
er did. The demand for a halt to settlement construction was congruent with the Obama ad-
ministration’s new stance as well (AA, 05/29/09; AA, 06/04/09). In line with EU regulations, 
the German government considered the EU-Israeli Association Agreement to apply only to 
products originating from Israel proper, whereas products originating from the Palestinian 
Territories were to be excluded from the preferential customs provisions. The German gov-
ernment, pointing to relevant UN Security Council resolutions, also refused to recognize 
Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/13311, 2009). 
Despite its foundation in international law German foreign policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict maintained its distinctly pro-Israeli character, where Israeli security con-
ceptions and interests tended to be prioritized. Germany’s positioning in the 2008-09 Israel-
Gaza conflict was the most prominent example. Moreover, the German government deviated 
from the European mainstream by explicitly recognizing Israel’s right to protect its citizens 
from harm and to build a security barrier for this purpose, while referencing the EU Coun-
cil’s ruling that the construction of such a barrier on Palestinian territory violates internation-
al law. The government further rejected the notion that Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip is 
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an act of collective punishment as such: measures necessary for security reasons and in com-
pliance with international law cannot be considered collective punishment; the legitimacy of 
Israeli measures might instead be evaluated on a case by case basis (Deutscher Bundestag, 
Drucksache 16/9889, 2009). 
Party positions 
Among all parties represented in the Bundestag in the 16th legislative period consen-
sus existed on the necessity for a comprehensive approach to the Middle East that addresses 
not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also other conflicts and tensions in the region, 
such as those emanating from Iraq and Iran, and that engages the Arab states. Representatives 
of all parties moreover desired greater German involvement in the peace process, including 
in the formulation of initiatives (Bundestag, 74th Session, 2006). A Bundestag debate on the 
2008-09 Israel-Gaza conflict (Bundestag, 198th Session, 2009) shows cross-party consensus 
on the necessity for a ceasefire and for an end to Hamas rocket fire as well as for a political 
solution to the conflict. Overall, politicians of SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP and the Green Party ex-
pressed understanding for Israel’s security situation and emphasized Israel’s right to defend 
itself whereas the Left was more critical of Israel. 
Foreign minister Steinmeier (SPD), referring to daily rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, 
highlighted the legitimacy of Israel’s right to respond to violence and to defend itself while 
asserting that Hamas shared the responsibility for the high number of civilian casualties dur-
ing Israel’s military offense. Similarly, Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD) highlighted that Hamas had 
ended the ceasefire, and that the extent of the rocket fire onto Israeli territory, reaching ever 
further into the country, made normal life there impossible. While vowing to take seriously 
accusations of disproportionality leveled at Israel he further placed blame on Hamas for stra-
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tegically using civilians as human shields. Dr. Rolf Muetzenich (SPD) cautioned against ap-
portioning blame and suggested that the democratic election of Hamas, despite its violent 
character, is a fact that the international community needs to deal with. 
For the CDU/CSU, Eckart von Klaeden and Philipp Missfelder evoked the question 
of cause and effect, highlighted by Chancellor Merkel, and blamed Hamas for the escalation 
of violence. Hamas ended the ceasefire and resumed rocket fire on Israel, which increased 
not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms (von Klaeden) and aimed to terrorize the 
Israeli civilian population and making Israel uninhabitable (Missfelder). Quoting passages 
from Hamas’s charter calling for the murder of Jews, von Klaeden and Missfelder insisted 
that direct talks with Hamas should remain out of the question. Dorothee Baer insisted that 
Hamas’s practice of using civilians as human shields is to be “fiercely condemned.”103
The opposition parties were, overall, more critical of German and EU policies to-
wards the Middle East, although the Left was alone in its fierce criticism of Israel. Dr. Wern-
er Hoyer (FDP) evoked the notion that Europeans do not understand Israel’s security situa-
tion. The trivialization of the permanent threat of rocket fire in the European media he de-
scribed as cynical. It is necessary to understand both the Palestinians’ feeling of permanent 
humiliation and the meaning for the Israelis of the unknown fate of the abducted solider Gi-
lad Shalit. At the same time he expressed opposition to the idea of apportioning blame, while 
criticizing the uncoordinated and insubstantial EU response to the crisis and questioned the 
 Ha-
mas, she asserted, tries to generate as many Palestinian victims as possible to win the fight in 
the media. Both von Klaeden and Baer highlighted the need to destroy tunnels used by Ha-
mas to smuggle weapons from Egypt into the Gaza Strip. 
                                                 
103 “auf das Schaerfste zu verurteilen” (21463A) 
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suitability of the “undifferentiated policy of isolation” in light of Hamas’s heterogeneity. Be-
cause of the trust it enjoys both with the Israelis and the Palestinians, Germany could fulfill 
an important role as mediator in the peace process. 
For the Green Party, Juergen Trittin called the rocket fire on Israeli cities a war crime 
and asserted Israel’s right to defend itself, while rejecting the idea of apportioning blame in 
the conflict as counter-productive. In light of the large number of civilian casualties on the 
Palestinian side, Trittin found it hard to “contend himself” with the term “disproportional,” 
although he too evoked the notion that Hamas used civilians as human shields, thus suggest-
ing a shared responsibility of Hamas and Israel. 
Chairman of the Left’s parliamentary group, Gregor Gysi, rejected Merkel’s one-
sided blaming of Hamas for the escalation of violence as false, although he acknowledged 
that it shared the responsibility. While finding it “wrong” that Hamas ended the ceasefire, he 
accused Israel of violating it first when it tried to destroy tunnels in military actions. He fur-
ther called the blockade of the Gaza Strip resulting in “collective confinement” (Kollektiv-
haft) a violation of international law and wrong. Israel’s war with bombs and ground troops 
he called “unacceptable and exorbitantly exaggerated.”104
The notion that a responsibility for Israel’s security is part of Germany’s raison d’état 
was evoked by Klose (SPD), Missfelder (CDU/CSU) and Dr. Hoyer (FDP), while Trittin 
(Greens) spoke of “a basic consensus on the solidarity with Israel and its right to self-
determination.”
 Gysi also fiercely criticized the 
German government for continuing to export arms to Israel. 
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104 “inakzeptabel und masslos uebertrieben” (21458A) 
 Dr. Muetzenich (SPD) too highlighted Germany’s responsibility for Israel 
105 “ein Grundkonsens ueber die Solidaritaet mit und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht von Israel” (21461A) 
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and implied special relations. Germany’s commitment to Israel’s right to exist and a con-
demnation of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad’s Holocaust denial and threats 
against Israel had been expressed in a 2005 motion that was introduced by all parties 
represented in the Bundestag: CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Green Party and the Left in December 
2005 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/197, 2005). 
In an interesting twist Gysi (the Left) and Dr. Hoyer (FDP) supported the hypothetical 
idea of an international peacekeeping force between the Israelis and the Palestinians in prin-
ciple although they rejected, for historic reasons, a German participation in such a force 
(Bundestag, 198th Session, 2009). A similar pattern had become apparent during the Bundes-
tag debate (Bundestag, 49th Session, 2006; Bundestag, 50th Session, 2006) on the deploy-
ment of a German naval mission within the UNIFIL framework following the 2006 Israeli-
Lebanon war. On that occasion, the majority of CDU/CSU, SPD and the Green Party had 
supported a German participation while the majority of the FDP and the Left in its entirety 
were opposed. The rhetoric employed reflects the flexible and ambiguous nature of how 
change and continuity can be classified. Representatives of CDU/CSU, SPD and the Green 
Party evoked foreign policy continuity, as the UNIFIL mission’s goal was to foster peace, 
was only one of several measures (including political and humanitarian) to establish peace, 
had been requested by Israel and Lebanon and was in line with multilateralism. By contrast, 
the FDP perceived the government’s desire to deploy German troops in the Middle East as 
breaking a taboo and thus as marking foreign policy change. The FDP, while generally ap-
preciative of the UNIFIL mission, opposed the deployment of German troops primarily be-
cause it considered such a move imprudent and feared that it would undermine Germany’s 
mediator role. The fear that German soldiers might face IDF soldiers was also voiced. By 
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contrast, the Left’s primary argument against German participation was historical: because of 
history Germany had a special obligation both towards Israel and the Palestinians and did not 
embody the neutrality necessary for participation in the UNIFIL mission. Fears about com-
promising Germany’s mediator position were also voiced. Notably, the once pacifist Green 
Party differed neither in its positioning nor in its rhetoric from the governing parties 
CDU/CSU and SPD, despite its opposition status. Of the reasons given for German involve-
ment in the Middle East the interest in Israel’s security was presented as the most prominent 
one, while security, economic and other national interests were also mentioned by some 
members of parliament. As during the Red-Green Coalition years the existence of a norm of 
anti-militarism must be questioned at the political elite level – at best it was embraced by the 
Left. 
The governing parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, were very pro-Israeli in their rhetoric in 
response to the 2008-09 Israel-Gaza conflict, which was also reflected in official Germany 
foreign policy. Among the opposition parties, the Left was the only one fiercely critical of 
Israel, while the FDP and the Green Party expressed understanding for Israel’s security situa-
tion, clearly shared the fundamentals of government policy but assumed a somewhat more 
balanced position that also criticized nuances of German, EU and Quartet policy. The FDP in 
particular supported the convention of a Conference on Peace and Cooperation in the Middle 
East, modeled on the Conference on Peace and Cooperation in Europe, and introduced a cor-
responding motion in the Bundestag in December 2006. The government finally adopted the 
suggestion (Niebel, 2009). 
Interestingly, the Green Party appears to have been fully socialized into the main-
stream by the 16th legislative period. Apart from the fact that it had been included in two con-
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secutive coalition governments with the SPD, in December 2006 Eckart von Klaeden of the 
governing CDU/CSU called a Green Party motion on reviving the peace process superior in 
diligence and quality to motions introduced by the FDP and the Left (Bundestag, 74th Ses-
sion, 2006), while Dr. Rainer Stinner of the opposition FDP praised and expressed support 
for a Green Party motion in support of the Palestinian unity government, debated in April 
2007 (Bundestag, 94th Session, 2007). In both cases, the competing motion introduced by the 
Left was criticized and rejected by the other parties. The notion of a largely “undisputed” 
Middle East policy (German Diplomat 1, 2009) can be confirmed106
A major step towards socializing into the political mainstream, however, was Gregor 
Gysi’s April 2008 speech in light of Israel’s 60th anniversary (Gysi, 2008), in which he out-
lined the position of the German left towards Israel. For the first time, a member of the Left 
openly classified a responsibility for Israel as part of Germany’s raison d’état and called it 
the most stable of the three pillars of German foreign policy – the other two being the transat-
lantic alliance and European integration. Gysi rejected the language of imperialism in the 
case of Israel and called for a more differentiated assessment of Israel and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict than had been common on the left. At the same time, he asserted that so-
lidarity with Israel should have a critical character and was linked to solidarity with Pales-
tine. Despite the importance of this speech, which was criticized by large sections of the par-
; only the Left deviated 
from the policy mainstream. 
                                                 
106 As further evidence, Secretary General of the FDP, Dirk Niebel, suggested in an interview that Israel would 
have to accept the creation of a Palestinian state, withdraw from the occupied territories and dismantle most of 
its settlements while the Palestinians need to live in peace with Israel, end terrorism and adopt democratic state 
structures (Niebel, 2009). These specifications reflect government policy and hint at a basic consensus on Mid-
dle East policy. 
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ty for moving the Left towards the center (Zwarg, 2009), the Left remained outside the main-
stream of German politics and marginalized by the other parties at the federal level. 
Public opinion 
Reliable public opinion data for the Grand Coalition period is scarce. A Pew Global 
Attitudes study reports 37 percent of Germans sympathizing with Israel following Hamas’s 
electoral victory in 2006, while only 18 percent sympathized with the Palestinians (World 
Public Opinion, 06/20/06). By contrast, a May 2007 Anti-Defamation League study (Anti-
Defamation League, 2007) finds that 22 percent of Germans sympathized more with the Pal-
estinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while 20 percent sympathized more with the 
Israelis, 12 percent with both and 40 percent with neither. Similarly, 27 percent held “very 
favorable” or “fairly favorable” views of Israel, compared to 23 percent responding with 
“very unfavorable” or “fairly unfavorable.” 55 percent of Germans supported the EU’s with-
holding of funds to the Palestinian government in the aftermath of Hamas’s election victory, 
with 31 percent opposing this policy. The discrepancy in the Pew and ADL polls may at least 
to an extent be influenced by developments on the ground, the election of Hamas producing 
an increase in support for Israel and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, a decline. BBC World 
Service Polls from 2007 (BBC World Service Poll 2007) and 2009 (BBC World Service Poll 
2009) find that 11 and 9 percent of Germans consider Israel’s influence in the world mainly 
positive, compared to 64 and 65 percent considering it mainly negative. Overall, public opi-
nion follows the trend from previous years, although it appears that the number of people fa-
voring neither party in the conflict decreased slightly and that support for Israel grew some-
what despite an overall high degree of skepticism of Israel’s influence in the world. 
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Summary 
German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 2005-2009 pe-
riod continued the Red-Green coalition trend by becoming more active and involved, espe-
cially within the EU. The German EU Presidency was particularly successful, thanks to the 
revival of the Middle East Quartet, the return to the Roadmap that coincided with it and to 
the inclusion of Arab states that had become a cornerstone of German Middle East policy. 
Steinmeier also essentially crafted two EU initiatives, the EU Action Strategy on the Middle 
East and the five-point plan for Gaza reconstruction. The former specified the contours for 
EU measures to support the Annapolis Conference and constituted the framework for the 
Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and The Rule of Law, which in 
itself is indicative of greater German involvement. Further, PA state building was a priority 
focus of German Middle East policy: the Future for Palestine project, donations of police 
cars and radio sets to the PA authorities and the overall German contribution to EUPOL 
COPPS were extensive. The General Delegation of Palestine in the Federal Republic of 
Germany viewed bilateral relations as “excellent” (hervorragend), as separate from German-
Israeli relations, and as having gained in density ever since 1993 (General Delegation of 
Palestine in the FRG, 2009). 
All of these developments had little impact on the conflict itself, which has been in 
stagnation since the failed Camp David Accords of 2000. The Bush administration’s 2007 
Annapolis Conference was barely a drop in the ocean and did not result in substantial peace 
negotiations between Israel and the PA. Palestinian infighting and the subsequent split be-
tween a Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip and a PA-governed West Bank have further complicated the 
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situation on the ground and deprived Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad of the legitimacy 
necessary to negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinian people. 
Another factor undermining the effectiveness of German involvement are the limita-
tions of European power. The CFSP works haphazardly at best and European foreign policy 
continues to be characterized by a lack of cohesion and distorted by too many national voic-
es. The “European” response to the 2008-09 Israeli-Gaza war is only the most prominent ex-
ample. Moreover, as civilian powers and unlike the U.S., Germany and the EU cannot gener-
ally provide hard security guarantees to either the Israelis or the Palestinians (German 
Diplomat 3, 2009; Voigt, 2009). The “currency” in the Middle East is “violence and violence 
prevention,” and power and influence are measured in “cannons and rifles,” which means 
that being a civilian power is no influence-maximizing factor (Voigt, 2009). The EUBAM 
and EUPOL COPPS missions indicate that the EU can use its strengths to assist with some 
aspects of the security dimension (German Diplomat 3, 2009), although these are focused on 
“soft” security (civilian police) rather than on hard security guarantees between the two par-
ties. For all of these reasons, an increase in German and European involvement did not trans-
late into tangible changes on the ground. 
Overall, German foreign policy was premised on support for the Palestinian Authori-
ty, which was also in Israel’s interest, while the commitment to Israel transpired in the rhe-
toric of members of parliament (except in the Left) as the primary factor for German in-
volvement in the Middle East. The official government response to the 2008-09 Israeli-Gaza 
conflict exemplifies the strength of the philo-Zionist norm. Within the EU Germany contin-
ues to be the advocate for Israel, although a more pragmatic view of Israel as a democratic, 
important and reliable partner in a neighboring region (German Diplomat 3, 2009) also con-
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tributes to this Israel-friendly attitude. A strictly constructivist reading would therefore ignore 
the degree of pragmatism that has entered into German-Israeli bilateral relations; rational li-
beralism has some explanatory power as well. Finally, the importance of security interests, in 
the form of concerns about geographical proximity and the threat of spillover effects as well 
as Islamist terrorism, were evoked by politicians and have undoubtedly been a significant 
determinant of German foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. Some members of the Bundestag 
also evoked economic and other national interests, which as discussed in case 4, are becom-
ing increasingly hard to disentangle.  
My findings are on the whole in line with the consensus in the evaluative literature: a 
combination of the commitment to Israel, which has both a moral-historical and a pragmatic 
dimension, and national (particularly security) interests was at play in the Grand Coalition 
period, while multilateralism constituted the framework for German involvement. U.S. lea-
dership continued to be acknowledged as inevitable and desirable. My interviews confirm 
this assessment as well: German diplomats described German foreign policy towards the con-
flict as being impacted by the special relations with Israel as well as by the European interest 
in peace and stability in the Middle East, which is a strategically important region for Europe 
(German Diplomat 1, 2009; German Diplomat 2, 2009). Director of the American Jewish 
Committee in Berlin, Deidre Berger, listed history, a dense web of German-Israeli relations in 
the political, military, scientific and other spheres, and realpolitical considerations as the ma-
jor determinants of German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Berger D. 
, 2009). 
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Philo-Zionism as an Elite-Level Norm? 
As Germany’s economy recovered and then boomed in the post-World War II years, 
the ideas of multilateralism, antimilitarism, European integration and the transatlantic al-
liance consolidated into norms and became integral to German political culture over time, as 
several studies (Banchoff, 1999; Duffield, 1999; Malici, 2006) have demonstrated. My hypo-
thesis was that a similar process consolidated a norm of philo-Zionism at the elite political 
level, which would in turn influence German foreign policy making towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
The rhetoric of government officials and Bundestag parliamentarians lends support to 
this hypothesis. A commitment to Israeli security and support for the Jewish State is today 
identified by diplomats and politicians across the political spectrum as part of Germany’s 
raison d’état (see discussion of party positions during the Grand Coalition period; also: 
Dressler, 2005; Gysi, 2008; Niebel, 2009; German Diplomat 1, 2009). The perception of a 
commitment to Israel’s security as one of the pillars of German foreign policy is shared also 
by Israeli diplomats (Israeli Diplomat, 2009). Diplomats and politicians of all parties moreo-
ver continue to highlight the presence of the past in German-Israeli relations and suggest that 
the Shoah will always be a central aspect of bilateral relations (as demonstrated in my case 
studies; see also Niebel, 2009; German Diplomat 1, 2009; German Diplomat 2, 2009). Par-
ticularly in the post-unification period, this notion has been complemented by the future-
oriented theme of common norms and values and of Israel being the only democracy in the 
Middle East (as evidenced e.g. in Bundestag debates and Merkel’s rhetoric; also Niebel, 
2009). A realistic and pragmatic assessment of Israel as the most reliable partner in the Mid-
dle East conflict has also been noted (German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
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Over time, German-Israeli relations have developed a great density across the politi-
cal, economic, military, cultural and other spheres (Berger D. , 2009; German Diplomat 2, 
2009; Niebel, 2009; Voigt, 2009) that is unparalleled elsewhere (Israeli Diplomat, 2009). 
Reinforced by the desire to “overcome” the past and work towards a cooperative future, the 
special relations have developed a momentum of their own (Voigt, 2009) and have become 
some of the closest each country entertains. Within the EU Germany continues to act as 
Israel’s advocate (German Diplomat 3, 2009), while for Israel Germany is the most important 
partner in Europe and its second-most important partner after the U.S. globally (Berger D. , 
2009). 
The case studies indicate that the development of the elite-level norm of philo-
Zionism was not a linear process and did not occur simultaneously for all parties. The SPD 
was the first party to exhibit philo-Zionist tendencies, as exemplified in the response to the 
1967 War, and was followed by CDU and CSU. The FDP and the Green Party then gradually 
socialized into the norm, and the Left today finds itself in the early stages of this process. 
While the FDP was in the 1960s and 1970s skeptical of Israel and pursued a more neutral 
policy, philo-Zionism had taken hold in segments of the party by the late 1980s and grew 
stronger after that. The Moellemann scandal called the FDP’s commitment to Israel into 
doubt, although opposition within the party evoked special German-Israeli relations and a 
German sense of responsibility for the Jewish state. Secretary General of the FDP, Dirk Nie-
bel, emphasized in an interview in May 2009 that “no one will find a political home for anti-
Israeli policies” in the party (Niebel, 2009). 
The Green Party, initially pro-Palestinian and still very critical of Israel by the late 
1980s had adopted the norm of philo-Zionism by the time it was represented in the govern-
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ment (1998-2005). Andrea Humphreys (2004) suggests that the Green Party had to adapt its 
policies and positions and accept the central tenets of German foreign policy to prove its Re-
gierungsfaehigkeit (ability to govern in a coalition). Thus, the Greens’ lessons from the Ho-
locaust changed from safeguarding human rights and support for the Palestinians in the 
1980s to an Israel-centric assessment of the conflict and a rather pro-Israeli positioning in the 
early 2000s. Joschka Fischer even faced criticism for appearing to speak on behalf of Israel 
rather than Germany while he held the office of foreign minister (Humphreys, 2004). A cer-
tain amount of pragmatism did probably spark the Greens’ socialization into mainstream 
German politics, including the norm of philo-Zionism. The Bundestag debates during the 
Grand Coalition years, exhibiting very Israel-friendly rhetoric among Green politicians al-
though the party was now in the opposition, indicate that this norm clearly persists beyond 
the Red-Green coalition years, however. 
In their most recent political programs, SPD (Hamburger Programm, 2007), CDU 
(Freiheit und Sicherheit, 2007) and the Green Party (Die Zukunft ist gruen, 2002) explicitly 
mention (for the first time) Germany’s special responsibility for Israel’s right to exist in safe 
borders as a central tenet of German foreign policy, as well as referencing the Palestinians’ 
right to their own state. As Die Zukunft ist gruen is the oldest of the three, the Green Party 
was actually the first to include the special relationship with Israel in a German party pro-
gram. The FDP’s most recent political program (Wiesbadener Grundsaetze, 1997) makes no 
reference to Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Neither does the foundational political 
program of the Left107
                                                 
107 In 2007 the Linkspartei.PDS merged with Labor and Social Justice – Electoral Alternative to form the Left. 
 (Programmatische Eckpunkte, 2007). To this day the Left remains a 
vocal critic of Israeli policies and actions, although its politicians have aligned themselves 
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with the other parties in affirming the German responsibility for Israel’s security. Gysi’s 
2008 speech was a benchmark in the Left’s socialization process, although much of the party 
was opposed to this process and Gysi was exceptionally vocal in his criticism of Israel’s Op-
eration Cast Lead in 2008/09.  
On the whole, the existence of an elite-level norm of philo-Zionism that continues to 
impact German foreign policy decisions cannot be questioned. This does not mean that offi-
cial pronouncements of special German-Israeli relations and a special responsibility for 
Israel’s security in all cases reflect a heartfelt commitment. The impact of rational liberal 
norm compliance is apparent e.g. where governing parties are more restrained in their criti-
cism of Israel than when they are in the opposition. Official foreign policy decisions from 
both the pre- and post-unification period show the influence of the philo-Zionist norm on 
German foreign policy – although the national interest, especially security concerns, also had 
a significant impact. 
The development of public opinion further confirms that philo-Zionism is an elite-
level but not a popular norm. Initially, support for Israel extended to the population at large, 
with the 1967 War marking the climax of popular support for, and sympathy with, Israel. Af-
ter 1967 and in light of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan 
Heights, and – until 1982 – the Sinai peninsula, as well as further Arab-Israeli wars German 
public opinion has become more critical of Israel. This phenomenon applies particularly to 
the extreme left and the extreme right. The latter has a long history of anti-Semitism and 
fascism, while the former developed a strong anti-Zionist current that was a response to the 
Israeli occupation and was crafted in “anti-imperialist” terms (Deligdisch, 1974). To an ex-
tent this phenomenon is mirrored on the left and in conservative circles more generally 
137 
(Berger D. , 2009). Psychological processes related to overcoming the German Nazi past, 
such as the notion that Israeli atrocities negate German guilt and are the basis for historical 
revisionism, have also played a role in the German public response to the 1982 Lebanon War 
and the 1987 Intifada. 
Elite level decision making today is described as rather isolated from, and immune to, 
public opinion (O Dochartaigh, 2007; Berger D. , 2009; German Diplomat 1, 2009). Philo-
Zionism as an elite level norm can therefore be expected to persist unless a cataclysmic 
shock occurs in German-Israeli relations. 
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Change or Continuity? 
The question of change and continuity in German foreign policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict after unification must be considered in the international political context 
and cannot disregard realist assumptions. Not only did the expansion of German territory and 
population increase the German power base; the erosion of the Cold War bipolar power 
structure also allowed greater foreign policy independence in Europe, where superpower al-
liance structures no longer constituted a constraint. The FRG in particular, after gaining full 
sovereignty with the Two-plus-Four Treaty, experienced unprecedented levels of foreign pol-
icy independence. 
Moreover, the international community started tackling new problems, in particular 
conflicts that had broken out after the Cold War. As international intervention in conflicts 
became common, external pressures on Germany increased: its allies, led by the U.S., re-
quested that Germany partake in multilateral military missions. This notion of increased ex-
pectations in and responsibilities for Germany in the post-Cold War world has been ac-
knowledged by politicians.108
The findings of this study make it possible to identify three phases in German foreign 
policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At first, while there was not so much an Israe-
 Meanwhile, the deployment of Bundeswehr troops outside the 
NATO area, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Lebanon, constituted a major break with the 
past. The debate over change and continuity in German foreign policy must take the changes 
in the structure of the international system and the resulting pressures on a united and fully 
sovereign Germany into account and cannot consider unification as an isolated event. 
                                                 
108 Chancellor Schroeder (SPD) and Stoiber (CSU) made statements to that effect in a Bundestag debate in April 
2002 (Bundestag, 233rd Session, 2002). Foreign minister Steinmeier also mentioned that Germany had become 
a welcome international partner at whom higher expectations were leveled (AA, 06/21/2009). 
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li-Palestinian as an Israeli-Arab conflict, Germany emotionally sided with Israel – although 
the political constellations caused by the Cold War permitted only “benevolent neutrality.” 
Foreign Office documents exhibit a clear pro-Israeli bias during the 1967 war, although for 
security-political reasons Germany upheld a neutral exterior. Economic factors and the 
Hallstein Doctrine further pushed the FRG towards neutrality and noninterference. The Pal-
estinian issue existed only in the form of a refugee issue, which was regarded in instrumental 
terms but received only marginal attention. 
The second phase, starting in the 1970s marked an increasing awareness of the Pales-
tinian issue: the EC was first in the west to acknowledge the plight of the Palestinian people 
and their right to self-determination. It is in this period that Germany developed its policy of 
evenhandedness, aided by a certain degree of foreign policy independence in light of a global 
east-west rapprochement (at least between Europe and the Soviet Union). The 1982 Lebanon 
war and the 1987 intifada were still marked by relative inaction, apart from declarations, on 
the part of Germany and the EC. A combination of the difficulty to get “Europe” to speak 
with one voice, the limitations of European power and other international crises capturing 
Europe’s attention were responsible for EC inactivity. The FRG appeared to follow a strategy 
of hiding behind EC decisions and declarations rather than getting involved and mediating 
between the conflict parties. Despite the doctrine of evenhandedness German advocacy on 
behalf on Israel in the EC was considerable: the FRG softened the language of statements 
and vetoed sanctions. Although the American influence on German and EC policy appears to 
have been marginal, it transpired that the EC could play only a complementary role to the 
U.S. in the Middle East. 
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This theme continued into the third, post-unification phase. When the Bush adminis-
tration withdrew from the conflict, the “peace process” stagnated throughout the Second Inti-
fada. Nevertheless, something had changed in the German conscience. Not least due to 
Joschka Fischer’s personal interest in the conflict the FRG started to pursue a more active 
foreign policy, although the Oslo Accords from 1993 were the primary enabling condition 
without which no substantial German involvement would have been possible. The end of the 
Cold War and regained sovereignty had further awarded the FRG unprecedented foreign pol-
icy independence. While still preferring to remain behind the scenes and rejecting a mediator 
role, Fischer’s shuttle diplomacy was effective at impacting symptoms of the conflict follow-
ing the 2000 Tel Aviv terrorist attack. His subsequent “Seven Point Plan,” from which the 
Roadmap developed, was a further indicator of an increased German willingness to be in-
volved in the peace process – while at the same it exemplified a commitment to multilateral-
ism and a welcoming of U.S. leadership. 
The Grand Coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign minis-
ter Frank-Walter Steinmeier continued in this tradition, although pursuing a more determi-
nedly regional approach. Germany was the driving force behind the revival of the Middle 
East Quartet and the return to the Roadmap, including the re-engagement of the U.S., ad-
vanced the inclusion of Arab states in the peace process, and hosted the Berlin Conference in 
Support of Palestinian Civil Security and The Rule of Law. Steinmeier moreover pursued a 
more active foreign policy in the EU, where he introduced two initiatives that resulted in the 
2007 EU Action Strategy on the Middle East and the five-point plan for the establishment of 
a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in early 2009. Finally, the FRG maintained 
its advocacy on behalf of Israel within the EU and thus slowly established itself as a three-
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fold mediator: between Israelis and Palestinians, between Israel and the EU and, now to a 
lesser extent, between the EU and the U.S. 
These three phases reflect not only a development in German policy but also the de-
velopment of the conflict itself: from an Arab-Israeli manifestation, via the withdrawal of 
Arab states and the recognition of Palestinian nationhood, to the recognition that, in the end, 
there needs to be a Palestinian state, living alongside the Jewish state of Israel. Paradoxically, 
German involvement reached unprecedented dimensions starting in 2000 while the peace 
process itself stalled after the failed Camp David Accords. A leading German diplomat as-
serts that following the Roadmap the unilateral and neoconservative U.S. involvement in the 
conflict produced no progress and no substantial negotiations (German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
The enabling condition for German involvement is therefore not so much the willingness of 
the Israelis and the Palestinians to talk to each other as it is the consolidation of the two-state 
solution into the accepted goal.  
 Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
Global context European inte-
gration 
German foreign policy 
Phase 1 
(1967) 
Arab-Israeli conflict 
Palestinian dimen-
sion eclipsed 
Cold War 
Clear alliance struc-
tures 
No foreign policy 
independence 
Loose European 
association in EEC 
No coherence or 
unity 
“Benevolent neutrality” 
Emphasis on non-
interference  
No attention to Palestin-
ians 
Phase 2 
(1982, 1987) 
Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict emerging 
PLO as major player 
East-west rap-
prochement, detente 
Some foreign policy 
independence 
Attempt at more 
cohesion and unity 
in EC 
Still with little 
power and influ-
ence globally 
Policy of evenhanded-
ness 
Declarations, overall 
inaction  
Recognition of Palestini-
an rights 
Phase 3 
(2000-2009) 
Two-state solution 
recognized as even-
tual goal post-Oslo 
Involved internation-
al community 
Post-Cold War 
Full foreign policy 
independence 
EU with (goal of) 
Common Foreign 
and Security Poli-
cy 
Active foreign policy 
Involved in multilateral 
settings (EU, Quartet) 
Palestinian state-
building 
Table 1: Phases in German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as they correspond with 
developments in Europe and the conflict itself 
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Finally, the three phases coincide with developments in Europe: from a loose associa-
tion of EEC states in 1967, via the movement towards a common position in the EC in the 
1980s, towards the official establishment (even if flawed and rudimentary) of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy as part of the Maastricht Treaty. A European factor is therefore 
very important, both in the form of European influences on German positions (transnational 
socialization and pressures) and in the sense that the concept of a unified EU had become a 
domestic norm and goal in the FRG. This also means, however, that Germany employed its 
power within the EU and shaped EU decisions according to its national interests and agenda. 
The major change from the pre- to the post-unification period, then, is a more active 
and involved German (and EU) policy that also no longer shies away from broaching contro-
versial issues and policies, such as Israeli settlement construction. German-Israeli relations 
have become so close and friendly that a new openness and frankness is possible. A signifi-
cant taboo was broken when during the Red-Green coalition period Germany for the first 
time supported UN resolutions criticizing Israel, at least as long as the language and criticism 
were perceived to be balanced. 
Continuity can be observed on three fronts. First, a commitment to Israel remains ap-
parent. Highly emotional and passionately conveyed by members of the Bundestag during 
the 1967 war, the responsibility for Israel’s security and its basis in the Shoah continue to be 
evoked to this day but usually without the pathos from the 1960s109
                                                 
109 Exceptions are speeches given before Jewish and Israeli audiences, such as Angela Merkel’s 2008 speech in 
the Knesset, or speeches commemorating Germany’s Nazi past. Merkel generally displays a heartfelt commit-
ment to the historically derived commitment for Israel’s security. 
, indicating the consolida-
tion of a norm of philo-Zionism. While no European foreign policy existed in 1967, Germany 
continued to advocate on behalf of Israel in the EC in the 1970s and 1980s as well as in the 
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EU from 2000-09, vetoing sanctions and moderating the language of statements and declara-
tions to soften criticism of Israel. When push comes to shove, Germany tends to prioritize its 
commitment to Israel over a common EU position. Thus, Germany tends to adopt Israeli se-
curity perceptions and reasserts Israel’s right to self-defense and protect its citizens from 
harm when other EU states criticize Israeli violations of human rights and international law, 
such as on the issue of the security barrier in the West Bank or during the 2008-09 Israeli-
Gaza conflict. Both Israeli and Palestinian diplomats identify continued German reticence 
when it comes to reprimanding Israel, although an open dialogue permitting constructive crit-
icism exists between Germany and Israel (Israeli Diplomat, 2009). The General Delegation 
of Palestine in Germany notes that Germany is “considerably more restrained” than France 
and the UK in criticizing “clear human rights violations” committed by Israel and is not as 
explicit and determined in the articulation of its demands on Israel (General Delegation of 
Palestine in the FRG, 2009). Germany was further instrumental in negotiating the EU-Israeli 
Association Agreement and in preventing its suspension in light of the Second Intifada. 
This pro-Israeli bias is complemented, second, by the official policy of evenhanded-
ness, which gradually developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the “legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people” were recognized in Germany and Europe. Although predominantly 
rhetorical in the 1980s, it manifested itself in the German commitment to Palestinian institu-
tion and state building, including tremendous financial contributions to the PA, and the Fu-
ture for Palestine project after unification and Oslo. The notion of Palestinian self-
determination had developed into the goal of Palestinian statehood by 1993. Rather than ac-
tual evenhandedness the German policy means support for the PA and checkbook diplomacy, 
while Germany continues to be sympathetic to Israeli security concerns and interests. Ger-
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many’s financial and institution building involvement is in fact supported by Israel, which 
recognized especially following Hamas’s election in 2006 that propping up the (fragile and 
corruption-ridden) PA and their representatives Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad was in 
its own interest. An actual act of balancing the commitment to the Israelis with that to the 
Palestinians, as identified in the literature review, did in that sense not occur: support for the 
Palestinians enriches and complements support for Israel. Germany aligns itself with EU 
(and Quartet) positions on settlement construction, East Jerusalem and the refugee issue, but 
on the EU continuum it continues to occupy the pro-Israeli pole. 
Third, a commitment to multilateralism, under U.S. leadership, figures strongly in 
Germany’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The desire for a unified European 
position was expressed as early as 1967, and European integration has progressed ever since. 
Limited to statements and declarations in the 1980s, European Middle East policy in the 
2000s was marked by an extensive financial involvement as well as institution building and 
soft security initiatives. As the European states streamlined their basic policies, Germany’s 
involvement in the EU increased. Both Joschka Fischer and Frank-Walter Steinmeier intro-
duced important initiatives that were adopted by the EU and the Quartet. Germany was in-
strumental in the creation and revival of the Roadmap and the Middle East Quartet, although 
neither produced significant improvements in the Middle East. Multilateralism is the only 
aspect of the civilian power model that Germany embraced with determination – although 
this commitment is more than a norm. The realization that neither Germany nor the EU (or 
any other individual state or institution) can bring peace to the Middle East was at least as 
important a factor in Germany’s commitment to multilateralism as were the ideas of multila-
teralism and European integration for their own sake. 
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Overall, the post-unification period has brought an intensification of the characteris-
tics of pre-unification German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unifi-
cation (foreign policy independence), global developments (the end of the Cold War) and 
developments in the conflict (mutual recognition of Israel and the PA and acceptance of a 
two-state solution as the end goal) have caused this development. Simultaneously, these de-
velopments, in conjunction with growing expectations on Germany, have impacted the ero-
sion of other elements of pre-unification foreign policy, notably the norm of anti-militarism. 
Conflicts between multilateralism and the commitment to conflict prevention on the one hand 
and anti-militarism on the other have eroded the latter and “ambiguated” the former. This 
finding is well in line with the consensus in the larger literature that in the pre-unification pe-
riod unambiguous norms yielded predictable prescriptions while post-unification conflicts 
between these norms have produced greater flexibility in their instrumentalization and the 
decisions they can justify. This process has resulted in the deployment of German troops in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germany’s deployment of troops to the UNIFIL mission in Leba-
non broke a further taboo: that German troops do not belong in the Middle East. Although a 
hypothetical German participation in a peacekeeping force between the Israelis and the Pales-
tinians is, for historical reasons, rejected by the majority of German politicians today, the de-
velopments of recent years suggest that this taboo too may soon be broken. 
Because the basic determinants and goals of German foreign policy have remained 
the same, despite these changes, I will borrow Sebastian Harnisch’s term “modified continui-
ty” (Harnisch, 2001, p. 38) to describe the development of German foreign policy towards 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pre- and post-unification. Continuity, and the prevalence of the 
pre-unification foreign policy tradition, has also been identified by several of my interview 
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partners (Berger D. , 2009; General Delegation of Palestine in the FRG, 2009; German 
Diplomat 1, 2009; German Diplomat 3, 2009). 
In assessing the impact of the independent variables on German foreign policy to-
wards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one needs to bear in mind that a certain discrepancy 
between official rhetoric and actual motivations is bound to exist. Identifying the determi-
nants of German foreign policy beyond a doubt based on official documents and public 
speeches is impossible. Access to classified Foreign Office documents is, at the time of writ-
ing, restricted for the period after 1978, and even the official documents consulted for the 
first case are the product of internal talks and negotiations whose documentation I had no 
access to. My conclusions therefore have to be taken with a grain of salt. At the same time, 
my interviews with German diplomats aimed to remedy at least part of this problem. 
The case studies suggest that the independent variable with the strongest impact on 
German foreign policy was the commitment to Israel. This commitment has both a normative 
and a more pragmatic dimension: a moral obligation derived from the Holocaust as well as 
the recognition that German-Israeli relations have material benefits for Germany and that 
Israel is the only reliable partner in the Middle East drive foreign policy decision making. 
Nevertheless, the weight of the moral dimension is apparent in Germany’s pro-Israeli record 
in the EU and in its unabated advocacy on behalf of Israel. In other words, Israel is no less a 
reliable partner for France and the UK, but their “unburdened foreign policy” (German 
Diplomat 1, 2009) results in different expectations, demands and attitudes. 
Secondary to the commitment to Israel, the national interest was a central determinant 
of German foreign policy in all case studies, although particularly so in 1967 and in the post-
unification period. In 1967, interestingly, philo-Zionism appeared to override economic in-
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terests, which would have called for a more pro-Arab positioning in and following the con-
flict. It was security concerns, however, that prevented the FRG from clearly taking sides in 
the conflict, although Bundestag debates and Foreign Office documents betray a clear pro-
Israeli bias. The Hallstein Doctrine too, prevented an official policy other than neutrality, al-
though de facto Germany practiced “benevolent neutrality.” In the aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., security interests were again high on the German 
and European agenda and were evoked by several politicians and officials. Rather than re-
sulting in perceivable foreign policy change, however, they appear to have offered additional 
motivation for a more active German involvement aimed at negotiating a political solution to 
the conflict. 
Of the civilian power norms a commitment to multilateralism was the most promi-
nent, although here the pragmatic realization that only a multilateral involvement can pro-
duce results in the Middle East weighed more heavily than the norm of multilateralism. In 
support of a constructivist reading is Joschka Fischer’s desire to act behind the scenes: al-
though Germany was instrumental in crafting the Roadmap, it did not want the limelight and 
desired U.S. leadership instead. The civilian power argument is further strengthened, and 
realism weakened, by the questions Germany asks in crafting its foreign policy: what can we 
achieve? (Voigt, 2009) or are we advancing things? (German Diplomat 3, 2009). France, by 
contrast, primarily cares about increasing its influence (Voigt, 2009). Anti-militarism can no 
longer be considered a norm in the 2000s, and a commitment to human rights, although in-
grained in Germany’s self-understanding, was subordinated to the commitment to Israel on 
various occasions.  
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Continuing integration into European institutions solidified a commitment to a com-
mon European position as a goal and norm in German foreign policy, which became apparent 
in my interviews with German diplomats. Politicians and scholars also exemplify this phe-
nomenon when they classify European integration and a common European foreign policy as 
a German national interest in its own right (see e.g. Groehe, Moosbauer, Perthes, & Sterzing, 
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The American influence on German foreign policy was inconsistent and dependent on 
the state of transatlantic relations as well as on the U.S. engagement in the conflict, although 
it was mentioned by several interview partners (Berger D. , 2009; Israeli Diplomat, 2009; 
Voigt, 2009). The FRG’s response to the 1967 war was, thanks to the Cold War, in line with 
the U.S. position, while the policy of east-west rapprochement in the 1980s allowed a more 
independent European foreign policy. Germany established itself as a mediator between the 
EC and the U.S. in this period. With the end of the Cold War Germany and the European 
). Conflict between the desire for a common European position and the commitment 
to Israel was most obvious and openly acknowledged by politicians in the 1980s. The FRG’s 
aligning with EC and EU statements and declarations and similarities in rhetoric further sug-
gest a considerable European influence on German policies. It can further be assumed that 
EU positions influenced German support for resolutions criticizing Israel. The reverse is also 
true, however, considering that Germany is a major player in the EU and its predecessors. On 
several occasions, the FRG has been found to have prevented sanctions or softened language 
perceived to be too critical of Israel. Differences between German, French and UK foreign 
policy and the disjointed response to the 2008-09 Israeli-Gaza conflict further indicate the 
limitations of the European factor. 
                                                 
110 Groehe is a member of CDU/CSU, Moosbauer of SPD and Sterzing of the Green Party. Perthes is a scholar. 
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states gained unprecedented levels of foreign policy independence. EU involvement funda-
mentally increased following the 1993 Oslo Accords, although primarily in economic and 
financial terms. In political terms it increasingly diverged from the U.S. during the years of 
the Bush administration, despite official statements to the contrary and publicly declared 
commitments to the Roadmap and the Quartet. The increased German and European com-
mitment did not translate into substantial developments in the conflict, demonstrating the li-
mitations of EU power and the necessity for a devoted U.S. involvement, although no outside 
actor can dictate peace in the Middle East. On the whole, rather than directly impacting Ger-
man foreign policy it seems that the state of U.S. involvement in the conflict and of transat-
lantic relations acts as an enabling or obstructing factor for the success of German and EU 
involvement. 
At the outset of this study my hypothesis was that historical narratives pertaining to 
the Shoah and the Third Reich caused the emergence of a norm of philo-Zionism at the elite 
level in the aftermath of World War II, which continues to inform German foreign policy to-
wards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after unification. Foreign policy continuity 
was expected both in terms of a pro-Israeli bias and in terms of a cautious involvement. The 
hypothesis can be confirmed, although the German involvement has became a lot more active 
over the last decade and is not, in terms of caution and restraint, comparable to the involve-
ment in the 1980s. 
The norm of philo-Zionism has been the primary cause of the modified continuity in 
German foreign policy making and influenced Germany’s policy towards the conflict as well 
as in the EU, which lends support to constructivism. The cross-party acceptance of a com-
mitment to Israel as part of Germany’s raison d’état illustrates this point in the sphere of do-
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mestic politics. Rational liberalism has some explanatory power as well because the norm of 
philo-Zionism also has a more pragmatic dimension that regards Israel as a viable partner and 
bilateral relations as benefiting the national interest (especially economically and scientifical-
ly). This dimension has become a lot more prominent since unification, although the histori-
cally-derived moral dimension remains dominant. 
Unification did not produce a major change in German foreign policy and certainly 
no power- or influence-maximizing policy as a consequence of the expansion of Germany’s 
power base. Although German foreign policy did become more active, it also became increa-
singly embedded in multilateral institutions. In the case of the Roadmap for Peace and the 
Middle East Quartet Germany actually became actively involved in creating new multilateral 
frameworks. On the issue of multilateralism, a rational liberal approach has more explanatory 
power than constructivism: the realization that only a concerted international effort can pro-
duce change was the core motivating force for the strong commitment to multilateralism. Eu-
rope’s inability to impact matters of war and peace in the Middle East sparked the desire for 
a unified position as early as 1967, while in the 2000s the Roadmap and the Quartet were the 
logical consequences of the lessons learned from past failed peace initiatives. Nevertheless, 
Germany’s desire to play a role behind the scenes, my interviews with German diplomats as 
well as statements by politicians convey the impression that a commitment to multilateralism 
and European integration has become a norm in and of itself as well. One diplomat also 
evoked another rational liberal argument: that Germany takes special care to articulate its 
policy in European rather than in national interest terms because its European partners con-
tinue to evaluate Germany’s behavior against its past (German Diplomat 1, 2009). 
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Realism can be discounted, although unification and the end of the Cold War (in con-
junction with developments in the conflict) certainly acted as an enabling condition for a 
more involved German foreign policy. That this foreign policy by and large continued in the 
pre-unification tradition lends support to constructivism and the salience of norms, however. 
Constructivism explains the modified continuity and the content of German foreign policy 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict best, whereas contingent realism merely offers clues 
as to the amount of power Germany could – and did – exercise pre- and post-unification. Ra-
tional liberalism also has explanatory power and comes into play in the cases of multilateral-
ism and, to a lesser extent, the philo-Zionist norm. While the norm of philo-Zionism had the 
greatest impact on German foreign policy, an adherence to the logic of appropriateness that 
undergirds the civilian power model can, in light of the predominantly instrumental view of 
multilateralism and the poor performance of human rights and anti-militarism as determi-
nants of German foreign policy, not be confirmed. The civilian power model appears to have 
had little applicability to German foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; sole-
ly the desire to produce results rather than increasing German influence and a normative ele-
ment when it comes to multilateralism support the civilian power assumption. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis attempted to answer the following research question: is the consensus in 
the literature on German foreign policy continuity after unification applicable to German for-
eign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? My hypothesis was that historical narra-
tives pertaining to the Shoah and the Third Reich caused the emergence of a norm of philo-
Zionism at the elite level in the aftermath of World War II, which continued to inform Ger-
man foreign policy towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after unification. In line 
with constructivism, continuity was expected in terms of a pro-Israeli bias as well as in a cau-
tious involvement, while I expected to disprove realist predictions of foreign policy change 
and growing German unilateralism. Rational liberalism explanations for foreign policy deci-
sion making based on cost-benefit analyses were considered as alternatives to constructivist 
interpretations. The study’s dependent variable was German foreign policy towards the Israe-
li-Palestinian conflict and the independent variables were a norm of philo-Zionism, norms 
derived from the civilian power model, security and economic interests, the impact of the 
U.S., and European integration. 
In order to test my hypothesis and evaluate the competing theories and paradigms I 
employed the qualitative method, using secondary literature as well as primary documents 
and interviews as empirical evidence. The five cases analyzed were the 1967 War, the 1982 
Lebanon War and the First Intifada in 1987 in the pre-unification period as well as the Red-
Green Coalition years starting with the Second Intifada in 2000 and the Grand Coalition 
Years (2005-2009). Although this study employed an interpretative case study, comparative 
insights from EU, UK and French Middle East policy were used to highlight the uniqueness 
of German foreign policy. 
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The study produced support for my hypothesis, although the post-unification in-
volvement is not comparable to the cautious engagement in the 1980s, and I could answer my 
research question in the affirmative: German foreign policy was characterized by “modified 
continuity,” with the norm of philo-Zionism being the primary independent variable. The 
other variables largely impacted nuances of German foreign policy making. Thus, security 
interests explained the German interest in the conflict in the 2000s but did not considerably 
impact the content of foreign policy except in 1967. European integration produced an 
alignment with European statements and positions, but Germany still deviated from the EU 
mean on several occasions and impacted EU policies. U.S. policies did not, apart from 1967, 
appear to have had a major impact on the content of German foreign policy. Rather, the state 
of transatlantic relations and of U.S. involvement in the conflict undermined or increased the 
impact of German and European efforts. Economic interests tended to be overshadowed by 
the philo-Zionist norm. 
The civilian power model, central to the constructivist continuity thesis, performed 
poorly as an independent variable. Solely the commitment to multilateralism was a strong 
tenet of German Middle East policy but was predominantly a consequence of the realization 
that only a concerted international effort can produce advancements in the peace process. The 
norm of anti-militarism appears to have eroded considerably by 2009, being embraced only 
by the Left, while the commitment to human rights tended to be subordinated to the philo-
Zionist norm. 
Contribution to the Literature, Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
This thesis contributes to the literature in that it applies the change and continuity 
framework to an area of German foreign policy that is not commonly addressed by scholars. 
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My findings suggest a possible reason: in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Germany’s com-
mitment to Israel undermines the civilian power status that is so central to the continuity the-
sis. Not addressing German Middle East policy because of this circumstance has been a ma-
jor oversight, however. The findings of my study indicate that norm-consistent foreign policy 
pre- and post-unification occurred also in the area of Middle East policy and that constructiv-
ism explains foreign policy continuity, although rational liberalism has some explanatory 
power as well. Besides supporting the usefulness of constructivism and strengthening the ar-
gument that Germany “confounds neorealism” (Duffield, 1999), my study also identifies the 
limitations of the civilian power framework. 
The limited scope of the primary documents I reviewed, the fact that I did not have 
access to classified Foreign Office documents after 1978 and that it is generally difficult to 
determine motivations for action based on rhetoric mean that my findings have to be treated 
with caution. These deficiencies were somewhat offset by the analysis of five different cases 
spread out from the 1960s to the 2000s and encompassing the greatest benchmarks in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as by my interviews. Nevertheless, the major drawback of 
an interpretative case study like the one employed here is that it sheds light only on the case 
under investigation without contributing to theory development. That I employed six va-
riables further decreased the theory-developing worth of my study. Future research could 
therefore more explicitly compare German Middle East policy to that of other states. 
For example, I used comparative insights from France and the UK only sparsely and 
to illustrate discrepancies between Germany and the other two major players in the UK, 
comparable among many other dimensions and in terms of economic and political power. A 
replication of my study that employs a full comparative analysis may shed further light on 
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the uniqueness of German foreign policy and may illuminate in how far the determinants of 
foreign policy differ between the FRG, France and the UK. A comparative analysis of party 
programs and parliamentary debates might also illustrate differences in the sphere of domes-
tic politics and may further illuminate the uniqueness of the norm of philo-Zionism in Ger-
many, including the socialization of leftist parties into this norm. Moreover, my study fo-
cused on German rhetoric in national settings (at the federal level) only. It would be interest-
ing for future research to analyze whether rhetoric changes in the European context, e.g. in 
debates in the European Parliament or the Council of the European Union, and in the UN 
context, and what implications this has for the conclusions I have drawn in this study. 
Finally, future research could contrast German foreign policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict with that towards other ethnic conflicts to investigate whether the civilian 
power model has greater applicability in cases where no “special relationship” with one of 
the parties exists. 
Future Outlook and Policy Implications 
A certain incongruity exists between the statements of diplomats and politicians and 
reality. The contention that Germany finds itself in the European mainstream when it comes 
to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (German Diplomat 2, 2009) and coor-
dinates its policy with the EU (German Diplomat 1, 2009) cannot be confirmed. Fischer and 
Schroeder certainly pursued a more active Middle East policy, both in the region and in the 
EU, but in times of political tension Germany tended to side with Israel. The evidence ex-
amined in this study shows that in its rhetoric, its arms shipment policies and its voting pat-
terns at the EU and the UN Germany must in fact be located at the pro-Israeli end of an (ad-
mittedly not too broad) EU continuum. Germany continues to advocate on behalf of Israel in 
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the EU, and there should be little doubt that Israel calls Germany one of its best friends and 
its second most important partner for a reason. Nevertheless, the interviews with German 
diplomats indicate the existence of a strong commitment to Europe and to the CFSP. In con-
junction with the insistence on German evenhandedness and mainstream positions this could 
indicate that further integration into the CFSP would indeed cause a Europeanization of 
German foreign policy in which the “history factor” would be delegated to the backburner. 
Such a scenario is, however, unlikely considering that a true CFSP is out of reach. 
The December 1, 2009 entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the office of 
the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy cannot gloss over the 
fact that, when push comes to shove, EU states prioritize national interests and policies over 
EU interests and policies. Germany, as my case studies show, is no exception to this rule, 
even if a furthering of the CFSP is asserted by diplomats to be in the national interest 
(German Diplomat 1, 2009). The more likely scenario, therefore, is one in which Germany 
exercises its power in the EU more assertively – in the spirit of a common European identity, 
while subject to its particular historical legacies and national interests. Hence, the occasional 
trumping of loyalty to Israel over a common EU position should be expected to persist in the 
future as well. 
A more active and assertive German role in the EU would be advisable also from a 
policy perspective in light of Germany’s positive reputation among the Israelis, the Palestini-
ans and the Arabs more generally. The FRG can further use its good relations with France 
and the U.S. to bridge EU-Israel and EU-U.S. divides. A true “Europeanization” of German 
foreign policy, on the other hand, would further decrease Israel’s appreciation for EU in-
volvement. 
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An overly optimistic view must be discouraged, however. As the case studies show, 
European involvement can have a positive impact on the peace process only when the U.S. is 
engaged in the region and willing to work with – rather than against or without – the EU as 
well as with regional actors. The EU’s military weakness is a further disadvantage. This 
leaves a strong economic role, which the EU has exercised since the Oslo Accords already, 
as well as smaller but more intensive political and diplomatic initiatives that complement 
U.S. efforts. That the PA desires a stronger European involvement in the conflict and has 
stronger faith in the EU than in the U.S. on some issues is an important asset in this regard. 
Germany in particular can use its unique position in the Middle East for mediation and dip-
lomatic initiatives and should exhibit more self-confidence, both in the EU and in the Middle 
East itself. That Israel has on several occasions requested German involvement or mediation 
in the conflict indicates also that at least some of the restraint Germany exercises in the Mid-
dle East is not only self-imposed but also not desired by its partners. 
At the same time, developments in recent years have highlighted the importance of 
including regional actors in the peace process. Not only do the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-
Lebanese conflicts need to be resolved; but it transpired that other Middle Eastern or Medi-
terranean states can assume important mediator roles, like Turkey did between Israel and Sy-
ria and Egypt did between Israel and Hamas in negotiating a ceasefire and between Hamas 
and Fatah on the issue of national reconciliation. 
Although the international community cannot dictate peace in the Middle East, it has 
an important role to play in introducing initiatives to the Israelis and the Palestinians. The 
centrality of U.S. leadership is beyond question, and German and EU efforts must comple-
ment U.S. efforts. That does not mean, however, that the EU should content itself with an 
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exclusively financial and economic role while leaving the political sphere to the U.S. Rather, 
Germany and the EU should more self-confidently present suggestions and alternatives to the 
U.S. administration and by so doing be involved in the crafting of peace plans and approach-
es rather than just in the implementation process.  
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Appendix 
Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) German intelligence service 
Bundestag German parliament (lower house) 
Bundeswehr German army 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU) 
EC European Community, 1967-1993 
EEC European Economic Community, 1957-1967 
EU European Union, since 1993 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
IDF Israeli Defense Forces 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PA Palestinian Authority 
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
PNC Palestine National Council  
UN United Nations 
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
U.S. United States of America 
Important Dates and Events 
May 23, 1949 Founding of the FRG 
October 7, 1949 Founding of the GDR 
September 10, 1952 Reparations Agreement between the FRG and Israel and the Jewish Claims 
Conference (Luxembourg Agreement), ratified 1953 
May 12, 1965 Establishment of German-Israeli diplomatic relations 
November 9, 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall 
October 3, 1990 German Unification 
Timeline of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Major Events) 
May 14, 1948 Creation of the State of Israel 
1948-49 First Arab-Israeli War 
June 1967 Six Day War/June War; ended with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip com-
ing under Israeli occupation 
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October 1973 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
1982 First Lebanon War 
1987-1991 First Intifada (Palestinian uprising) 
1993 Oslo Peace Accords, mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO 
September 2000-? Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) 
2002 Start of the construction of the Israeli security fence 
2003 Road Map for Peace by the Quartet (UN, U.S., EU, Russia) 
2005 Evacuation of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip 
2006 Second Lebanon War 
June, 2007 Hamas takes control of the Gaza Strip and ends unity government with Fa-
tah after only four months 
November, 2007 Annapolis Negotiations 
December 2008 – 
January 2009 
Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead) 
German Parties 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christian Demo-
cratic Union of Germany 
CSU Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern, Christian Social Union of 
Bavaria 
Die Linke The Left 
Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen Green Party 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei, Free Democratic Party 
NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, National Democrat-
ic Party of Germany 
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, Party of Democratic 
Socalism, predecessor of Die Linke 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic 
Party of Germany 
German Governments in Brief 
Case 1: 1967 War 
1966-1969 Government: CDU/CSU and SPD 
Opposition: FDP 
Chancellor: Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) 
Foreign Minister: Willy Brandt (SPD) 
1969-1972 Government: SPD and FDP 
Opposition: CDU/CSU 
Chancellor: Willy Brandt (SPD) 
Foreign Minister: Walter Scheel (FDP) 
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Case 2: 1982 Lebanon War 
1980-09/1982 Government: SPD and FDP 
Opposition: CDU/CSU 
Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt (SPD) 
Foreign Minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) 
1982-1983 
1983-1987 
Government: CDU/CSU and FDP 
Opposition: SPD 
Chancellor: Helmut Kohl (CDU) 
Foreign Minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) 
Case 3: First Intifada (1987-1991) 
1987-1991 Government: CDU/CSU and FDP 
Opposition: SPD, Green Party 
Chancellor: Helmut Kohl (CDU) 
Foreign Minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) 
Case 4: Red-Green Coalition (2000-2005) 
1998-2002 Government: SPD, Green Party 
Opposition: CDU/CSU, FDP, PDS 
Chancellor: Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) 
Foreign Minister: Joschka Fischer (Green Party) 
2002-2005 Government: SPD, Green Party 
Opposition: CDU/CSU, FDP, 2 PDS politicians 
Chancellor: Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) 
Foreign Minister: Joschka Fischer (Green Party) 
Case 5: Great Coalition (2005-2009) 
2005-2009 Government: CDU/CSU, SPD 
Opposition: Green Party, FDP, The Left 
Chancellor: Angela Merkel (CDU) 
Foreign Minister: Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) 
 
 
